LETTER VIII. · CORRUPT DECISIONS OF THE CASUISTS RELATING TO · JUDGES, USURERS, THE ‘MOHATRA’ CONTRACT, BANK- · RUPTS, RESTITUTIONS, ETC. VARIOUS OTHER OBLI- · QUITIES OF THE SAME AUTHORITIES.

CORRUPT DECISIONS OF THE CASUISTS RELATINGJUDGES, USURERS, THE ‘MOHATRA’ CONTRACT, BANK- RUPTS, RESTITUTIONS, ETC. VARIOUS OTHER OBLI- QUITIES OF THE SAME AUTHORITIES

You would not suppose that people would have had the curiosity to enquire who we are…

22 · V · 1656ParisPrinted pp. 117–136

LETTER VIII.

CORRUPT DECISIONS OF THE CASUISTS RELATING TO
JUDGES, USURERS, THE ‘MOHATRA’ CONTRACT, BANK-
RUPTS, RESTITUTIONS, ETC. VARIOUS OTHER OBLI-
QUITIES OF THE SAME AUTHORITIES.

Sir,

You would not suppose that people would have had the curiosity to enquire who we are: nevertheless, there are some who are endeavouring to detect us; but they have not succeeded. Some take me for a Doctor of Sorbonne; others attribute my letters to four or five different persons, who, like myself, are neither priests nor ecclesiastics. All these fruitless efforts convince me, that I have been not unsuccessful in my aim to be known by none but yourself and the worthy Father who takes so patiently my visits; and whose discourse I am obliged, in return to endure, although with much distaste. I put however a constraint upon myself; for if he were to perceive the disgust his statements excite in me he would not continue them, and thus I should be unable to fulfil my engagement, to make you acquainted with their whole system of morality. You may give me, I assure you, some credit for the violence I do to myself. It is not a little painful to see the whole

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code of Christian morals overthrown by these unhappy perversions, without daring to contradict them. But I suspect, after having kept so strict a guard over my feelings, for your satisfaction, I shall break out for my own, when I find he has nothing more to tell me. However, I will refrain as much as possible; for the more I show myself inclined to listen, the more communicative he will be.

He gave me so much information on the last occasion, that I shall hardly know how to report it all to you. You will now see what convenient maxims they inculcate, for evading the duty of restitution. For—palliate it as they may—the principles which I am now proceeding to relate tend to nothing less, than to extenuate the practices of corrupt judges, of usurers, bankrupts, rogues, abandoned women, and tricksters; who are all most leniently absolved from the necessity of restoring the ill-gotten fruits of their several vocations. These were the subjects of our last conversation.

“ At the commencement of our interview,” he said, “ I promised to explain to you the maxims of our Society for the direction of the various conditions of society. You have already learnt those relating to beneficiaries, priests, religious orders, servants, and the aristocracy; we will proceed now to the others, and begin with the judges.

“ I must first of all tell you one of the most important and beneficial of the principles laid down by our Fathers in favor of this class of persons. It is that of the learned Castro Palao, one of our twenty-four Elders; these are his words: ‘May a judge, in a question of equity, pronounce judgment according to a certain probable opinion,

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in preference to another opinion which is more probable? Yes, and even if it be contrary to his own: imo, contra propriane opinionem.' And he is confirmed in this by our Father Escobar, tr. 6. ex. 6. N. 45." "Truly, my good Father," I exclaimed, "this is an admirable commencement! The judges must be indeed beholden to you; and I am surprized that they should ever oppose your probabilities, as we find them sometimes doing, seeing how favorable they are to themselves. You give them, by these methods, the same power over the fortunes of the community, as you yourselves exercise over their consciences." "You ought to see," he replied, "that it is from no regard to our own interests that we thus act, but merely from a concern for the quiet of their consciences; and this is where our eminent Molina has been successful in respect to presents made to the judges.

