LETTER XII. · REFUTATION OF THE SOPHISTRIES OF THE JESUITS ON · THE SUBJECTS OF ALMS-GIVING AND SIMONY.

I had prepared to address you respecting the aspersions in which you have so long…

Printed pp. 197–218

LETTER XII.

REFUTATION OF THE SOPHISTRIES OF THE JESUITS ON
THE SUBJECTS OF ALMS-GIVING AND SIMONY.

Reverend Fathers,

I had prepared to address you respecting the aspersions in which you have so long indulged towards me in your various publications; styling me successively ‘impious and ignorant,’ ‘buffoon and Merry-Andrew, an impostor, a calumniator, a cheat, a heretic, a Calvinist in disguise, a disciple of Molina, one possessed with devils, &c. &c.’ Not choosing entirely to acquiesce in such treatment, I was about to appeal to the world as to its justice, and had determined publicly to expose your calumnies and impositions, when your later replies to me appeared; and therein I found myself made, in my turn, the subject of similar charges of imposition on your part. I have thus been obliged to alter my plan of proceeding; although I intend still, in a measure, to pursue my original purpose; and trust to be able, in defending myself from the charge of impostures, to convict you of some more palpable and flagrant than any which you have imputed to me.

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And truly, my Fathers, your case is one of more suspicion than my own. Little probable is it that, standing as I do alone—without external power or human aid—and confronting a body so powerful as yours,—sustained alone by the weapons of integrity and truth, I should expose myself to the loss of every thing dear to me, by risking a conviction of falsehood and imposture! It is but too easy to detect untruth in matters of fact like these; and well do I know, I should not lack accusers, nor would full scope and opportunity be denied to them to establish their charges. As for you, Reverend Sirs, your position is far different; you may use what language you please against me, and I can complain to none. In this unequal contest, I should feel little bound to use reserve, did not other considerations restrain me. Nevertheless, as you choose to hold me up as an impostor, you compel me to a defence; while, as you must know that this cannot be made without fresh disclosures on my part, and laying bare anew the whole foundation of your moral system, I must be allowed to entertain doubts of the policy of your conduct. The war must now be carried on within your own borders, and at your own cost; and although you may think, that by mystifying the questions at issue with scholastic terms, the replies will be so tedious, so obscure and abstruse, as to repel the public mind from their consideration, you may possibly find yourselves herein mistaken. It shall be my endeavour to occasion as little weariness as may be possible in such a controversy as this. Your maxims have at least this property, that they afford universal amusement. Remember, however, that it is yourselves who challenge me anew

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to this discussion ; and let us now see which of us shall come the best out of it.

The foremost of your charges of imposture is concealing the ‘opinion of Vasquez upon the duty of alms-giving.’ Allow me however, first of all, to give a clear explanation of the point at issue, in order that all obscurity be removed in our discussion.

It is well known, Sirs, that according to the authority of the Church, there are two precepts on the subject of alms ; the one, to give of our superfluity for relieving the ordinary necessities of the poor, the other to give of what is even necessary to ourselves (according to our means,) in cases of extreme destitution. This is what is laid down by Cajetan following St. Thomas ; so that, to ascertain the spirit of Vasquez’ regulations of alms-giving, we must examine his directions, both as to what may be deemed superfluous, and what necessary.

As to superfluity, which is the most usual resource for the relief of the poor, this is entirely got rid of by the tenet I recited in my letter, De Fl. c. 4, N. 14, viz. ‘That which persons, moving in the world, retain for supporting their station in society, and that of their relatives, is not to be deemed superfluous. Therefore it can rarely happen that such persons, even of the most exalted rank—not excepting Sovereigns—can be said to possess a superfluity.’ You see therefore, my Fathers, that according to this definition, no persons of an aspiring disposition are likely to suffer under a superfluity of possessions : and by this means, alms-giving, in regard to the greater part of the world, is virtually abolished.

But even if this were not the case, men would be dispensed

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from this duty, in cases of ordinary necessity, according to Vasquez; who impugns entirely any obligation of the kind on the part of the rich. These are his words, ch. 1, d. 4, N. 32. ‘ Corduba,’ he says, ‘ teaches that those who enjoy a superfluity of means are bound to distribute, at least some portion to all who are in circumstances of ordinary necessity, in order, in some measure, to conform to the precepts of the church on this head; but this I do not agree with: ‘ sed hoc non placet;’ for we have demonstrated the contrary, in opposition to Cajetan and Navarre.’ Thus, my Fathers, the obligation to alms-giving, under this head, is according to this decision entirely abolished.

