Refutation of the Reply of the Society to the preceding · (12th) Letter.

Refutation of the Reply of the Societythe preceding (12th) Letter

Whoever may be the party I am now addressing…

Printed pp. 218–236

Refutation of the Reply of the Society to the preceding
(12th) Letter.

Sir,

Whoever may be the party I am now addressing, and who has undertaken the cause of the Jesuits against a publication which exposes so fully the delinquencies of their moral system, you seem, by the eagerness with which you hasten to their succour, to be sensible of their weakness ; and herein your judgment is not to be impeached. But, if you entertain the belief that you have really succeeded in establishing their defence, your discretion, I must take leave to tell you, will not appear to be equally sound. I entertain, however, a better opinion of you ; and am satisfied that your aim is only to divert the author of the Letters from his object by a feigned attack. In this you have not been successful ; and, to my great satisfaction, the Thirteenth Letter is on the eve of appearing,

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although he has made no reply to your strictures upon the 11th and 12th; and, in fact, has scarcely bestowed a thought upon the writer. This leads me to hope that other and similar animadversions will remain disregarded by him. Doubt not, Sir, that he would have found you an easy antagonist. You have seen how he has dealt with the Society in general; what difficulty could he have found in encountering yourself individually? You may judge of this by what I am about to remark, in answer to your strictures upon his Twelfth Letter.

I shall here leave unnoticed all the reproaches you have directed against the author of the Letters. He has himself promised to reply to them; and I suspect he will do it after such a fashion, as will leave to you little more than the trophies of shame and remorse. It will not be difficult for him to overwhelm with confusion mere individuals such as yourself and your brother Jesuits, who indecently presume to usurp the authority of the Church; to treat as heretics whomsoever you please; while you are impotent to defend yourselves against the just reproaches which their flagitious maxims have drawn upon you. For myself, I shall restrict myself to the refutation of those new impostures to which you have resorted, for the justification of your casuists. We will begin with Vasquez.

You make no reply to all that the author of the Letters has cited in proof of his pernicious doctrines of alms-giving, and you weakly accuse him (the author) of four falsehoods, the first of which is, that he has suppressed from the passage cited out of Vasquez, in the 6th Letter, these words, “ Statum quem licitè possunt acquirere;”

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and has been guilty of dissimulation respecting the reproaches brought against him thereupon.

I see plainly, Sir, that you have been led to believe, on the faith of your worthy friends the Jesuits, that these words are to be found in the passage quoted by the author of the Letters; for had you known that they are actually not there, you would rather have blamed these Fathers for bringing the charge against him, than felt surprise that he had not condescended to reply to so frivolous an objection. But do not put so much confidence in them. Be assured you will be taken in. Look, for yourself, into the passage quoted by the author. You will find it, De Elem. ch. 4, N. 14; but you will not find in it any of the words alleged to be suppressed; nay, you will be astonished to find them occurring just fourteen pages previously! After this, you will no doubt feel you have cause to complain of these good Fathers; and will see, that to justify a charge against this writer of suppressing the words in question, he ought to be bound to introduce passages extending through fourteen pages in folio, into a letter consisting of eight pages in quarto, a space also in which he has been accustomed to give about thirty or forty quotations. This is not quite reasonable.

This then may suffice to prove that it is you who are the real authors of the misrepresentation; and equally easy is the conviction of Vasquez. This Jesuit has been charged with overthrowing the precept of Christ, which enjoins the rich to give alms of their superfluity; by maintaining, “ that what the rich retain for the maintenance of their station in life, or that of their relatives, is

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no superfluity ; and therefore, that people of the world, and even Sovereigns themselves, scarcely ever have any superfluous means.” This position it is—“ that people of the world scarcely ever have a superfluity ”—which absolves them from the duty of alms-giving ; since it is a necessary consequence, that having nothing superfluous, they are bound to give nothing away. If the author of the Letters had drawn this inference, you would have had some ground for pretending that it was not deducible from the principle, “ that what the rich retain for maintaining their station, or that of their relations, is not to be called superfluity.” But he has found it in full detail in Vasquez. He has read these words, so opposed to the spirit of the gospel and to Christian moderation: “ Scarcely is superfluity of means to be found among people of the world, or even among Sovereigns.” He has also read the following sentiment, quoted in the 12th Letter: “ We are scarcely bound to give alms at all, if we are bound to give it only of our superfluity.” And what is curious, is, that this expression is found in the very same place that contains the words, “ Statum quem licitè possunt acquirere ;” by means of which you pretend to make your escape. You throw away your manœuvres upon the principle in question, since you are obliged to be silent respecting the consequences formally deduced by Vasquez ; and which are sufficient to annul the precept of Christ, as he is in fact charged with doing. If Vasquez had drawn such conclusions erroneously, he would have added unsoundness of judgment to error in morals ; and he would not have been less blameable, nor the precept of Christ less impugned. But it will appear, by the refutation

