LETTER I. · ON THE DISPUTES OF THE SORBONNE.
We have been imposed upon.
LETTER I.
ON THE DISPUTES OF THE SORBONNE.
Sir,
Paris, Jan. 23, 1656.
We have been imposed upon. It was only yesterday that I was undeceived. Up to that time I had entertained the belief that the disputes in the Sorbonne were upon matters of importance; and especially so to the interests of religion. So many meetings of a body of such celebrity as the Faculty of Theology of Paris, and in which matters of such extraordinary—such unexampled moment had been discussed, led, unavoidably, to the belief, that the subjects under deliberation were of the most vital nature. You will be surprised, then, to learn, by the account I am about to give you,—and on the best information,—what has been the insignificant result of such large preparations.
Two questions were discussed; the one of circumstance, the other of principle—the facts, and the merits, of the case.
The question of fact was, whether M. Arnauld had
[p. 2]been guilty of indiscretion in stating in his second letter, “that he had carefully read Jansenius’ book, and had not been able to discover in it the propositions condemned by the late Pope; and yet, being himself opposed to those propositions, wherever they might be found, he was ready to condemn them in Jansenius, provided they were really contained in his work.”
The point then raised was, whether he was justified in declaring his doubts that these propositions were to be found in Jansenius, after the reverend the Bishops had asserted that they were in the book?
This question was laid before the Sorbonne. Seventy-one doctors undertook his defence; and maintained that he was not bound to make any other reply than the one he did make to those who had, in such various publications, demanded of him, whether he maintained these propositions to be in the book, unless he had actually seen them there; while at the same time, he professed to condemn them, if they should be proved to be in the work in question.
Some of them even (a little in advance of their brethren) declared, “that after the strictest search, they could find nothing of the kind in the work; but on the contrary, had discovered sentiments quite opposed to the propositions.” After this, they categorically demanded that, if any of the learned doctors had themselves seen them, they should point them out—a thing so easy as not to admit of a justifiable refusal; and the most effectual way to silence all the others, and even M. Arnauld himself. This however was uniformly refused. You have now the summary of all that passed upon this point.
[p. 3]On the other hand, there were twenty-four of the Secular, and about forty-six of the Regular Doctors, who condemned M. Arnauld's propositions; without however, examining whether they were true or false; but stating that the question with them was, not as to their truth, but only as to the temerity of the author in propounding them.
There were fifteen others, not in favor of the censure; and who are termed neutrals.
This is the way, then, in which the question of the fact has been settled, about which I do not give myself much concern. Whether M. Arnauld had been rash or not, is no point of conscience with me. And, if curiosity should lead me to enquire, whether these propositions be really to be found in Jansenius, his book is neither so scarce nor so voluminous, but that I may be able to search through the whole of it, without consulting the Sorbonne.
But if I were not apprehensive myself, of appearing indiscreet, I should be of the same mind as most of those around me; who, although hitherto impressed with the belief, that these propositions were to be found in Jansenius, begin now to suspect the contrary, from the strange refusal on the part of his accusers, of all proof to that effect; for never have I yet found any one who could tell me that they had actually seen them there. On this account I fear that this censure will prove to have done more harm than good; and may convey to those unacquainted with its origin, an impression quite opposed to the general conclusion. In truth, people are becoming suspicious, and will believe nothing but what they have really seen.
[p. 4]But, as I have said already, this point is of little importance, since it has nothing to do with any question of faith.
As to the question of principle (the merits of the case) that seemed much more important, inasmuch as it might involve one of faith. On this account, I have taken especial pains to inform myself upon the matter; but you will be much pleased to learn, that this also is as insignificant as the preceding.
The question arose as to what M. Arnauld had said in the same letter, viz. “that Grace, without which man can do nothing, had failed in Peter, at the period of his fall.” You and I had both supposed that the question was as to the great principle of grace, whether it had been conferred upon all men, or, at least, whether it is efficacious in all: but we were mistaken. I have speedily become a great theologian; and you shall now see a proof of my proficiency.
