To Alexander Bain.

John Stuart MillAlexander Bain

and as it is a long time since I either wrote to you or heard from you…

7 · I · 1863Blackheath ParkPrinted pp. 271–274

To Alexander Bain.

1863
—
Aetat. 56.

Dear Bain,—I have been here now for about a month,

and as it is a long time since I either wrote to you or heard from you, I think it is time to send you a bulletin from myself and to ask for one from you.

I have done a good deal of work on Hamilton at Avignon and some here, though in both places I have had, and shall have for some time longer, exceptional occupation which makes me rather slow in getting on! My plan has been to go deliberately through the whole writings of Hamilton, writing down in the form of notes the substance of what I as yet find to say on each point. This will make it comparatively easy to write the book when I have finished the preparatory work. The only point which I have yet developed at any length is the formation of the idea of externality, and consequently of matter, and this, I think, I have brought out more fully and clearly than had ever been done before, though my theory does not differ essentially from yours or from Grote's, as indeed from our premisses there can be but one theory. But I have grappled with the details of the subject in a manner which I have nowhere yet seen. I mean in this book to do what the nature and scope of the "Logic" forbade me to do there, to face the ultimate metaphysical difficulties of every question on which I touch.

By the way, is it not surprising that Hamilton should have believed, and made the world believe, that he held the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge? As told

[p. 272]

1863
—
Aetat. 56.

by him the doctrine is little better than a play upon the word knowledge, since he maintains that a great mass of Belief, differing from Knowledge in the mode, but not in the certainty of conviction, may philosophically and ought morally to be entertained respecting the attributes of the Unknowable. Nor is even this all, for he does not hold to the doctrine of unknowability even in his own book; but thinks that the primary qualities of matter are given in Consciousness as attributes of Things in Themselves. I used to wonder at the catena of authorities he brought to prove that almost all philosophers have thought as he did; but I ought to have known that he was more likely to be right in his erudition than in his philosophy, and I now find him so, for his own doctrine amounts to no more than what was thought by the writers whom he quotes. His speculations on the point seem to me of no philosophic value except as refutations of Schelling and Hegel, while the use they can be practically put to is shown in Mansel's detestable, to me absolutely loathsome book. We are taught there, from Hamilton's premisses, that as we cannot know what God is in himself, nothing that we are told concerning him is in the smallest degree incredible because it is monstrous to the human reason or conscience; and that because we cannot know what Absolute Goodness is, we are at liberty, and in some cases are bound, to believe that it is not the perfection of human goodness, but the direct contrary of it. It is true that these conclusions are very illogically drawn from Hamilton's and Mansel's own premisses, these being, that we do not know God as he is in himself, but know him as we do other things, in his relation to us—in other words, phenomenally; which places him in exactly the same category, as an object of thought, with our human fellow-creatures, and with Matter; which also we do not know as they are in themselves. God, in part, is a subject of knowledge in so far as thinkable at all, namely as a subject of phenomenal experience, and as such is amenable to the canons of phenomenal credibility; and if any proposition concerning Man and Matter may and ought to be rejected because it

[p. 273]

1863
—
Aetat. 56.

violates those canons, so for the same reason may any proposition concerning God.

Having been so much disappointed by Hamilton's conception of the relativity of human knowledge, I should like to look again at Ferrier to see if his is any better. I think you have my copy of the “Institutes of Metaphysic”; if so, and if you are not at present reading it, I should be obliged by your sending it, but this need not be done for the next two or three weeks, for I have enough in hand to occupy me during that time.

In Herbert Spencer's “First Principles” I do find a much better conception of the doctrine of relativity, though if he holds to it in its proper sense he must give up much which he has said in his “Principles of Psychology.” The book is a remarkable one in many respects, and its wide-reaching systematisation of so many heterogeneous elements is very imposing. But was there ever so strange a notion (for a man who sees so much) as that the doctrine of the Conservation of Force is à priori and a law of Consciousness? He expresses himself almost as if he thought that there is no objective standard of truth at all, which is in one sense true, but not in the obvious sense; inasmuch as each person's phenomenal experience is to have a standard relatively objective, and the correction of error consists to each mind in bringing its ideas and their relations into clearer accordance with what are, or would be in the given circumstances, its sensations or impressions and their relations. Of course Grote meant nothing at variance with all this, but the omission to state it explicitly seems to me both an imperfection in the theory and a great stumbling-block to its reception; and, on my pointing it out, he at once said that he would supply the defect.

We have just returned from a visit to Grote, during which I had an opportunity of reading some of his MS. I chose the “Theœtetus” as falling in with the subject of my present thoughts, and I was delighted to find how good it is. He has triumphed wonderfully over the difficulty of rendering the thoughts or semi-thoughts of Plato, and of

[p. 274]

1863
—
Aetat. 56.

those on whom Plato commented, with the language of modern philosophy ; the view of Plato himself which goes through it will, I think, be recognised as original and striking ; and his own thoughts on the matters discussed are good and well stated. I find, however, an oversight which you also must have perceived in reading it, viz., that his mode of defending the Protagorean maxim is very open to misconception.

Choose any passage to light it on the printed page.

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About this letter

Letter 143 of 165 · printed pp. 271–274 · scan leaf 333 of 378

Where it sits in the book: black are letters, grey the editor’s narrative, pale the front matter, appendices and index.

Source
The Letters of John Stuart Mill, Vol. I, edited, with an Introduction, by Hugh S. R. Elliot, 1910, pp. 271–274.
How it was read
Read by machine. Not yet proofread by people. Expect occasional slips in names, accents and foreign words. The book’s reading score is 100 out of 100. How this text was read
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CitationJohn Stuart Mill to Alexander Bain, 7 January 1863, “To Alexander Bain.”. In The Letters of John Stuart Mill, Vol. I, edited, with an Introduction, by Hugh S. R. Elliot (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1910), pp. 271–274. Paper Lanterns edition, https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/mill-letters-vol1-1910/143/.

BibTeX@incollection{mill-letters-vol1-1910-letter-0143,
  author    = {John Stuart Mill},
  title     = {To Alexander Bain., 7 January 1863},
  booktitle = {The Letters of John Stuart Mill, Vol. I},
  publisher = {London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1910},
  year      = {1910},
  pages     = {271--274},
  note      = {Edited, with an Introduction, by Hugh S. R. Elliot. Paper Lanterns edition},
  url       = {https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/mill-letters-vol1-1910/143/}
}

Linkhttps://paperlanterns.ink/collections/mill-letters-vol1-1910/143/

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