"In order to satisfy their scruples in receiving these kind of douceurs, he has taken the pains to enumerate the several cases in which they may take them conscientiously, in the absence of any special law forbidding it. It is in his t. 1. tr. 2. d. 88. N. 6. as follows: 'Judges may receive presents from parties when given from motives of friendship or gratitude for justice rendered them; or as an inducement to render such in time to come; or in the hope that they may take an especial interest in their affairs, or dispatch them with promptitude.' Our learned Escobar also says, on this subject, tr. 6. ex. 6. N. 43. 'If there be several individuals, none of whom have greater claim to dispatch than others, is it a sin in the judge to receive a gratuity from one on condition—'ex parte'—to give him the preference in dispatch over

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the others? Certainly not, according to Layman; for, by natural right, he does no injury to the others, when he concedes to one, in consideration of his gratuity, what he might have given to any other, as he pleased: nay, being equally bound to all by the equality of their claim, he is still more so to the giver of the present which is made for the purpose of securing the judge's good offices; which services may lawfully be secured by a consideration in money—'Quæ obligatio videtur pretio æstimabilis.' "

"My reverend Father," I here interposed, "I cannot but be surprised to hear of such an indulgent code as this, unknown too, as it is, to the highest of our legal dignitaries. Why, our chief president has just introduced into Parliament an Act for prohibiting certain registers to accept gratuities for this very species of preference; a plain proof that he is far from thinking such practices allowable in the judicial office; and every one has extolled a reform so salutary to all parties."

The good Father, surprised at my remark, replied, "Indeed, I was not aware of that. Our opinion, understand, is only a 'probable' one; the contrary may be probable also." "Truly, my Father," I said, "it is believed that M. Le President has done a more than 'probable' service; and has arrested by its means a long-continued course of public corruption." "Well, on the whole, I am of the same opinion," the Father rejoined, "but let us proceed; we will leave the judges." "Quite right," I said; "particularly as they don't seem very grateful for the indulgence you show them." "It is not exactly that," rejoined the good Father; "but there is

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so much to be related under the various heads, that we must be brief upon each individually.

“ Let us now go on to the case of men of business. You know, the great difficulty with them is to wean them from usurious practices: and this is what our Fathers have the most assiduously aimed at; for they detest this vice, as Escobar has it, tr. 3, ex. 5. N. 1. ‘ To say that usury is not a sin is heresy.’ And Père Bauny in his ‘ Summary of Sin,’ fills several pages with the penalties incurred by usurers. He declares that they ‘ are infamous in life, and unworthy of Christian burial after death.’ ” “ My good Father ! ” I exclaimed, “ I did not think he could have been so severe.” “ He is so, I assure you, when there is a necessity for it; but, then, this rigid Casuist, observing that it is only a love of gain that urges to usury, says, in the same place, ‘ It would be benefiting not a few persons, if, while secured from the evil tendencies of usury, as well as from the sinful propensity which leads to it, they could be assisted to derive an equal profit from their money in a good and legitimate employment of it, as from usurious practices.’ ” “ Doubtless, Father, there would be no usurers after that,” I interposed. “ And for this purpose,” he continued, “ our author has furnished a general rule for all classes of persons, gentlemen, presidents, councillors, &c.; and one so simple, that it consists of nothing more than the pronouncing a few words previous to a loan of money; after which they may receive their interest without fear of its partaking of the nature of usury; although, otherwise, it would undoubtedly have been such.” “ And what then are these mysterious words, my Father ?” “ Here they

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are in his own terms; for you are aware the writer has composed his work on the ‘ Summary of Offences,’ in French, that every one may understand it. They are as follows: ‘ Celui à qui on demande de l’argent repondra donc en cette sorte ; Je n’ai point d’argent a préter ; si ai bien a mettre à profit honnête et licite. Si desirez la somme que demandez pour la faire valoir par votre industrie à moitie gain, moitie perte, peut être m’y resoudrai-je. Bien est vrai qu’à cause qu’il y a trop de peine à s’accommoder pour le profit, si vous m’en voulez assurer un certain, et quant et quant aussi mon sort principal, qu’il ne coure fortune, nous tomberions bien plus tôt d’accord, et vous ferai toucher argent dans cette heure.’*

