LETTER XIII. · THAT THE DOCTRINE OF LESSIUS UPON HOMICIDE IS THE SAME AS THAT OF VICTORIA. HOW EASY IS THE TRANSITION FROM SPECULATION TO PRACTICE. THE REASON OF THE JESUITS AVAILING THEMSELVES OF THIS FUTILE DISTINCTION, AND THEIR CULPABILITY IN SO DOING.
I have just seen your last paper, in which you pursue your charges of imposture…
LETTER XIII.
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF LESSIUS UPON HOMICIDE IS THE SAME AS THAT OF VICTORIA. HOW EASY IS THE TRANSITION FROM SPECULATION TO PRACTICE. THE REASON OF THE JESUITS AVAILING THEMSELVES OF THIS FUTILE DISTINCTION, AND THEIR CULPABILITY IN SO DOING.
My Revered Fathers.
Sept. 30, 1656.
I have just seen your last paper, in which you pursue your charges of imposture; but state that you have now done with that kind of accusation, and intend to adopt a different method of defending yourselves, viz. by showing that there are many casuists, besides those of your fraternity, whose views are equally lax with your own. I have now before me the whole of the misrepresentations which I have to reply to; and as the fourth, where we left off, is on the subject of homicide, it will tend to convenience, while answering you on that point, to dispose, at the same time, of No. 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18, which are all upon the same subject.
I have then, in the present letter, to maintain the fidelity of my quotations, in contradiction to the falsehood with which you charge me. But as you have dared to
[p. 238]maintain in your writings, “ that the sentiments of your authors on the subject of murder are conformable to the decisions of the Popes and of ecclesiastical law,” you compel me to enter upon a refutation of a proposition, so audacious in itself, and so injurious to the Church. It is incumbent upon me to demonstrate that her holy institutions are untainted by your corruptions, in order that heretics may not avail themselves of your errors, to draw inferences dishonourable to her purity. And thus, by placing in contrast, on the one hand, your pernicious maxims, and, on the other, the canons of the Church, by which they are condemned, it will be seen at once, both what should be avoided, and what obeyed.
Your fourth misrepresentation is on the subject of a decision upon the question of murder, which you charge me with falsely attributing to Lessius. It is this: “ A man who has received a blow, may pursue his enemy at the instant, even sword in hand; not to revenge himself, but for the purpose of repairing his honour.” Upon which you reply: “ The opinion in question is one of the Casuist Victoria.” Now this again is not the matter of dispute, for it is no contradiction to say that it is jointly that of Victoria and Lessius; because Lessius himself says that it is also that of Navarre, and your Père Henriquez; who teach, “ that a person receiving a blow may instantly pursue his antagonist, and give him as many blows as he may think necessary for the reparation of his honour.” The question, then, is only, whether Lessius is agreed in opinion with these authors, as well as his cotemporaries? And, therefore, you add, “ Lessius only refers to this opinion for the purpose of confuting it;” and
[p. 239]thus I attribute a sentiment to him which he brings forward only to oppose—an act, of all others the most mean and disgraceful in a writer. But I maintain that he quotes it, for the purpose of expressing his agreement with it. It is a question of fact, which may easily be determined. We will therefore see how you establish your position, and you shall then see how I persist in maintaining mine.
To prove that Lessius does not hold the opinion in question, you say he condemns it in practice; and for proof of that, you produce an extract from his works, Book 2, c. 9, n. 82, as follows: ‘I condemn this practice.’ I acknowledge that if you look through Lessius (N. 82) as referred to by you, you will find these words. But what will you say, my Fathers, when I tell you that in this place he is treating of a question wholly different from the one in dispute; and that the opinion, which he here says he in practice condemns, is entirely unconnected with that we are discussing. You have but to open the book, to ascertain the fact: his argument is to the following effect.
He is treating of the question ‘whether it is lawful to take life for a blow?’ (No. 79,) and he concludes the subject at No. 80, without a single word in condemnation. This question being finished, he begins a new one at Art. 81, viz. ‘Whether life may be taken for slanderous language.’ It is respecting this question that he uses at (No. 82) the words we have quoted from him, ‘I condemn the practice.’