In order to get at the truth, I procured an interview with M. N——, a Navarrese doctor, and my near neighbour; who, as you know, is one of the most zealous opponents of the Jansenists: and, as my curiosity rendered me almost equally ardent in the matter with himself, I asked him, whether it had not been formally decided, “that grace is given to all men;” in order that this question might be no longer one of controversy. He replied, however, with some abruptness, that this was not the point at issue; that there were some among his party who held, that grace has not been bestowed upon all; that the Examiners themselves had said, in full College, that this opinion is a problematical one; and that he
[p. 5]himself entertained the same view. In confirmation of this he cited a celebrated passage of St. Augustine, “We know that grace is not given to all men.”
I begged his excuse for having misapprehended his opinion, and requested him to inform me, whether he did not, at least, condemn that other position of the Jansenists, which had caused so much excitement, viz. that “Grace is effectual, and operates upon our will for the production of good works?” But I was not more fortunate in this, than in my previous enquiry. “You are quite mistaken,” he replied; “this is no heresy; it is an orthodox opinion: all the ‘Thomists’ hold it; and I myself have entertained it as a member of the Sorbonne.” I did not dare to explain my doubts to him—and indeed I began to be not very clear wherein my difficulty lay; but in order to get further information, I requested him to inform me, in what the heresy of M. Arnauld consisted. “It is in this,” he replied,—“he does not acknowledge that the just have power to perform the commandments of God, in the way in which we understand the matter.”
I left him after this; and, proud of having penetrated to the bottom of the question, I found out M. N—— who was getting gradually better, and was sufficiently recovered to take me to his brother-in-law, a Jansenist, (if ever one was to be found,) yet notwithstanding that, a very good man. To insure a favourable reception, I professed myself quite of his own views, and accosted him thus, “Is it possible that the Sorbonne has introduced into the Church such an error as this, that ‘the just have always power to keep the commandments?’” “What do
[p. 6]you mean ?” said the doctor to me, “do you call such a Catholic sentiment as this, error—a sentiment that none but Lutherans and Calvinists oppose ?” “What,” said I, “is this not your opinion ?” “No,” he replied, “we anathematize it, as impious and heretical.” Surprised at this reply, I saw that I had carried the Jansenist too far, as I had before assumed too much of a Molinist; but feeling still uncertain of the real meaning of his answer, I requested him to tell me, in confidence, whether he held, “that the just always possess an actual power to keep the commandments ?” My friend, upon this, became warm, (though his zeal plainly originated in devout motives) ; and said, he should never conceal his opinions, such as they were ; “this was his belief,” he said, “and he, and all his party would defend them to their last hour, for they were the pure doctrines of St. Thomas and of St. Augustine their master.” He spoke so seriously, that I could doubt no longer; and after this confirmation, returned to my learned friend, and said, with much satisfaction, I was sure peace would soon be restored in the Sorbonne; that the Jansenists were agreed as to the power of the just to keep the commandments; that I would answer for them; and had their own word for it, that they would seal the opinion with their blood.
“Softly, my friend,” said he; “you ought to be a theologian, to understand this matter. The difference between us is so subtle that we can scarcely explain it ourselves : you would have difficulty in apprehending it. Be satisfied to be informed that the Jansenists are right when they assert that the just have power to keep the commandments this is not the matter in dispute: but they do
[p. 7]not tell you that this power is a 'proximate' one.* This is after all the great point."
This word was to me new and unknown. Up to this time I had seen my way; but I was now involved in darkness; and I believe the expression was invented only to perplex the enquiry. I requested him to explain himself; but he became mysterious, and dismissed me, without further satisfaction, to enquire of the Jansenists, whether they allowed of this 'proximate power;' I taxed my memory to recal the word; for as to the understanding it, it was out of all question. And lest it should escape me again, I repaired immediately to my friend the Jansenist; and, after the first civilities had passed, said abruptly, "Tell me, I beg, do you allow of a 'proximate' power?" He laughed, and drily said, "Tell me yourself in what sense you understand the term, and then I will tell you what I believe about it." As my knowledge did not extend so far as this, I was little prepared with a reply; but, not willing wholly to fail in the object of my visit, I said at a venture, "I understand it in the same sense as the Molinists." "Who, my friend?" said he, still coolly, "which of the Molinists do you refer to?" I knew of no distinction between them, but supposed them to be all of one party, and to hold the same views.