“ Is not that now a most easy way of getting money without committing a sin ? And is not Père Bauny right when he says in his concluding part, ‘ This is, in my opinion, a method by which multitudes of persons who would otherwise by their usurious extortion, and unlawful bargains, provoke the just displeasure of God, may ensure their safety in rendering their gains honest and lawful.’ ”

“ My good Father ! ” I exclaimed, “ these are indeed words of most wonderful efficacy. They must, I am satisfied, possess some secret virtue in neutralizing the crime of usury far beyond my comprehension ; for I have always hitherto supposed the offence to consist simply in receiving back a larger amount than that which had been lent.” “ You have a very imperfect notion of the matter,” he said : “ usury, according to our Fathers, consists

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almost exclusively in an intention to take an usurious profit. And thus, Père Escobar lays it down, that usury may be avoided by a simple change of the intention. You will find it at tr. 3, ex. 5, N. 4, 33, 44; ‘It would be an usurious act,’ he says, ‘to take interest from those to whom we lend money, if it be exacted as of right; but if received as a matter of gratitude, it is then not usury.’ And at N. 3, ‘It is not allowed to intend directly to make a profit of money lent; but when received by way of consideration on the part of those to whom it is lent—‘medié benevolentia’—that is not usury.’

“It must be allowed,” he continued, “that there are refined ways of proceeding: but one of the best, in my opinion, (for we have several to make choice of) is that of the ‘Contract of Mohatra.’ “The Contract of Mohatra?” I asked. “I see,” he continued, “you are not acquainted with it. It is only the name that is peculiar. Escobar will explain it, in tr. 3, ex. 3, N. 36. ‘The Mohatra Contract is one by which persons buy merchandize at high prices on credit, and sell it again, simultaneously, to the same persons, at low rates, and for ready money.’ This, you see, is the Contract of Mohatra; by which means they acquire a certain amount in ready money, and remain in debt to the party for the surplus.” “But, my Father, can any one besides Escobar have sanctioned such a plan? Do any other of your writers mention it?” “How little you are acquainted with these matters!” he replied. “The latest work on Moral Theology, printed this very year at Paris, treats of the Mohatra, and very profoundly; it is entitled ‘Epilogus Summarum;” and is an abridgment of all the summaries of theology of our

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Fathers Suarez, Sanchez, Lessius, Fagandez, Hurtado, and other celebrated Casuists, as expressed in the title. You will find it at p. 54. ‘The Mohatra is, when a man wants to raise twenty pistoles, and buys of a merchant goods to the amount of thirty pistoles, payable in a year, selling the same to him simultaneously for twenty pistoles, ready money price.’ Thus, you see, this Mohatra is not an obscure mode of procedure.” “Well, my kind Father,” I asked, “and is this sort of contract allowed?” “Escobar,” he replied, “says in the same place that there are laws which prohibit it under severe penalties.” “Then it is useless.” “By no means; for Escobar himself goes on to prescribe methods by which it may be permitted: ‘although even,’ he says, ‘the person who buys and sells may primarily intend to make a profit; provided, however, in the sale he does not exceed the highest price of merchandise of that description; and (in re-purchasing,) he does not go beyond the lowest; and also, that no previous agreement be made, either express or implied.’ But Lessius, de Jael, Book 2, C. 21, d. 16, says, ‘Even if the sale have been made with the intention to repurchase at the lowest price, we are not bound to make restitution of the profit, unless in the way of charity, in case the party of whom the advantage has been gained, be in a state of indigence; and provided also it can be done without inconvenience to ourselves;’—‘si commodè potest.’ This is saying every thing that is possible.” “In truth, my Father, I cannot but think that more indulgence might be blameable.” “Ah,” said he, “our Fathers know just the exact point where they ought to stop!

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You see in that very circumstance the usefulness of the ‘ Mohatra.’