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of your next charge against the author of the Letters, that these evil consequences are properly deduced from the bad principle laid down by Vasquez in the same place; and that the Jesuit in question has not offended against the laws of sound reason, but only against those of the gospel!

Your second slanderous charge, “of having dissembled after he had been convinced of error,” alleges that he has omitted the words in question designedly, for the purpose of misrepresenting the Father’s sentiments, and drawing from them this scandalous conclusion, “that,” according to Vasquez, “those who have much ambition can possess no superfluity.” Here I must tell you, Sir, in one word, that nothing can be more unfounded than this accusation. The Jesuits themselves have never complained of this inference; and yet you reproach the author of the Letters with not having answered an objection that was never before brought against him. But if you think yourself more clear-sighted than the whole of their body, it will be easy to cure you of a self-complacency, which is really injurious to this great fraternity. For how can you deny that, from the principle of Vasquez, viz. “that what is reserved for the maintenance of our condition in society, or that of our relations, is not to be called superfluity,” the conclusion is unavoidable, that an ambitious person cannot have superfluous means. I willingly allow you to add the restriction expressed in another passage, which is, that we must never seek to improve our condition, except by lawful means; “Statum quem licitè possunt acquirere.” This by no means impeaches the correctness of the inference, which you object to as unfounded.

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It is quite true, that there are rich persons who may be allowed to improve their condition by lawful methods. An expectation, on the part of the individual, of promoting the public good, may sometimes justify the wish, provided the object be not so much to promote his own interest as the honour of God, and the general welfare. But how rarely does the spirit of the Gospel—without which no pure desires can exist—suggest such motives as these to the rich and worldly? That gracious influence more usually prompts to diminish the encumbrances which check our aspirations after heavenly good; and sounds in our ears the Gospel-warning, “He that exalteth himself shall be abased.” Thus, the desires so prevalent in most men of the present day, continually to raise themselves and their connexions in station (even though by lawful means,) are ordinarily nothing more than the instigations of earthly cupidity and ambition; for it is a gross error to suppose that ambition to rise in condition is only evinced by the employment of unlawful means. And it is this error which St. Augustine condemns in his work ‘On Patience,’ ch. 3, wherein he says, “The love of wealth and reputation is a vanity sanctioned by the world; and it is supposed that avarice, ambition, luxury, dissipation, are innocent, because they do not involve crimes and irregularity forbidden by the laws.” Ambition consists in desiring elevation and honour for their own sake, as avarice is a love of money for itself. If pursued by unjust means, these objects become more criminal; but you do not, by merely substituting lawful means, render such propensities innocent. Now Vasquez does not refer, on this occasion, to instances in which certain

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persons of substance desire to improve their condition, and “ are in the probable way to do so,” as Cardinal Cajetan says. If he had done so, it would have been absurd to conclude (as he does) that people of the world rarely have a superfluity; for those very rare occasions, which can seldom occur (perhaps only once or twice in a life,) and that, only in the instances of a very small number of wealthy persons, to whom God has revealed that they shall not injure themselves by advancing in station for the good of others—these instances, I say, cannot invalidate the position that the larger number of rich persons enjoy much of superfluity. But he speaks of a vague and indefinite love of aggrandizement, and a desire of elevation that knows no bounds; for had it been duly limited, the rich would have been conscious of possessing superfluity, before such a point had been attained.

And thus, at last, he brings himself to believe that the desire in question is so universal and so allowable, that very few wealthy persons can in reality possess any superfluity.

