To Samuel Bailey, · on his books, “On the Received Text of Shakespeare,” and “Letters on the Philosophy of the Mind.”
The new volume of your Letters is, I think, at least equal to either of its predecessors.
To Samuel Bailey, on his books, “On the Received Text of Shakespeare,” and “Letters on the Philosophy of the Mind.”
Blackheath Park, 21st January 1863.
Dear Sir,—Allow me to thank you very sincerely for the gift of your last two works. The one on Shakespeare was very pleasant reading, and many of the conjectural emendations seemed to me happy, while in other cases I fancied that a good deal might be said for the received text. But it is almost an impertinence in me to make any observations on a subject on which my opinion is so little worth consideration.
The new volume of your Letters is, I think, at least equal to either of its predecessors. Like everything I have read of yours, it is both instructive and interesting ; and if, as might be expected on such a subject, I sometimes differ from you, it is always as from a thinker, and from one whose canons of thought are not fundamentally different from my own. You may probably anticipate what are our principal points of difference. I am not able to see how it is possible that the mind should directly perceive that one event produces another, or how the idea of producing could be suggested without repeated experience of the sequence of one event upon the other. Neither can I see how a fact can be known to be necessary by direct perception, or how necessity can be in any way a direct subject of human apprehension. Apart from these points, and minor ones connected with them, I agree with you in essentials on
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almost all the topics discussed. In several instances you have done, and done well, what I have been long wishing to see done. This is particularly true of your remarks on Comte's depreciation of psychology; and on the improper assimilation, by Comte and others, of physical to moral laws, an assimilation dictated by their desire to attach the idea of religious obligation to the prudential regard for the warnings of physical science.
In the discussion on Personal Identity you have (I think for the very first time) chosen the right starting-point for the inquiry by considering first what makes me the same person to the apprehension of others, while psychologists have usually started from the far more complex question, what makes me the same person to my own apprehension. You have, in fact, commenced the examination of personal identity by considering what it is which constitutes identity in the other and simpler cases in which it is predicated; and by thus for the first time applying to the question the only philosophical method of investigation, you have, as might be expected, arrived at much better results.
On the subject of Language I of course agree in your principal thesis. The origin and history of a word are not the appropriate evidence of its present meaning. But have you not a little underrated the worth of this kind of knowledge in its bearing on the great questions of metaphysics? The most keenly contested questions in psychology are those which relate to the origin of certain of our mental notions; is not light often thrown on this by the origin of the corresponding words? A certain school of psychologists are always contending that such and such notions must be part of the original furniture of the mind, on the ground that there have always been names for them; and we know how strong is the tendency to suppose that whatever has got a name, has a real existence, not as a particular mode of contemplating things which when looked at for other purposes are known by other names, but as an independent entity. It seems to me very pertinent, in opposition to this notion, to show (if it can be shown) that, for instance, all abstract names were originally
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concrete, and that all the more general words of relation were once nouns or verbs. The part of your book which treats of Moral Sentiments I value even more than all the rest. Several important points of what we agree in holding as the true theory I have not seen so well brought out anywhere else. I am the more interested by what you have done because I have myself been led into a very similar vein of thought, and have published it in a series of three papers which, unless you are a habitual reader of Fraser's Magazine, you are not likely to have heard of. If I reprint them separately, as I am thinking of doing, I will beg your acceptance of a copy. In the last of these papers (December 1861) I derive most of the peculiar characters of the moral sentiment from the element of vindictiveness which enters into it. Our modes of developing the idea are different but not conflicting.
Choose any passage to light it on the printed page.