“ I could have furnished you,” he continued, “ with more of their opinions upon these points, but these will suffice ; and I must now acquaint you with our views respecting persons in embarrassed circumstances.

“ Our Fathers were very desirous of alleviating the privations of such persons ; for which purpose, if they have not sufficient property to live respectably upon, and to pay their debts also, they are permitted to secure a part to themselves by becoming bankrupts. This is the decision of Père Lessius, and confirmed by Escobar, tr. 3, ex. 2, N. 163, ‘ May a person who has become bankrupt, retain with safe conscience such part of his property as is necessary for maintaining his family in respectability— ‘ ne indecoré vivat ? ’ I maintain, with Lessius, that he may ; and that, even, if it have been acquired by injustice, and notorious offences—‘ ex injustitia et notorio delicto ; although in the latter case he may not retain so large an amount as otherwise.” “ How ! my Father, by what strange species of charity is it that you allow property obtained in this way to remain in the possession of those who have acquired it by fraud, rather than to fall to the creditors, to whom, of right, it belongs ?” “ We cannot satisfy every body,” he replied, “ and our Fathers have especially aimed at relieving the unfortunate. And thus, with an especial view to the indigent, the celebrated Vasquez, quoted by Castro Palao, t. 1, tr. 6, d. 6, N. 12, says, ‘ When we see a swindler resolutely bent upon defrauding a poor person, we may, to avert his purpose, assign to him some very rich person to commit his fraud

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upon, instead of the other party.’ If you have not got Vesquez or Castro Palao, you will find the same thing in Escobar; for, as you are aware, almost every sentiment of importance is propounded in common by the twenty-four Elders: it is at tr. 5, ex. 5, N. 120., ‘On the practice of our Society, respecting charity to our neighbour.’”

“That is certainly a remarkable species of charity,” I observed, “to save one person from sustaining loss at the expense of another. But I should think, to render it complete, the person giving such an intimation ought in conscience to make good to the rich man the loss that he occasions him.” “Not at all,” he replied, “he does not rob him himself; he only gives information to another to do so. Hear, now, the judicious decision of Père Bauny in another case, which will surprise you still more, and lead you again to suppose that restitution ought to be commanded. It is in the 13th chap. of his ‘Summary.’ These are his own words; ‘A person desires a soldier to assault one of his neighbours, or burn the barn of some one who has offended him. It is asked whether, in case of the soldier being a defaulter, the other person at whose instance the wrong was done, ought to make it good? I think not. For no one is bound to restitution, where no wrong has been committed. Is it a wrong to ask a favour of another? Whatever the request be, the other is at liberty to grant it, or refuse. Whichever way he inclines, it is purely of his own will; nothing induces him but his own kindness and facility. If then the soldier in question does not repair the injury, the other party ought not to be compelled to do it, at whose instance the innocent person has suffered the wrong.’”

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This passage had nearly put a stop to our conversation, for I was on the point of bursting into a violent fit of laughter at the idea of “the kindness and facility” of the supposed incendiary of the barn; and the absurd reasonings, which went to exempt from restitution the real author of the conflagration—a crime which our jurisprudence would have visited with death. But I knew if I did not restrain myself, the good Father would be offended, for he spoke with all seriousness; and thus continued, with equal gravity.

“From these various instances you ought now to be convinced how frivolous are your objections. Notwithstanding, we will proceed with the subject of embarrassed persons. For their relief, several of our Fathers—and among them Lessius—Book 2, Ch. 12, N. 12, state ‘that it is lawful to steal, not only under pressure of extreme want, but also under circumstances of heavy, though not absolute, necessity.’ Escobar quotes this also, tr. 1, N. 29, ex. 9.” “That is surprising,” I said; “there is nobody in the world who may not come to experience this pressing necessity, and whom you would not in this way authorize to rob with a safe conscience. And even if you were to limit the sanction to those only who were really in such circumstances, you would open the door to an infinity of larcenies, which the judges visit with punishment, notwithstanding this grave necessity; and which you ought yet more signally to reprove—you, who are bound to uphold in society not only the principles of justice, but of charity also, both which are overthrown by these maxims. For, is it not a violation of these principles, and the greatest wrong that can be inflicted, for one man to cause