As regards the duty, in case of extreme and pressing necessity, you see that by the various conditions which must unite to impose the obligation, the very wealthiest people in Paris may pass their whole lives without having once incurred it. I will only adduce two of these; the one is, that ‘ they must be certain that the poor applicant will not be able to receive relief from any other quarter;’ ‘ hæc intelligo et cætera omnia, quando scio nullum alium opem laturum, ch. 1, N. 28.” What shall be said to this, Reverend Sirs? Is it likely often to happen, I would ask, that in Paris, where beneficence so abounds, it shall be demonstrable that none would be found except ourselves to relieve a distressed applicant? And yet, according to this authority, unless ascertained of this fact, the cry of poverty may always, with a safe conscience, be left unheeded! The other preliminary is, ‘ that the necessity of the pauper shall be such that he be in imminent danger to life or good fame;’ N. 24 and 26. This is a

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case certainly not of very common occurrence; and what proves the infrequency of it is, that the author says (N. 45) that the poor man, being thus in the circumstances which are to impose the necessity of alms-giving for his relief, ‘is justified in robbing the rich for the relief of his necessity.’ So that, after absolving the rich from the duty of giving alms of his superfluity (which is the grand source of charity,) he only obliges him to afford relief to the poor, in circumstances of such exigency, as that, according to his doctrine, the pauper object is permitted to help himself to the goods of the rich. This is Vasquez’s theory, to which you refer your readers for their edification.

I come now to other charges of misrepresentation. You insist much upon the way in which Vasquez enforces the duty of alms-giving upon ecclesiastics; but this is not the question between us at present. Be assured I shall be ready to discuss it whenever you please. As to the laity (whose case alone it is we are considering), you seem to wish it to be understood that Vasquez is speaking, in the passages I have quoted, only the sentiments of Cajetan, and not his own. As nothing, however, can be more unfounded than this, and as you have not ventured so far even as to state the fact unreservedly, I am willing, for your own sake, to believe that it was not your intention to convey such a meaning.

You afterwards complain vehemently, that, after quoting the maxim of Vasquez, ‘that scarcely any persons living in the world—not even excepting sovereigns—will be found to possess “superfluity,”’ I should have deduced the conclusion that the rich are under very little obligation

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to give of their superfluity. But what else does this mean, I pray? If it be true, that the rich may contend that they rarely possess superfluous wealth, is it not equally certain that they cannot be bound to give alms out of their superfluity? I might pursue the argument at more length, had not Diana (who is so great an admirer of Vasquez, that he calls him “the Phœnix of minds”), drawn the same inference from his principles; for, after quoting the maxims referred to of Vasquez, he thus concludes: “As to the question, Whether the rich are bound to give alms of their superfluity, although the opinion may be well founded, it will seldom or never happen that they will be under any obligation to act upon it.” Now, I have done no more than follow, word for word, these authorities. Diana, however, may repeat with eulogies these sentiments of Vasquez, may hold them forth as most reasonable, and “very convenient for the rich” (as he says in the same place); and you hold him to be no calumniator, no forger, no impostor. But if I, on the contrary, venture to adduce these same opinions (but by no means holding their author to be a phœnix)—I am an impostor, a forger, a calumniator of his principles! Be assured, reverend Fathers, you have good reason to fear, that this difference in your conduct towards those whose statements are identical, and who disagree only in their opinions of your doctors, will betray your secret motive; and make it apparent that your only aim is to uphold, by whatever means, the reputation of your Society. So long as your accommodating theology passes for a prudent condescension to the infirmities of your followers; you are not forward to disavow the statements of those who publish

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it; but, on the contrary, eulogize them, as contributing to the support of a common object. But when it is denounced as a pernicious laxity, then the same instinct of self-defence leads you to disavow principles which are bringing discredit upon you. Thus you own or repudiate, not by the rules of truth, which are immutable, but by the mere accident of shifting circumstances; according to the ancient saying, “ Omnia pro tempore, nihil pro veritate.” Take heed, then, O Fathers! and that you may not again charge me with having drawn from the principles laid down by Vasquez, conclusions which he would have disavowed, know that he has drawn those very conclusions himself (C. 1. N. 27): “ Persons are scarcely bound,” he says, “to alms-giving, when only out of their superfluity, according to the opinion of Cajetan, and according to mine also—et secundum nostram.” You must confess then, Sirs, on the testimony of Vasquez himself, that I have exactly stated his sentiments; and you will then see with what justice you have dared to say, “ If the matter be investigated to its source, it will be seen that he (Vasquez) has inculcated the very opposite doctrine.”