You ought then, Sir, to understand once for all, that it is this love of aggrandizement—this effort perpetually to rise above our fellows and associates, even by lawful means—‘ ad statum quem licité possunt acquirere ’—that the author of the Letters has designated as ambition ; for it is the name which the Fathers give to it, and which the world itself does not disown. He has not thought himself bound to adopt the common trick of such casuists—that of banishing vices by their real names, but retaining them under others. If then the words ‘ Statum quem

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licité possunt acquirere’ had been in the passage he adduced, he would not have been obliged to suppress them in order to prove it to be criminal. It is in combining them that he justly condemns Vasquez for the position he lays down, that the ambitious can have no superfluity; and he is not the first who has drawn such a conclusion from this doctrine. M. Du Val had done it before him (though in less formal terms), while combatting this maxim—Vol. 2. q. 8. Sp. 576; “ It would follow,” he says, “ that they who aspired to the highest station, that is, who had the largest share of ambition, would possess no superfluity, although enjoying much more than they needed for their present rank—‘ Sequeretur eum qui hanc dignitatem cuperet, seu qui majori ambitione duceretur, habendo plurima suprà decentiam sui statûs, non habiturum superflua.’”

Thus, Sir, you have been utterly unsuccessful in the two first charges of misrepresentation brought against the author of the Letters; let us now see whether the rest are better founded. Of these, the one is, that he has stated Vasquez to maintain that the rich are not bound to give of what is required for maintaining their condition in society. The refutation of this charge is easy; it is simply that it is false, and that what he has stated is the direct reverse. No other proof is required of this than the passage which you yourselves produce, only three lines lower down, in which he cites Vasquez as saying, “ that the rich are bound to give of what is necessary for them, on certain occasions.”

Your last complaint is not less unfounded. Let us look at the substance of it. The author of the Letters had

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referred to two decisions of doctrine in Vasquez; the one “that the rich are not bound either by duty, or charity, to give of their superfluity (and still less of what they need themselves) in any cases of ordinary necessity of the poor.” The other, “that the occasions on which they are bound to give out of that which they need themselves, are so rare, as that they scarcely ever occur.” To the first and most flagrant of these decisions you have no reply to offer: what then do you make of the second? You join them together; and, contriving some paltry evasion as to the latter, you endeavour to make it appear that you have produced an answer to the two. Now it shall be my endeavour to unravel what you purposely perplex; and I ask you, is it not true that Vasquez teaches, that the rich are never bound to give of their superfluity, either by necessity, justice, or charity, in the ordinary exigencies of the poor? Has not the author demonstrated it by the express words of Vasquez; “Corduba teaches (he says) that those who have abundance are bound to give in ordinary cases of necessity, in order in some measure to conform to the precept.” (Observe that the question here is not whether the duty be one of justice or charity, but of absolute obligation.) See then the decision of Vasquez hereon; “But this does not please me—‘sed hoc non placet’—for we have proved the contrary, in opposition to Cajetan and Navarre.” To this then you have given no reply, and have left your Jesuit friends convicted of a dogma diametrically opposed to the Gospel!

And as to his second decision, “that the rich are to give on such infrequent occasions, as almost never can occur, of that which is acquired for their own wants,” the

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author of the Letters has not less clearly proved it by the numerous conditions which the Jesuit collects together to constitute the obligation; viz. that the case, being one of urgent necessity, can receive relief from no other quarter, and that the necessity must be attended with mortal danger to the person or the reputation. The question is then asked, whether these various contingencies are of frequent occurrence in a place like Paris; and next he presses the Jesuits with this argument, “That Vasquez, permitting the poor to rob the rich, under the same circumstances in which he requires the rich to relieve the poor, must have supposed, either that those circumstances were of very rare occurrence, or that the latter would be commonly allowed to resort to robbery.” What answer have you given, I ask, to this? You have concealed all these conditions, and have simply reported three passages from Vasquez; in the two first of which he says, that the rich are bound to help the poor in urgent need; a position which the author of the Letters expressly acknowledges; but you have taken care not to add, that he mixes up with the precept such conditions, as that the necessity for alms-giving will scarcely ever arise; which is the matter actually in question.