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another to be deprived of his property for his own advantage? This, at least, has always hitherto been my belief.” “It does not, however, hold in all cases,” said the Father; “for the great Molina teaches, Vol. 2, tr. 2, disp. 328, N. 8, ‘that the rule of charity does not require that we forego an advantage ourselves, to save our neighbour from a similar loss.’ This he states, in order to establish what he further advances in the following passage, ‘We are not bound in conscience to make restitution of property, which may have been given us by another person, for the purpose of evading his creditors.’ And Lessius, who maintains the same opinion, confirms it by a like principle in his 2d Book, C. 20, dist. 19, N. 168.

“Now you are not so considerate,” he continued, “towards persons in distressed circumstances; our Fathers are more indulgent. They do equal justice to the poor and the rich. Nay, further, they are not unmindful even of those who fall into sin. For though they strongly censure the offenders, they nevertheless do not hesitate to inculcate, that property acquired by evil practices may be justifiably retained—‘Quamvis mulier illicitó acquirat, licité tamen retinet acquisita.’ And to the same effect our Fathers unanimously decide, that what a judge receives from a party, whose case is bad, to induce him to give an unjust decision in his favour, and what a man of arms gains for committing a homicide, and the money gained by other infamous crimes, may be all lawfully retained. This has been collected by Escobar from various of our authorities, and condensed into one general rule, in tr. 3, ex. 1, N. 33, as follows; ‘Property gained

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by scandalous offences, such as murder, unjust sentences, licentiousness, &c. becomes a lawful possession, and is not required to be restored.’ And again tr. 5, ex. 5, N. 53, ‘ We may dispose of property acquired for the commission of homicide, unjust decisions, infamous crimes, &c., because the possession has become one of right, and we acquire a lawful property in that which we have ourselves gained.’”

“ My worthy Father,” I here interposed, “ I must say this is a mode of acquisition altogether new to me ; am I to believe that justice authorizes and admits as valid the reward of assassination, corruption, and adultery ?” “ I know nothing,” he replied, “ of what law-books may hold ; but I know that our Society, who are the true guides of conscience, affirm what I have stated. It is true, they except one case, in which restitution is required ; it is ‘ when money has been received from such as have not the power lawfully to dispose of property ; such as infants, and religious orders.’ For our great Molina excepts them in t. 1, de Just. tr. 2, disp. 94. ‘ Nisi mulier accepisset ab eo qui alienare non potest, ut a religioso et filio familias.’ In that case it must be restored. Escobar cites this passage in tr. 1, ex. 8, N. 59, and confirms the opinion in tr. 3, ex. 1, N. 23.

“ My reverend Father,” I said, “ your religious orders are here better treated than others.” “ Not at all,” he replied ; “ is not the same thing done by minors generally, in which class members of religious orders rank during the whole of their lives ? It is perfectly just to except them. But in regard to all other persons, it is not obligatory to make restitution of what has been received

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for evil actions. Lessius fully proves this in his 2d Book, ‘ de Just. C. 14, d. 8, N. 52.’ ‘For,’ says he, ‘a criminal action may be estimated by a price in money, taking into account the advantage gained by him who causes it to be committed, and the trouble incurred by him who commits it; and therefore it is not compulsory to refund what has been received for the commission of the act, whatever be its nature—homicide, corrupt sentences, impurity (for there are instances of every description,) provided it has not been received from such as have not a legal power to dispose of property. You will perhaps say that he who receives payment for an ill action commits a sin, and therefore should not be allowed either to receive or retain it. But I reply, that after the thing is done, there is no sin either in paying, or returning the payment. The great Filiutius enters still more into detail on the subject. He says ‘ we are bound in conscience to pay on a different scale for actions of this kind, according to the condition of the persons committing them; and that some are entitled to more than others. And this he establishes by the soundest reasons—tr. 31, C. 9, N. 23; ‘ Occultæ fornicariæ debeter pretium in conscientiá, et multó majore ratione, quàm publicæ. Copia enim quàm occulta facit mulier, &c. &c. &c.’ ”

