To Arthur Gore,
I have received many letters which, like yours…
To Arthur Gore,
who had written to Mill, criticising his definition of “cause” in the “Logic.”
February 1854.
Sir,—I am glad that my book should have afforded you any of the pleasure and benefit which you do me the honour to tell me you have derived from it.
I have received many letters which, like yours, ask me to explain or define particular passages of the “Logic.” I am not sorry to receive them, as they are a sign that the book has been read in the manner which all thinkers must desire for their writings—that it has stirred up thought in the mind of the reader. But my occupations compel me to beg my correspondents to be satisfied with a more summary explanation of the opinions they dissent from, than I can generally venture to hope will remove their difficulties.
It seems to me that there is a fundamental difference between the case of the rust and that of the motion of a projectile. In the case of the rust, the original cause of
[p. 179]1854
—
Aetat. 47.
its existence, even if a thousand years ago, may be said to be the proximate cause, since, as there has been no intermediate change of any sort, there is no cause more proximate than it. You may say, there is the existence of the rust itself during the intermediate time. I answer, the rust all through the thousand years is one and the same fact, therefore we do not say that it causes itself; but the motion (though, as you say, it may be the same, qua motion) is, taken in its ensemble, a different fact, since it is eventually constituted by a different phenomenon, viz., the body in one place instead of the same body in another place. The argument is still stronger when the motion is not even the same, qua motion; when, besides the difference in the fact itself, there has also intervened the action of a new cause, a deflecting force or a resisting medium. The concurrence of forces at each successive instant is then a cause evidently more proximate to the effect of the next instant than the original impulse, which, therefore, can only be called the remote cause.
Our difference is more one of expression than of fact. It seems to me that when there is a change of any sort at that precise point, we ought to say that a fresh causation commences. It is only when things remain exactly as the original cause left them, that the original can be also termed the proximate cause of their state.
Choose any passage to light it on the printed page.