The third passage upon which you comment states solely, that the rich are not bound to give alms even in cases of extreme necessity, that is, if a human being be at the point of death, because they are very rare: whence you maintain it to be false that the cases in which Vasquez enjoins alms-giving are very rare. But you deceive yourself, Sir: you can conclude no otherwise; since, if Vasquez does not apply the term ‘rare’ to the occasions of

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giving alms, he renders them such in reality by the restrictions he imposes upon them. In this, however, he does but follow the system of the entire company. The member in question had to soothe the rich, who choose to be under very slender obligation to give alms ; and to satisfy the Church, which makes large demands upon them for such objects. According to the method of the Society, therefore, he wished to please all parties, and he has succeeded. On the one side, he insists upon conditions of such rare occurrence, that the most sordid mind must be contented; on the other, he conceals from view the infrequency, in order to give satisfaction to the Church. It is immaterial therefore whether Vasquez have used the term ‘rare’ or not. The charge is not as to a name. He was too subtle a Jesuit to call bad things by a bad name. But the question is, whether he makes them ‘rare’ in reality by his restrictions ; and this it is which the Author of the Letters has so clearly established, that no resource is left to you, but that which never fails—dissimulation and silence.

All that you subsequently add, as to the subtlety of Vasquez’s mind, in the different senses in which he uses the terms “necessary” and “superfluous,” is pure deception. He has never (any more than other theologians) treated of them but in two senses. There is, according to him, what is “necessary for nature, and necessary for station ; superfluous for nature, and superfluous for station.” But to constitute superfluity for station, he maintains that it must be such, not only for the present, but also for such future condition as wealth may enable men to attain to for themselves or their families, by lawful

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means! Thus, according to Vasquez, all that is retained for improving our condition is simply necessary for station, and only superfluous for nature; whence it follows (as the author has demonstrated) that the occasions in which the duty of alms-giving will be incumbent, can scarcely ever arise.

It is needless here to add any thing to the remarks of the author of the letters upon the comparison between Vasquez and Cajetan. I will only, in passing, give you warning that you misrepresent both the Cardinal and Vasquez in saying that “ contrary to what he had stated in the Tract upon Alms-giving, he teaches in that upon indulgences, that the omission of the duty to give of our abundance does not exceed “ venial sin.” Read it, Sir, for yourself, and trust not so implicitly to Jesuits, either dead or living! You will then find that Cajetan formally inculcates the direct reverse; and after saying, that there are only extreme necessities (among which he comprehends also the greater part of what Vasquez calls “ urgent,”) which involve mortal sin, he makes this exception: “ unless it be to possess superfluous property;—seclusa superfluitate bonorum.”

I now proceed, with you, to the doctrine on Simony. The author of the Letters has had but one object in view, viz., to prove that the society holds this principle; that, by the laws of conscience, it is not Simony to give a spirituality for a temporal consideration, provided the temporality be not the principal motive in the transaction, and be not received as its price. And to prove this, he has in his Twelfth Letter, produced entire, a passage from Valentia, which establishes the doctrine so clearly, that

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you have nothing to advance in reply to it; any more than to his further proofs from Escobar, Erade Belle, and others; who all declare the same thing. This unanimity of opinion is sufficient (according to the doctrine of “Probability,” which your whole body maintain) to bring home these views to the Society, inculcated as they are by so many learned provincials. You must confess then, that in leaving undisturbed, as you have done, the sentiments of all the other Jesuits, and demurring only to that of Tannerus, you have wholly failed in impeaching the correctness of the author of the Letters whom you select as the object of your attack, and in justifying the Society, which you have undertaken to defend.

But—to leave nothing in doubt upon this head—I maintain that you are in error as to Tannerus, as well as all the others. First, you cannot deny that he says, generally, “it is not Simony, in conscience—‘in foro conscientiæ’—to bestow a spirituality for a temporal consideration, when the temporality is not the principal motive, nor even the price.” And when he says it is not Simony, “in conscience,” he means that it is not such, either by Divine rules, or by positive law. This is the general rule of Tannerus, to which he makes one exception, viz., “in cases designated by law, it is a Simony by actual law, or a Simony by presumption.” Now, as an exception cannot be co-extensive with the rule, it follows, necessarily, that the general maxim, as above-cited, applies in some cases of spiritual-transfers; and thus, that there are spiritualities which may be bestowed without Simony, by actual law for temporal considerations, by exchanging the term “price,” for that of “motive.”