He rejoined however, "You are under a mistake. So far from being the same, they hold opinions quite opposed to each other. United only in the one object of ruining M. Arnauld, they have all agreed to adopt this term 'proximate,' that they may appear to hold the same language, although they put different constructions upon it; and
[p. 8]thus, through an apparent conformity, may form one large and united body for the purpose of oppressing him the more effectually.”
I was surprised at this reply; but being unwilling to adopt these unfavourable impressions of the Molinists upon his word only—and in fact having no interest myself in the matter,—I persisted in my endeavours to ascertain the various senses in which they used this mysterious word.
He replied, “I would inform you with all my heart; but you would find such gross inconsistency and contradiction as you would be scarcely able to credit. You would think I was deceiving you. You would be more satisfied in questioning the parties themselves; and for this purpose, I will refer you to some of them. Call separately upon M. Le Moine and Père Nicolai.” “I am not acquainted with either,” I said. “See then,” he rejoined, “whether you know some of these,” naming others: “for they hold the same opinion as M. Le Moine.” I found I was acquainted with some of these, and determined to follow his advice, and sift the affair further. I left him; and first of all repaired to one of the disciples of M. Le Moine.
I entreated him to inform me what was the meaning of a “proximate” power to do any thing. “Nothing is more easy,” he replied,—“it is to have every thing that is necessary to do any thing, so that nothing is wanting for proceeding to action.” “Then,” said I, “to have the ‘proximate’ power of fording a river, is to be provided with a boat, boatmen, oars, and so on; in fact, with every thing needful.” “Exactly so,” he rejoined. “And
[p. 9]to have the ‘proximate’ power to see,” I added, “is to have good sight and a clear noon-day ; for any one having a good sight, in the midst of darkness, would not, as we hold, have a ‘proximate’ power of seeing ; light being wanting, without which no one can see.” “Very just,” he said. “And, consequently,” I continued, “when you say that the just possess a ‘proximate’ power to keep the commandments, you must understand, that they have all the grace required for obedience, so that nothing is deficient on the part of God.” “Listen to me,” said he, “they have all that is necessary for obedience, or at least they may ask it of God.” “I understand you,” I said, “they have all that is required, to pray to God for assistance, without requiring any further grace from God to enable them to pray.” “You understand the point,” he replied. “But is it not necessary to have an effectual grace in order to pray to God ?” “No,” he replied, “not according to M. Le Moine.”
That I might lose no time, I next proceeded to the Dominicans, and enquired for some whom I knew to be of the party called “New Thomists.” I begged them to tell me the meaning of the “proximate” power. “Is it not that,” said I, “in which nothing is deficient, but every thing prepared for action ?” “No,” they answered. “What, my Father, if any thing should be incomplete in the ‘power’ in question, would you then call it ‘proximate’? For instance, would you say of a man in the middle of the night, and without light of any kind, that he had the ‘proximate’ power to see ?” “Doubtless, that is our opinion, if he were not blind.” “Very good,” said I, “but yet M. Le
[p. 10]Moine seems to think otherwise.” “It may be so,” they rejoined, “but this is our view.” “I understand you perfectly,” I said, “as for me, I am not fond of disputing about terms, provided I have a correct idea of the sense in which they are used. But, I now see, that when you say the just have always a ‘proximate’ power to pray to God, you mean that they require some further assistance, or else they cannot pray at all.” “Admirable,” cried the Father, embracing me, “Admirable! you know very well that there is an effectual grace required (and which is not conferred upon all men) to incline their will to prayer; and it is therefore heretical to deny the necessity of this ‘effectual grace’ to enable us to pray.”
“This is all very clear,” said I, in my turn, “but, according to you, the Jansenists are catholic, and M. Le Moine heretical; for the Jansenists say, the just have power to pray, but nevertheless require effectual grace to do so: and this seems to be your opinion. Now M. Le Moine holds, that the just pray without any effectual grace; and this you condemn.” True,” said they, “but M. Le Moine calls this power, a ‘power proximate.’”
“What! reverend sir,” I cried, “why, this is mere trifling with words, to talk of agreement on account of making use of certain common terms, when you differ on the sense of them.” The Father made no reply: and at this moment, by a most fortunate coincidence, as I considered it, my friend, M. Le Moine’s pupil arrived; although I have since found that their meetings are not infrequent.
