To Lord Hobart, · acknowledging his “Remarks on the Law of Partnership Liability.”
pamphlet on the Law of Partnership.
To Lord Hobart,
acknowledging his “Remarks on the Law of Partnership Liability.”
Blackheath, 7th August [1853?].
My Lord,—Allow me to thank you for a copy of your
pamphlet on the Law of Partnership. Such subjects are not often discussed with so much closeness of reasoning and precision of expression; and it is still more rare to find the question of justice separated from that of expediency and made paramount to it. I prefer to say “justice” rather than, in your words, “natural justice,” both because Nature is often grossly unjust, and because I do not think that the first spontaneous sentiment of justice always agrees with that which is the result of enlightened reflection.
As you do me the honour to ask my opinion of your argument, I think that much of it is sound, and conclusively stated. But you have not convinced me that
[p. 177]1853
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Aetat. 47.
either justice or expediency requires the unlimited liability of all who take part in the management, or in other words, that there ought to be no compagnies anonymes. Justice, it appears to me, is fully satisfied if those who become creditors of the partnership know beforehand that they will have no claim beyond the amount of the subscribed capital. The points of additional information mentioned in pages 5 and 7, and which you say cannot be possessed by the public, do not seem to me required in justice even if they were in point of expediency. Volenti non fit injuria: if a person chooses to lend either to an individual or a company, knowing that the borrowers only pledge a certain sum and not their whole property for the debt, I cannot see that there is any injustice done merely because the lender cannot watch that certain sum and know at all times where it is and what is being done with it. I differ from you also, though with somewhat less confidence, on the question of expediency. I do not doubt that the unlimited liability of railway directors would be some additional security for prudent management, but the additional security would, I think, be too dearly purchased by the abrogation of all power in the shareholders to control the directors or to change them. The publicity afforded by the periodical meetings of shareholders, and by the necessity of laying before them the entire state of the concern and their power of verifying the statements, seems to me a far greater protection to the public as well as to shareholders than the liability of the directors to the full extent of their property, especially considering how imperfect a check to rash speculation this is in private transactions.
Choose any passage to light it on the printed page.