By what I have now adduced, then, you show the value of your assertion, that if Vasquez does not compel the rich to give alms of their superfluity, he enjoins, as a set-off, that they should give of that which is necessary to themselves. But you have omitted to add the combination of circumstances which he declares to be necessary to constitute the obligation, and which restrict it almost to the point of annihilation; while, instead of stating explicitly his doctrines, you say, generally, that he compels the rich to give, even of that which is necessary to their station.

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This would be proving too much, my good Fathers. The gospel-rule goes not this length; and Vasquez would be far from falling into such an error. To conceal his laxness, you impute to him a severity which would be actually blameable; and, by that means, you shake all belief in the fidelity of your representations. But he is by no means deserving of this reproach, after having maintained, as I have shown, that the rich are not bound by the laws of justice or charity, to give of their superfluity, and still less of their necessaries, in any ordinary cases of poverty; and that the obligation in extraordinary cases is so rare, as scarcely ever to occur.

I have now disposed of all your cavils; and it only remains for me to show, how unfounded your assertion is that Vasquez is more rigid even than Cajetan. This will be extremely easy; for the Cardinal teaches, “We are bound in justice to give alms of our superfluity, even in relief of the ordinary necessities of the poor: since, according to the holy Fathers, the rich are only stewards of their possessions for the purpose of dispensing to the wants of the needy.” And thus, instead of being, as Diana says of the maxims of Vasquez, “highly convenient and agreeable to the rich and their confessors,” the doctrine of the Cardinal affords them no such consolation. He declares (“De Eleem.” c. 6), that he has no words for the rich but those of Jesus Christ, “That it is easier for a camel to pass through a needle’s eye, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven;” and to their confessors, “If the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch.” Such sacredness did he attach to the duty in question!

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And have not all the Fathers and holy men of old maintained the same obligation ? “There are two cases,” says St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 118, Art. 4, ad. 2, “in which we are bound by the rules of justice to give alms—ex debito legali—the one, when the poor are in circumstances of dangerous destitution ; the other, when we ourselves enjoy a superfluity of means.” And q. 87, a. 1, ad. 4 : “ The tithes which the Jews were directed to distribute to the poor, have been augmented under the new law ; for Christ commands us to give not only a tenth, but the whole of our superfluity.” And yet Vasquez would exempt his followers from the distribution even of a pitiful fraction ; such is his indulgence towards the rich —his insensibility to the poor—his contrariety to the pious and beneficent sentiments expressed by the holy Gregory, in those words so unpalatable to the rich and worldly : “ When we minister to the necessity of the poor, we give them not so much of our own, as of theirs ; and it is a debt of justice, rather than an impulse of compassion.”

It is on this ground that the saints enjoin on the rich to share with the poor the bounties of earth, that they may enjoy together with them the blessings of heaven. And, instead of inculcating upon them, like your Brethren, that worldly ambition which would leave them no superfluous wealth, and those avaricious propensities which would forbid its distribution ; these holy men laboured to induce men to give bounteously of their superfluity ; and to show them how large would be its amount, if measured, not by our natural cupidity (which nothing can satisfy), but by the rule of piety, which seeks, with ingenious pains, to retrench all superfluous indulgence, in order that

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we may have the more to dispense in the exercises of charity. “We shall have large superfluity,” says St. Augustine, “if we confine ourselves within the limits of necessity; but if we give the reins to vain indulgence, nothing will satisfy us. Ascertain, my brethren, what suffices for the service of God, and the wants of nature; and not what is demanded by your cupidity, which is the mere temptation of Satan; and remember, that the superfluity of wealth is the necessity of the poor.” In Ps. 147.

I earnestly desire, Reverend Fathers, that what I have now advanced, may not only serve for my justification, which is, in itself, of little importance; but may cause you to perceive and to abhor the evil tendency of those corrupt maxims of your Casuists; that thus we may be united together in the observance of the sacred rules of the gospel, by which we must all hereafter be judged!