He here showed me, in the pages of these authors, things of this description so detestable, that I should not dare to transcribe them, and such, that the Father was himself shocked at them (for he was really a well-meaning man,) although the respect he entertained for these worthies made him receive with deference every thing that fell from them. I remained silent, however, although

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less from a wish that he should continue his details, than from astonishment to find the writings of any religious men filled with sentiments, at once so horrible, so unjust, and so absurd. He therefore pursued his discourse without interruption, and concluded as follows: “For these reasons, our illustrious Molina (I hope you will be convinced after this) thus decides the question; ‘When money has been received for the commission of a criminal act, ought it to be restored? We must here,’ says this great man, ‘draw a distinction: if the act, for which money was received, has not been done, the money must be returned; but if it has been accomplished, it need not be:’ ‘si non fecit hoc malum, tenetur restituere; secus, si fecit!’ This is cited by Escobar in tr. 3, ex. 2, N. 138.

“These are some of our principles touching restitution. You have now had a good lesson for one day; I should like to see how you have improved by it. Answer me then. ‘When a judge has received money from a party in a suit, for procuring a judgment in his favour, is he bound to restore it?’ You will say ‘No,’ I replied. “I am not so clear,” he said; “have I said any thing to that effect, generally? I have told you he is not bound to make restitution, if he has given the judgment in favour of the party whose right is not good. But if a man has right on his side, would you have him pay for a decision in his favour when it is his own lawfully? You see you are under a mistake. Don’t you perceive that a judge is bound to do justice, and therefore ought not to make it matter of purchase; on the other hand, he is not bound to injustice, and therefore may receive payment for it?

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All our leading authorities agree in this—Molina, disp. 94 and 99; Reginaldus, Book 10, N. 184, 5, 7; Filiutius, tr. 31, N. 220 and 8; Escobar, tr. 3, ex. 1, N. 21 and 23; Lessius, Book 2, C. 24, d. 8, N. 55—‘ A judge is strictly bound to restore money that he has received for deciding justly, provided it have not been given by way of mere liberality (per liberalité,) but he is not bound to restore what he has received from a man in whose favour he has given an unjust judgment.’”

I was amazed at these fanatical decisions; and while reflecting upon their pernicious consequences, the Father propounded another question to me, saying, “ Answer me now more circumspectly: Is a man that has been engaged in divinations bound to restore what he has gained by his craft ?” “ Just as you please, reverend Father,” I replied. “ As I please ! That is good: one would think, from your way of speaking, that truth was dependent upon our pleasures. I see, however, you will not find this out by yourself. Learn now how Sanchez solves the difficulty—Sanchéz, remember ! First, he draws this distinction, Som. Book 2. c. 38. N. 94, 5, and 6; ‘ Has the diviner made use of astrology and other natural means, or has he used diabolical arts ? For in the one case he is bound to restitution, although not in the other.’ Now you must tell me which is that case.” “ There is no difficulty in that,” said I. “ I see what you mean,” he rejoined ; “ you think he ought to refund, in the supposition that he has been dealing with demons. You are quite wrong; it is just the contrary. This is Sanchez’s solution, in the same passage: ‘ If the diviner has not taken the pains to ascertain by diabolical means