Upon this, I said to my friend, “I am acquainted with a person who maintains that all just persons have the power of praying to God; but that, nevertheless, they
[p. 11]will never pray without an effectual grace to incline them to do so; and this God does not grant to all just persons. Is he a heretic?” “Stay,” said the Doctor; “you take me by surprise; let us proceed quietly; ‘distinguo.’ If he call this a ‘proximate power,’ he is a Thomist, and so far, a Catholic; if not, he is a Jansenist, and then a Heretic.” “He does not call it,” said I, “either ‘proximate,’ or ‘not proximate.’” “Then he is a heretic,” he rejoined; “ask these worthy Fathers.” I was not disposed to refer again for their judgment, as their assenting nods had already declared their opinion; but I said to them, “He refuses to admit this word ‘proximate;’ for he can get no explanation of it.” On this, one of the Fathers was about to make another attempt at explanation, but he was interrupted by the pupil of M. Le Moine, saying, “Do not let us begin our broils again. Have we not agreed not to explain this word ‘proximate,’ but to pass it on from one to another without saying what is meant by it?” To this the Dominican assented.
By this time I saw their design; and rising to take leave, I said, “Truly, reverend Fathers, I am greatly afraid that all this is mere trickery on your part; and, whatever else may result from your councils, I venture to predict that, when your censures shall be pronounced, peace will not be restored. For when you have decided that these mere syllables ‘prochain,’ (proximate) shall be adopted, who can doubt, that—no definite meaning being attached to them, each of you will claim the victory? The Dominican will say that the word is to be understood in their sense; and thus, there will be more dispute upon its proper explanation, than upon its introduction: for, after all,
[p. 12]what great danger will there be in receiving it when no particular sense is assigned to it? It is the meaning only that can make it hurtful. But surely it would be unworthy both of the Sorbonne and of the theology they teach, to use equivocal and deceptive terms, without affording any explanation of them. Therefore, Fathers, for the last time, I entreat you tell me, what it is that, as a Catholic, I ought to believe?” “You ought,” said they, speaking all together, “to acknowledge that all the just have the ‘proximate power,’ but in a certain abstract sense: abstrahendo a sensu Thomistarum, et a sensu aliorum theologorum.”
“That is,” said I, as I departed, “you must pronounce certain words with the lips, to avoid the stigma of heresy. But, after all, is this word to be found in the Scriptures?” “No,” they replied. “Is it then, in the Fathers, or the Councils; or authorised by the Papacy?” “No.” “Is it in St. Thomas?” “No.” “Why then must it be used, if there is no authority for it, and no meaning in it?” “You are obstinate,” said they, “You must use it, or you are a Heretic, and M. Arnauld, also: for we are the most numerous party; and if necessary, we can get as many Grey-Friars as we wish, and carry the day upon the question.”
On hearing the last reason, I left them, to send you the preceding account; by which you will see, that there is no real controversy upon any of the following points, but that they remain uncondemned on one side as well as the other, viz. “1. Grace is not given to all men. 2. The just have always the power to obey God’s commandments. 3. They need, nevertheless, for obeying the commandments
[p. 13], and even to enable them to pray, an effectual grace, to constrain and influence the will. 4. This effectual grace is not bestowed upon all men, but results from the pure mercy of God.” So that, after all, there is no danger but in the mere word ‘proximate;’ and that, without having any definite meaning attached to it.
Happy those who never heard it! happy those who lived before its invention! For I see no remedy, but for the Academy, by the exercise of their prerogative, to banish from the Sorbonne this barbarous word, which occasions so much discord. Unless this be done, the censure will certainly be pronounced; but I consider that it will have no other effect than to lower the Sorbonne, and to diminish its authority in carrying on successfully future controversies.
As to yourself, I leave you full liberty to adhere to the term ‘proximate,’ or not; for I love you too well to make this a source of molestation. If these details should prove not unacceptable, I will continue to inform you of what passes; and, in the meantime, I am, &c. &c.
Notes
- *'Prochain.' (Fr.)
Choose any passage to light it on the printed page.