As to the second matter in question, Simony—before replying to the reproaches you have cast upon me—I commence by an explanation of your doctrines on the subject. Finding yourselves embarrassed between those canons of the Church, which impose fearful penalties upon simoniacal practices, and the avaricious propensities of so many who are addicted to them, you have adopted your usual method, of conceding to men all that they desire; and to God—nothing but words and empty pretences! What does the simonist want, I pray, but money, for the bestowal of his benefices? And this is what you exempt from the charge of simony! But since it is necessary that the name should still exist—a certain something to which it may be attached—you have created for this purpose a mere fiction, which would never have occurred to

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the thought of a simonist, and would indeed be useless to him,—that is, to weigh the money, considered in itself, against the spiritual good in question, considered in itself. Now, who would have ventured to compare things so disproportioned, and of such opposite natures? And yet, provided, as say your authorities, this metaphysical comparison be not made, it is allowable to transfer a benefice to another, and receive money as a consideration, without the crime of simony!

Thus it is that you make puppets of religion, in complaisance to men's corrupt passions. Yet, see with what gravity your Father Valentia delivers his vagaries, in the passage cited in my letter, t. 3, disp. 6, q. 19, part 3, p. 2044; “A temporal consideration,” he says, “may be given for a spirituality in two ways; the one in fixing a higher price on the temporal than the spiritual,* which would be simony; the other in regarding the temporal consideration as the motive and inducement for the transfer of the spirituality, without, however, estimating the temporality higher than the spirituality; and this is no simony. The reason of which is, that simony consists in receiving a temporal consideration as the actual price of a spirituality. Now, if the temporality be required—si petatur temporale—not as the price, but as the motive which induces the bestowal, this is no kind of simony, even if the principal end and aim be the acquisition of the temporality—minime erit simonia, etiamsi temporale principaliter intendatur et expectetur.”

And your illustrious Sanchez has laid down similar

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dogmas, according to Escobar, tr. 6, ex. 2, N. 40. These are his words: “ If a temporal consideration be given for a benefice, not as a price, but as a motive inducing the patron to the bestowal, or a compensation, if already bestowed, it is not simony. Sanchez declares this, Opusc. t. 2, l. 2, c. 3, d. 23, N. 7, Theses of Caen, 1644: “ It is a probable opinion, inculcated by many Catholics, that it is not simony to bestow a spirituality for a temporal consideration, when the latter is not given as a price for the same.” And as to Tannerus, this is his doctrine (and Valentia’s is similar), which, I think, will show with what justice you complain of me, for alleging its discrepancy with that of St. Thomas. Here is his own avowal, in the passage cited in my letter, t. 3, disp. 5, p. 1519; “ Properly speaking,” he says, “ there is no real and actual simony, excepting the receiving a temporal consideration as a price for a spiritual cure; but if it be taken as the motive for the bestowal of the benefice, or as a testimony of gratitude to the giver, then it is not simony, at least by the rules of conscience.” And afterwards: “ The same may be said, even if the temporality be the principal consideration, and made more the object than the spirituality; although St. Thomas, and some others, seem to hold the contrary; in that they affirm it absolutely to be simony to bestow a benefice for a temporal consideration, when the latter is the object of the transaction.”

Here then, Reverend Fathers, is your doctrine on the subject of simony, as laid down by your most eminent authors, following each other’s views with a wonderful exactness! It remains only for me to reply to your charges of misrepresentation upon this head.

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You say nothing respecting the opinions of Valentia; and his doctrines, therefore, remain untouched by your statements. But it is upon Tannerus that you pause; and you allege that he has only decided the matter in question not to be simony “ by the divine law;” leaving it to be supposed that I have suppressed, in my quotation, the words “by divine law.” Now this, I maintain to be untenable; for the terms, “ by divine law,” are not at all in the passage. You go on to say that Tannerus declares it to be a simony “ by actual law.”* Again, you are wrong, Reverend Sirs: he does not say this in general terms; but only as to particular cases—“ in casibus a jure expressis”—as he says in the same place. And herein he makes an exception from the general position laid down in the same passage, “ that it is not sinning by the rule of conscience (simonie en conscience); which implies that it is not such by actual laws; unless you would convict Tannerus of the impiety of maintaining simony by actual law, not to be such by the rules of conscience. But you are fond of putting forward designedly such terms as, “ right divine, positive right, natural right, interior and exterior tribunal, cases expressed by law, external presumption,” and others equally obscure, in order to conceal your meaning under their abstruseness, and blind people’s eyes to your extravagances. You shall, however, I assure you, not escape by these subtilties: I proceed to put to you some questions of so simple a nature, that they shall not be subject to a “ distinguo.”