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The author of the Letters has thought fit to apply the doctrine of Valentia and Tannerus to the case of benefices. But it is quite unimportant to his argument that you make a change; and allow, instead of benefices, the sacraments, or ecclesiastical offices to be bartered for money. He considers both to be alike immoral, and gives you the choice of either. It would seem, Sir, that you are disposed to make the election, and would have it understood that it is not simoniacal, to repeat masses (for instance) when the chief motive is the money to be received for the performance: and this impression is unavoidable, from your own statements, as to the practice of the Church in Paris. Now if you had meant to say simply, that the faithful are at liberty to offer of their temporal goods to those who minister to them in spiritual, and that those who “serve the altar may live of the altar,” none would contradict you; but this is quite beside the question. The real point, is this: is a priest, whose only motive in offering the sacrifice is the money he receives for the office, guilty, in the sight of God, of Simony? You, (following the doctrine of Tannerus) would acquit him; but can you do so, on the principles of Christian faith? “If Simony,” says Peter Le Chautre, one of the brightest ornaments of the Church of Paris, “be so flagrant and damnable in matters connected with the sacraments, how much more so must it be in regard to the very sacraments themselves; and chiefly that of the Eucharist, where Jesus himself, the source and spring of all grace, is received? Simon Magus,” continues this holy man, “having been repulsed by Simon Peter, might have said, ‘You repel me now, but the time will come when I shall

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triumph over you, and the whole body of the Church. I shall establish my empire upon the altar itself; and when the angels shall assemble on the one side, adoring the body of the Redeemer, I shall stand over against them, instructing the minister of the altar to form the elements, that complete that body, for money!’” Yet the crime which this pious theologian so sternly condemns, consists only in the cupidity which renders the temporal consideration, for which holy offices are performed, the chief object in such performance. And this leads him generally to remark, “that holy offices (which he calls ‘ouvrages de la droite,’) being performed through the love of money constitutes Simony—‘Opus dexteræ operatum causâ pecuniæ acquirendæ, parit Simoniam.’” What then would he have said, had he heard that atrocious maxim of the casuists, which you defend, “It is lawful for a priest to renounce, for a small sum of money, all the spiritual benefits that he might expect from the sacrifice”?

You see then, that if this be the whole of your defence of Tannerus, you prove only that the falsehood of his doctrine is aggravated by its impiety; and what then becomes of the exception to be made in his favor?

It was to get rid of all these refinements that the author of the Letters enquired of the Jesuits, “Would it be Simony by the rules of conscience, according to your authors, to bestow a benefice of 4000 livres annual value, in consideration of a payment of 10,000 francs, if it be in the way of motive and not of price?” To this he has demanded an answer, without any phraseology of “positive rights,” or resorting to scholastic terms and grammatical

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subtleties, which nobody understands or cares for. This you profess now to do, and have given this reply: “That apart from the rules of law, it would not be Simony, in the same manner as there would be no sin in not attending mass on festivals, if the Church had not ordained it.” That is to say, it is only Simony because the Church makes it so; and, but for the actual law, it would be an innocent act. To this I reply,

First, you do not properly answer the question that is put to you. The author asked, “Is it Simony, according to the Jesuit authorities, quoted by him?” The question is not at all as to your opinion: what weight does that carry? Are you a learned doctor? I much question it? The point is, as to the opinions of Valentia, Tannerus, Sanchez, Escobar, Erade Bille, all men of unquestionable learning. It is for them that you are called upon to answer. The author of the Letters affirms that you cannot maintain the case in question to be Simony (according to the laws of conscience) by the rules of these Jesuits. Now as to Valentia, Sanchez, Escobar, and the others, you leave them to answer for themselves. You make a show of fighting in favor of Tannerus, but you see that it is unavailing; and, after all, it remains clear that the Society teaches, that a spiritual charge may, without conscientious Simony, be given, for a temporal consideration, provided the temporality be only the inclining motive, but not a price. This is all that was contended for.

Secondly, I maintain that your reply involves a flagrant impiety. What! Will you dare, Sir, to say, that, apart from the ecclesiastical law there would be no Simony in giving money, though in this circuitous way, for admission

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into the offices of the Church; that before the canons had pronounced it crime, money was a*lawful way of entrance, provided it were not given as a price; and that thus, St. Peter's condemnation of Simon Magus was harsh and rash, seeing it was not clear whether the money he offered, was in the way of price or only of motive ?