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that which he could not learn by any other—si nullam operam opposuit ut arte diaboli id sciret—he must make restitution ; but if he has taken the pains to do so, he is not so bound.’” “ And how do you explain this, my Father ?” “ Don’t you understand ? ” said he ; “ it is because we may divine by diabolical arts, but not by astrology, which is a deceptive system.” “ But, my good Father, suppose the devil does not give a true answer ; for there is no more truth in his arts than in those of astrology ; must not restitution be made in that case, and for the same reason ? ” “ Not always. ‘ Distinguo,’ says Sanchez on this point ; ‘ for if the diviner be unacquainted with diabolical arts—si sit artis diabolicæ ignorus—he is bound, in that case, to restore : but if he be an accomplished conjurer, and have done all that he could to get at the truth, he is then not bound : in such a case, the diligence of the diviner is to be made a consideration of money—diligentia a mago apposita est pretio æstimabalis.’” “ Your plan is a sensible one,” I said ; “ by this means you will make the diviners diligent and accomplished in their art ; through the hope, according to your principles, of making lawful gains in a faithful service of the public.” “ I suspect you are jesting,” rejoined the Father ; “ that is very unbecoming ; if you were to talk in this way where you were not known, you might be suspected, by those who did not understand you, of turning religious matters into ridicule.” “ I could easily clear myself from that reproach,” I replied ; “ for I believe, if any one were to take the trouble to examine the real meaning of my words, there would not be found one that did not imply the reverse ; and the time may come

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perhaps, before our communications close, when I shall have the opportunity of making it fully apparent.” “Oh! Oh!” said the Father; “you are not joking now.” “Indeed,” I replied, “the reproach that I was making a jest of sacred things would be to me as painful as it would be unjust.” “I did not mean exactly to say as much as that; but let us talk a little more seriously,” he rejoined. “I am quite disposed to do so,” I replied, “if you wish it; but it must rest with yourself. I must confess, however, I have heard with surprise that your Fathers have so extended their cares to all descriptions of persons, as to make regulations for legalizing the profits of soothsayers!” “We cannot,” he said, “write for too many sorts of men, nor particularize too much, nor recapitulate too often the same directions. You will see that, by the following passage from one of our greatest divines. Judge for yourself; it is our present Père Provincial, the revered Père Cellot, in his 8th Book on the Hierarchy, ch. 16. § 2; ‘We know an instance of a person,’ he says, ‘who was taking a large sum of money for restitution, by his confessor’s order; and stopping on his way at a bookseller’s, asked if he had anything new— ‘nam quid novi?’ He was shown a new work on Moral Theology; and, turning over the leaves carelessly and without reflection, he stumbled upon his own identical case, and ascertained that he was under no obligation to make restitution. Upon which, being relieved of the burden of his scruples, but retaining that of his money, he returned with a light heart to his home; ‘abjectâ scrupuli sarcinâ, retento auri pondero, levior domum repetiit.’

“Now, say,” he continued, “whether the knowledge of

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our maxims is not of some utility? Will you laugh at them now? Will you not rather, with Père Cellot, make this pious reflection upon the fortunate encounter; ‘Events of this kind are to be regarded, in respect of God, as proofs of his providential care; in respect of his guardian angel, as an instance of his vigilance; and in respect of those to whom they occur, as the result of their predestination. God has from all eternity determined that the golden chain of their salvation should depend upon certain contingencies, rather than others. If such a person had not written, such a one had not been saved. Let us then conjure, by the bowels of Jesus Christ, those who cavil at the number of our authors, not to censure works which the eternal election of the Almighty and the blood of Jesus Christ has procured to be written for them.’ Sweet words! by which this learned man establishes his proposition; how useful is it that a number of authors have written upon moral theology!—‘ Quàm utile sit de Theologia morali multos scribere!’”

“ My Father,” I here said, “ I will defer till another opportunity the expression of my opinion upon this passage, and will at present say no more than that, as your maxims are so adapted for general usefulness, and it will be so advantageous to give them publicity, you must continue to put me in possession of them; for I assure you that the friend to whom I transmit them will not fail to bring them under the notice of very large numbers of persons. Under other circumstances we should not have thought of availing ourselves of them; but we do really consider it to be most advantageous that the world should be acquainted with them.” “ It is on that very account,”

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he rejoined, “ that I am careful to withhold nothing from you; another time I shall be willing to inform you of those facilities and conveniences which our Fathers allow to men, in their passage through life, to render their salvation easy, and soften the gloom of devotion. In this way, having learnt what concerns each particular condition of society, you will understand every thing relating to men in general, and acquire a perfect insight into our system.” Having said this, the Father left me. I remain, &c.