I ask you then, my Reverend Fathers—without making

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it any question of “positive rights” or “external presumption” or “an exterior tribunal”—whether an incumbent, according to your authority, is a Simonist who transfers a benefice of four thousand livres annual value,* and receives ten thousand francs money down,† not as the price of the living, but as a motive which induces him to give it? Answer me plainly, Sirs; what would be the decision of your authors upon such a case as this? Would not Tannerus say, with his usual formalities, “It is not Simony by the rules of conscience, because the temporal consideration is not the price of the benefice, but only the motive which causes him to bestow it?” Would not Valentia, Sanchez, and Escobar also, (as do your Caen Theses) decide it “not to be Simony” for the same reason? Is any thing further necessary to shelter this incumbent from the charge of Simony? And would you venture to treat him as guilty of the offence, in your confessionals, (whatever might be your private opinion of his case,) when he would have it in his power to silence you by alleging that he had acted on the opinions of such learned authorities as these? Acknowledge then, that the party, whose case we are supposing, must be acquitted of Simony, according to your doctrine; and then defend the doctrines themselves in the best way you can.

This is the proper way, my Fathers, to treat questions of this kind; to dissect and disentangle them, instead of wrapping them up in scholastic terms; or changing the state of the question, as you do (in your last piece of

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vituperation) after this fashion: “ Tannerus,” you say, “ declares at least, that such a barter is a great offence.” And then you reproach me with having maliciously suppressed this expression, which, as you allege, entirely justifies him. Here again you are mistaken, and in various ways. For, even, were what you state true, it would not be a question, (in regard to the passages I referred to) whether sin had been committed, but simply, is it Simony? Now these are two very opposite questions. “ Sin,” according to your principles, “ only requires confession; Simony demands restitution:” and there are those who consider these things to be very different. For you have invented methods to render confession most indulgent; but none have been found to make restitution agreeable. I must further tell you that the case which Tannerus holds to be one of sin, is not simply, that in which a spiritual property is given for a temporal, which is the principal motive; but he superadds, “ that the temporal shall be valued higher than the spiritual.” And it is not amiss in him to adduce such a case as this as a sin; for a man must be either very knavish, or very stupid, who could not avoid falling into sin, by a device so easy as that of, merely, not drawing into a comparison the value of these two matters, when he is at liberty to give the one in exchange for the other. Besides this, Valentia, in his enquiry, (in the part already referred to) whether it be sinful to exchange spiritualities for a temporal consideration (the latter being the motive for the barter) reports the reasons of those who decide in the affirmative, adding: “ sed hoc non videtur mihi satis certum ”—this does not appear to me sufficiently clear.

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But, since that period, it has been decided by your Père Erade Bille, Professor of cases of conscience at Caen, that the cases in question have not the nature of sin; inasmuch as the probable opinions in their favor are progressively acquiring strength. He states this in his writings in 1644; in answer to which M. Dupré, Doctor and Professor of Caen, published his beautiful and well-known Dissertation. For, although Père Erade Bille acknowledges that the doctrine of Valentia (followed by Père Malhard, and condemned by the Sorbonne) “ is opposed to the general feeling, is open in various ways to suspicion of Simony, and obnoxious to legal punishment, if detected,” he nevertheless does not scruple to add, that it is an opinion, probable, and consequently safe, as regards the conscience, that there is no Simony in it; and therefore no sin. It is,” he says, “ a probable opinion, and one inculcated by many learned Catholics, that it is not Simony, and no sin, to give money, or any other temporal consideration for a benefice; either on the ground of acknowledgment, or, as a motive without which it would not be given; provided it be not an exact equivalent for the spirituality required.”

Here then is all the proof that can be desired! And thus, my Fathers, you see by this concurrence of authorities, that Simony will be reduced within such narrow limits, that even Simon Magus himself—the Prototype of all Simoniacal purchasers—who desired to give money for the gift of the Holy Ghost;—and Gehazi also—the Prototype of Simonical venders, who received money for the performance of a miracle—that even these would be exempted

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from the charge! For it is not to be doubted, that when Simon (in the Acts) offered the apostles money for their miraculous endowments, he used none of the terms of buying, and selling, and price; and did nothing more than offer his money as the motive for which the spiritual gifts were to be be imparted to him. Which being (according to your writers) no Simony, he ought to have been exempted from the denunciation of St. Peter, had the apostle been duly instructed in your doctrine. This ignorance also must be regarded as a source of great wrong to Gehazi, when struck by Elisha with leprosy; for (receiving the largess of the Prince, after his miraculous cure, merely as a mark of his gratitude, and not an equivalent for the supernatural power which had effected the miracle) he might have compelled the prophet to restore him from the plague, under pain of a mortal sin; seeing he had acted only on the principles of so many profound theologians—principles on which your confessors are bound to absolve their penitents, and to wash them from that spiritual leprosy, of which the corporeal is a type!