To what school, I ask, would you send us, to learn this doctrine? Not that of Jesus Christ, who ever taught his disciples, “freely to give as they had freely received ;” and who in those words, as Peter Le Chantre remarks, in verb. Abb. C. 36, “ forbids every species of present or compensation, by agreement, or without agreement; for God sees the heart.” It is not to the school of the Church, for she treats not only as criminals, but as heretics, all who employ money for the obtaining ecclesiastical preferments, and designates such traffic—by whatever artifice palliated—not as a violation of one of its positive laws, but, as heresy—“ Simoniacam Hæresim ! ”

The school, then, in which these principles are taught —be it, that it is not Simony by positive law; or that it is such only by presumption, or that it is not sinful to give money as a motive, but only as a price—such a school is no other than that of Gehazi and of Simon Magus! It is that school, in which those two first traffickers in holy things—doomed to execration in all ages— may alone be acquitted of guilt; a school in which, flinging to cupidity the reins of its basest desires and unholiest acts, its pupils are taught to evade the laws of the Omniscient by changes of words, while action remains unaltered ! But let the disciples of that school learn in what way the great Pope, Innocent III., in his Missive to

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the Archbishop of Canterbury, in the year 1199, has launched his indignant anathemas against the damnable subtleties of those, “ who, blinded by the lust of gain, pretend to palliate the crime of Simony under reputable names ;—‘ Simoniam sub honesto nomine palliant ;’—as if the change of a name could alter the nature of the crime, or the punishments due to it. But God is not mocked,” (adds the Pope) “ and if these followers of Simon could escape in this life the retribution they deserve, they shall not escape in another the everlasting punishment reserved for such guilt ! No well-sounding names can extenuate crime, nor shall the disguise of a word conceal its real nature : ‘ Cum nec honestas nominis criminis malitiam palliabit, nec vox poterit abolere reatum.’ ”

The last question between us is, that relating to bankrupts. Here I cannot but admire your hardihood. The Jesuits, whom you defend, had very imprudently objected to the discussion of the authority of Lessius, as adduced by Escobar ; for the author of the Letters cited Lessius only on Escobar’s authority, and attributed to the latter alone the decision complained of ; viz. “ that bankrupts may retain a sufficiency of their property for competent maintenance, although that property may have been obtained by notorious peculation and crime.” It is, therefore, as to Escobar alone, that he has pressed them, either openly to disavow this maxim, or to acknowledge that they hold it ; and—in the latter alternative—“ I send them,” he says, “ to the laws.” It is to them that they must make answer ; and not shelter themselves under the plea that Lessius (with whom we have nothing to do) is of a different opinion from Escobar, who alone is the party

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in question. Do you suppose that to evade an inquiry is to answer it? Do not thus deceive yourself. You shall answer for Escobar, before we proceed to Lessius. It is not, however, that I shrink from encountering him also; and I promise you, hereafter, a very full exposition of the doctrine of Lessius upon bankruptcy, and thorough proof that it is as much opposed to the Law, as to the Sorbonne.

Our controversy, with the help of God, shall not stop here; but it shall be now suspended, on my part, till you have replied to the points in question respecting Escobar. You shall give satisfaction upon this, before we enter upon other matters. Escobar is the first in order; he shall be disposed of, in spite of all your evasions. Be assured that Lessius’ turn shall soon follow! *

Notes

  1. *French Editor’s note. Although by a different hand, and very inferior in merit to the Provincial Letters, this article seemed to me too interesting to be omitted in the present edition.

    ** If, as above stated, this letter be by a different hand, and not, as is possible, under the assumed character of a colleague, in order to give variety to the correspondence, it may be doubted whether it should be regarded as very inferior. It is full of point and energy, and may remind us of the fire of Demosthenes, interposing between the more flowing and graceful rhetoric of Cicero; or—in modern days—the sparkle and impetuosity of Fox or Sheridan breaking in upon the measured dignity of Pitt. (Transl.)

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Letter 16 of 25 · printed pp. 218–236 · scan leaf 304 of 570

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Source
The Provincial Letters of Pascal, with an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce, 1847, pp. 218–236.
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CitationRefutation of the Reply of the Society to the preceding (12th) Letter, “Refutation of the Reply of the Society to the preceding · (12th) Letter.”. In The Provincial Letters of Pascal, with an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1847), pp. 218–236. Paper Lanterns edition, https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/16/.

BibTeX@incollection{pascal-provincial-letters-1847-letter-0016,
  author    = {Refutation of the Reply of the Society},
  title     = {Refutation of the Reply of the Society to the preceding · (12th) Letter., undated},
  booktitle = {The Provincial Letters of Pascal},
  publisher = {London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1847},
  year      = {1847},
  pages     = {218--236},
  note      = {With an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce. Paper Lanterns edition},
  url       = {https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/16/}
}

Linkhttps://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/16/

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