Now, my Reverend Fathers, is it not disgraceful to find you producing these expressions, in order to cause it to
[p. 240]be believed that Lessius condemns the opinion, that homicide may be perpetrated in revenge for a blow; and that, resting upon this solitary proof, you should triumphantly exclaim, as you have done, ‘ Several distinguished persons in Paris have already ascertained, by a perusal of Lessius, this scandalous falsehood; and have thus been enabled to judge what degree of belief is due to this calumnious writer.’
What, Sirs ! is it thus you abuse the confidence reposed in you by these eminent personages ? To prove to them that Lessius does not hold the doctrine in question, you open his book at a part where he condemns another; and impose on the credulity of persons who are incapable of suspecting your sincerity. I doubt not, my good Fathers, that, for the success of this flagrant artifice, you have availed yourselves with good effect of your own doctrine of ‘ Equivocation,’ and while reading the passage ‘ aloud,’ you said ‘in a whisper’ that it had reference to a different matter. But I may be allowed to doubt whether this procedure, however satisfactory to your consciences, will satisfy the just reproaches which will be made you by these honourable persons, when they discover the imposition that has been practised upon them.
Take care, then, I pray you, to prevent their seeing my letters; for this is the only way in which you can much longer preserve your credit. I do not take this precaution with yours: I send them round to all my friends : I wish the whole world to see them. And I believe we are both in the right. For, as to yourselves, after trumpeting so publicly the refutation of my fourth misrepresentation, what will be your situation, when it is
[p. 241]found that, to make good your case, you have substituted one passage for another? Naturally will it be judged, that if you had been able to find what you wanted in the part where Lessius treats of the quotation at issue, you would not have sought it elsewhere; and that you have had recourse to this method, only because you could find nothing else favorable to your object. You desired to discover in Lessius what you stated in your “ Imposture,” p. 10, Lig. 12,—“ That he does not allow this opinion to be speculatively probable.” Now Lessius says expressly, in the close of his Discussion, N. 80: “ The opinion— that life may be taken for a blow—is speculatively probable.” Is not this, word for word, the opposite of your assertion? And who but must admire the audacity with which you adduce from him in express terms a sentiment the very reverse of the real one? So that—instead of opposing—Lessius is proved by his own words, distinctly to sanction it.
You would desire to represent Lessius as “ condemning the practice” in question; and (as I have said already) not a word of condemnation is to be found in his Treatise; but these are his actual expressions: “ It seems that this practice ought not lightly to be allowed;—‘ in praxi non videtur facile permittenda.” Is this, Sirs, the language of a man who condemns a doctrine? Is not the just conclusion rather—since nothing to the contrary is stated—that, although the practice is not lightly to be sanctioned, it may sometimes (even, if rarely) be allowed? And, as if he would teach the whole world when it may be allowed, and relieve persons receiving the offence in question from inconvenient scruples, as not knowing exactly
[p. 242]the occasions on which they may practically be indulged in committing the murders in question, he is careful to prescribe what should be avoided, in order to carry the doctrine into practice with a safe conscience. “It seems,” he says, “that it ought not to be lightly allowed, on account of the danger of its being practiced through hatred, or for revenge, or in excess; or, lest it should occasion too many murders.”
From all this then it is clear that this species of homicide is in practice fully allowed by Lessius, provided these inconvenient consequences be avoided; that is, provided it be done without malice, not in revenge, and without occasioning too large a number of homicides. Do you wish, my Fathers, for an instance? I can furnish you with one sufficiently recent. It is that of the blow of Compiegne.* And you will allow that the person receiving it, gave proof by his conduct, that he was sufficiently master of his feelings of hatred and revenge. It was only necessary for him then further to take care that no excessive amount of murders should ensue—and you well know it is so rare an occurrence for Jesuits to inflict blows upon officers in the royal household, that there was not much reason to fear that a single homicide on this occasion would have brought others in its train. You cannot therefore deny that this Jesuit might have been killed with a safe conscience; and the offender in so doing, would in no way have acted in violation of the doctrine of Lessius. And, indeed, my good Fathers, he in all probability would have done so, had he been versed in the
[p. 243]lessons of your school—had he learnt of Escobar, “ that a man receiving a blow is regarded as dishonoured till he has succeeded in taking the life of the party inflicting it.” But there is reason to believe that the instruction of a very different kind, which had been received by him from an ecclesiastic, not holding, indeed, a high station in your esteem, contributed in no small degree, on the occasion referred to, to save the life of a member of your own fraternity!