Alas! my Reverend Fathers, it is but too easy to turn all this into matter of ridicule. Why you should thus expose yourselves to it, I know not; I might easily, with the same view, adduce other decisions; such as that of Escobar, in his ‘Practice of Simony,’ according to the Society of Jesus, tr. 6, ex. 1, N. 44. ‘Is it Simoniacal,’ he says, ‘for two ecclesiastics to make an agreement of this kind: give me your vote for my election to the office of Provincial, and I will give you mine for getting that of Prior? No.’ And this again, tr. 6, N. 14; ‘It is not

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Simony to procure a benefice under a promise of money, if we have, in reality, no intention of paying it; for this is only a feigned Simony, and not more real than counterfeit gold is pure gold.’ Here is indeed a subtilty of conscience! A man is supposed (adding theft to simony) to procure the benefice without payment—and yet without Simony! But I have not space to pursue this subject further, and must hasten to refute your third calumnious charge on the subject of Bankruptcies.

Nothing, my Fathers, can be more gross than this. You accuse me of imposition, on the ground of a certain sentiment of Lessius, not cited by myself, but brought forward by Escobar, in a passage quoted by me from him; and thus, even if it should be proved that Lessius did not hold the opinion attributed to him by Escobar, what can be more unjust than to visit this error upon me? If I quote Lessius and your other authors, as of myself, I am answerable for them. But Escobar, having collected the views of four and twenty of your Fathers, I ask you whether I ought to be held responsible for any thing but what I myself have quoted from him, and should be made to guarantee further all his questions from others? How unreasonable is this! And yet this is the point in question. I cited in my letter the following passage, very faithfully translated from Escobar, tr. 3, ex. 2, N. 163 (upon which you make no remark.) “May a bankrupt retain with a safe conscience a sufficiency of property to enable him to live respectably: ‘ne indecoré vivat?’ I reply with Lessius, Yes.” ‘Cum Lessio assero posse, &c.’ Hereupon you affirm, that Lessius does not hold this opinion. Now, consider for a moment what it is to which you are

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committing yourselves. If the fact be not as you state, you are guilty of imposition in asserting the contrary; if it be, then Escobar is the impostor. So that, in some way or the other, some Member of the Society is convicted of imposition. See the scandal you are causing! You know not how to trace things to their necessary consequences. You think you have only to fling about your malevolences, without considering upon whom they may be retaliated. Could you not have foreseen your difficulty in regard to Escobar, before you committed yourselves to such a statement? He would have set you right. It is not difficult to communicate with Valladolid where he is living, in excellent health,* occupied in completing his great work on Moral Philosophy, in six volumes (of the first of which I shall some of these days perhaps take an opportunity of giving you some account.) My first ten letters have been transmitted to him: you might also have communicated to him a statement of your difficulty, and I will answer for it he would have replied to it; for it cannot be doubted that he has himself seen the passage in question of Lessius, from whence he got the ‘ne indecoré vivat.’ Read it carefully yourselves, my Fathers, and you will find it as I have done, Book 2, ch. 16, N. 45; ‘Idem colligitur aperté ex juribus citatis, maxime quoad ea bona quæ post cessionem acquirit, de quibus is qui

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debitor est etiam ex delicto, potest retinere quantúm necessarium est, ut pro suâ conditione non indecore vivat. Petes an leges id permittant de bonis quæ tempore instantis cessionis habebat ? Ita videtur colligi ex D.D."