P.S. I have continually forgotten to say, there are several editions of Escobar. If you purchase one, get that of Lyons, which has in the frontispiece a lamb standing over a book sealed with seven seals; or else that of Brussels of 1651. As these are the latest, they are more accurate and copious, than the earlier editions of Lyons of the years 1644 and 1646.

*⸭* Subsequent to all the above-mentioned, there was a new edition published at Paris by Pegit, more accurate than any of its predecessors. But the opinions of Escobar may be still better learnt from the Grande Theologie Morale published at Lyons. (Ed.)

Notes

  1. *This being somewhat antiquated French, and not admitting of a very literal rendering, I have thought it best to leave it in the original language. (Transl.)

Choose any passage to light it on the printed page.

Scan leaf 203 of the 1847 edition (printed page 117), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 204 of the 1847 edition (printed page 118), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 205 of the 1847 edition (printed page 119), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 206 of the 1847 edition (printed page 120), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 207 of the 1847 edition (printed page 121), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 208 of the 1847 edition (printed page 122), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 209 of the 1847 edition (printed page 123), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 210 of the 1847 edition (printed page 124), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 211 of the 1847 edition (printed page 125), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 212 of the 1847 edition (printed page 126), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 213 of the 1847 edition (printed page 127), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 214 of the 1847 edition (printed page 128), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 215 of the 1847 edition (printed page 129), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 216 of the 1847 edition (printed page 130), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 217 of the 1847 edition (printed page 131), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 218 of the 1847 edition (printed page 132), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 219 of the 1847 edition (printed page 133), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 220 of the 1847 edition (printed page 134), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 221 of the 1847 edition (printed page 135), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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Scan leaf 222 of the 1847 edition (printed page 136), showing letter LETTER VIII..
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About this letter

Letter LETTER VIII. of 25 · printed pp. 117–136 · scan leaf 203 of 570

Where it sits in the book: black are letters, grey the editor’s narrative, pale the front matter, appendices and index.

Source
The Provincial Letters of Pascal, with an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce, 1847, pp. 117–136.
How it was read
Read by machine. Not yet proofread by people. Expect occasional slips in names, accents and foreign words. The book’s reading score is 88 out of 100. How this text was read
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Cite this letter

CitationCORRUPT DECISIONS OF THE CASUISTS RELATING to JUDGES, USURERS, THE ‘MOHATRA’ CONTRACT, BANK- RUPTS, RESTITUTIONS, ETC. VARIOUS OTHER OBLI- QUITIES OF THE SAME AUTHORITIES, 22 May 1656, “LETTER VIII. · CORRUPT DECISIONS OF THE CASUISTS RELATING TO · JUDGES, USURERS, THE ‘MOHATRA’ CONTRACT, BANK- · RUPTS, RESTITUTIONS, ETC. VARIOUS OTHER OBLI- · QUITIES OF THE SAME AUTHORITIES.”. In The Provincial Letters of Pascal, with an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1847), pp. 117–136. Paper Lanterns edition, https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/10/.

BibTeX@incollection{pascal-provincial-letters-1847-letter-0010,
  author    = {CORRUPT DECISIONS OF THE CASUISTS RELATING},
  title     = {LETTER VIII. · CORRUPT DECISIONS OF THE CASUISTS RELATING TO · JUDGES, USURERS, THE ‘MOHATRA’ CONTRACT, BANK- · RUPTS, RESTITUTIONS, ETC.  VARIOUS OTHER OBLI- · QUITIES OF THE SAME AUTHORITIES., 22 May 1656},
  booktitle = {The Provincial Letters of Pascal},
  publisher = {London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1847},
  year      = {1847},
  pages     = {117--136},
  note      = {With an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce. Paper Lanterns edition},
  url       = {https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/10/}
}

Linkhttps://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/10/

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