I will not pause here to show that Lessius, in this dogma, abuses the sanction of the law, by which a bankrupt is allowed a mere subsistence, and not the means of an honourable maintenance.* It is sufficient to have justified Escobar from the charge against him, and more than was necessary. But you, reverend Fathers, have not done your duty ; for the matter in question is to reply to that passage in Escobar, whose decisions are very inconvenient, inasmuch as, being independent of all that precedes and follows, and dealing in abstract dogmas, they are not subject to your distinctions. I have already quoted one entire passage, which permits " those who make compromises, to retain a portion of their property (even though unjustly acquired), for the respectable maintenance of their families." Upon which I felt myself compelled to make this comment in my letter ; " By what strange species of charity do you maintain, that property shall belong rather to those who have acquired it by injustice, than to the lawful creditors ? " This it is which calls for a reply ; but then comes your difficulty ; which you will seek in vain to elude by citing other passages from Lessius, quite beside the point. I ask you, can this decision of Lessius be conscientiously acted upon by one who has committed bankruptcy ? And beware how you answer ! If in the negative, I ask what becomes of your

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Doctor, and your doctrine of probability? If in the affirmative, then I send you to the courts of justice!

I take leave of you, my reverend Fathers, in this dilemma; for I have left myself no space now to expose your next imposture, respecting the passage from Lessius upon homicide. Let this suffice for the present: more shall follow.

I shall also, on this occasion, make no reply to the false and scandalous reflections upon myself, with which you wind up each successive misrepresentation. They shall all be encountered in a succeeding letter; in which also, I hope effectually to open up the hidden sources from which your various calumnies are drawn.

Yet, Sirs, for your own sakes, I cannot but lament to see you resorting to such weapons. The wrongs that you inflict upon me, will not set at rest our controversies; and your menaces—of whatever description—shall never deter me from self-defence. You think yourselves sheltered by the impunity of power; but I stand on the vantage-ground of innocence and truth! Long and persevering may be the assaults of violence against those sacred bulwarks. No efforts of rude power can overthrow truth; they serve only to enhance her lustre; while truth's most transcendent radiance avails not to arrest the course of violence, and serves but to irritate it the more. When force opposes force, the stronger overpowers the weak; when controversies are arrayed against each other, those founded on justice and reason may silence the clamours of vanity and falsehood: but violence and truth will ever wage against each other a fruitless and interminable warfare. Yet, let it not then be concluded that their forces are

[p. 218]

balanced, and their weapons tempered alike. There is between them this immeasurable difference, that violence traces a course limited and circumscribed by the resistless decree of God, which causes all its efforts to subserve the advancement of the sacred cause assailed. But truth shall remain ever unimpaired, and be victorious over all her enemies ; for she is immortal and omnipotent, like the Eternal himself !

Notes

  1. *‘Prisant davantage le temporel que le spirituel.’ (Fr.)
  2. *‘ De droit positif.’ (Fr.)
  3. *‘De quatre mille livres de rente.’ (Fr.)
  4. †‘Dix mille francs argent comptant.’ (Fr.)
  5. *Escobar. From all that is related by Alegambe of the Père Escobar, he seems to have been (in his way) a well-meaning, laborious, and devoted man. It is said that when he learnt how he was brought forward in the Provincial Letters he was delighted, and thought much more of himself than before. His portrait is in existence: it is striking, and shows him to have been a resolute and decided man, of thorough self-confidence. He died at Valladolid in July, 1669, at the age of 81. (Editor.)
  6. *‘ Vivre avec honneur.) Fr.)

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About this letter

Letter LETTER XII. of 25 · printed pp. 197–218 · scan leaf 283 of 570

Where it sits in the book: black are letters, grey the editor’s narrative, pale the front matter, appendices and index.

Source
The Provincial Letters of Pascal, with an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce, 1847, pp. 197–218.
How it was read
Read by machine. Not yet proofread by people. Expect occasional slips in names, accents and foreign words. The book’s reading score is 88 out of 100. How this text was read
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Cite this letter

CitationLetter, “LETTER XII. · REFUTATION OF THE SOPHISTRIES OF THE JESUITS ON · THE SUBJECTS OF ALMS-GIVING AND SIMONY.”. In The Provincial Letters of Pascal, with an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1847), pp. 197–218. Paper Lanterns edition, https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/14/.

BibTeX@incollection{pascal-provincial-letters-1847-letter-0014,
  author    = {},
  title     = {LETTER XII. · REFUTATION OF THE SOPHISTRIES OF THE JESUITS ON · THE SUBJECTS OF ALMS-GIVING AND SIMONY., undated},
  booktitle = {The Provincial Letters of Pascal},
  publisher = {London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1847},
  year      = {1847},
  pages     = {197--218},
  note      = {With an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce. Paper Lanterns edition},
  url       = {https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/14/}
}

Linkhttps://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/14/

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