Let us hear no more, then, of the inconvenient results which are to be avoided in encounters of this kind; and (avoiding which) the homicide, according to Lessius, is in practice allowable. These have been thoroughly treated by your several authors, quoted by Escobar in his “ Practice of Homicide, according to the Jesuits’ Society, tr. 1, ex. 7, N. 48: “ Is it lawful,” he says, “ to kill one who has inflicted a blow upon you ? ” Lessius says, it is lawful speculatively, but practically it is not to be recommended—‘ non consulendum in praxi ;’—on account of the risk of its giving rise to animosities, or murders, dangerous to public welfare. But others are of opinion that if these evil consequences be avoided, the practice is lawful and safe ;—‘ in praxi probabilem et tutam judicarunt Henriquez, &c.’ This is the way in which your opinions rise step by step towards probability. For, at last, the permission is given without any distinction of speculation and practice, as follows : “ It is lawful on receiving a blow to retaliate on the instant with the sword, not in a spirit of revenge, but for the preservation of honour.” This is prescribed by your brethren at Caen, in 1644, in their published writings, laid by the University before the
[p. 244]Parliament, on presenting its third petition against your doctrine of Homicide, as appears in p. 389 of the book at that time published on the subject.
Observe then, I pray you, that your own authors overthrow, of themselves, the frivolous distinction which they had attempted to draw between speculation and practice, so justly ridiculed by the University; and which is nothing more than one of those ingenious devices of your policy that ought to be exposed. For, besides that this furnishes a clue to your 14th, 16th, 17th and 18th charges, it can never be otherwise than instructive to unravel, one after another, the intricate principles of this mysterious system.
Whenever you have taken upon you to decide cases of conscience, such as these, in a lenient and accommodating manner, the first point has been to ascertain those in which religion only is concerned,—such as contrition, penitence, the love of the Deity, and all such things as especially affect a tender conscience. But then, you were met by other cases in which the public welfare had a joint interest with religion, such as usury, bankruptcy, homicide and the like; and it has been matter of poignant concern to those who are really attached to the Church, to find you, on numberless occasions in which the interests of religion only are involved, overthrowing her rules, without reserve, distinction, or fear; as in your audacious decisions upon penitence and the love of God; and this, because you too well knew that the world is not the scene where the Great Ruler of all things is wont openly to vindicate his justice. But in matters in which the State has an interest equally with religion, your apprehensions of human jurisprudence have led you to divide (as it
[p. 245]were) your decisions, and distribute them into two separate compartments, the one you call “speculative,” in which, viewing crimes in themselves, without reference to public interests, but only to the offended laws of God, you sanction them without scruple. Thus you set yourselves in opposition to the judgment of God. The other, you call “practical;” wherein, considering the injury that may accrue to society, and fearing the severity of magisterial rebuke, you affect occasionally to discountenance the commission of those murders and other crimes, to which you have given your speculative sanction; in this way you contrive to keep on good terms with the Judges. Thus, for instance, on the question, “whether it is lawful to kill another for slander,” your authors, Filiutius tr. 29, Cap. 3, N. 52, Reginaldus 1, 28, Ch. 5, N. 63, and others, reply: “Speculatively it is lawful,—‘ex probabili opinione licet;’ but I do not approve of it practically, on account of the large number of murders which would ensue, to the detriment of public interests, if all slanderers were to be killed; so that taking life for this cause would expose persons to public justice.”
We have here a specimen of your opinions, under this kind of subtle reservation; by which you merely overthrow the sanction of religion, while you avoid doing serious injury to the State.
In this you think yourselves safe. You suppose that the repute in which you are held in the Church will screen from punishment your offences against truth; and that your precautions to prevent your sanctions being carried out too easily in practice, will keep you in safety from the magistrate, who, not concerning himself with niceties of
[p. 246]conscience, takes cognizance only of external conduct. Thus, an opinion which would be condemned in practice, is enunciated with safety as speculative only. But, the foundation being laid in this manner, it becomes easy to build upon it your whole system. Infinite was the distance between the Divine interdict against murder, and the speculative permission to the act conceded by your writers. But, practically, the interval is reduced to almost nothing. It was required only to demonstrate that what is thus allowed in theory, should become also lawful in practice. Reasons for this will be found in abundance: you have already discovered them in some of the most difficult of your cases. Would you learn, my Fathers, by what process they have been arrived at? You have but to follow the reasoning of Escobar, who has plainly decided the point in the first of the six volumes of his “Grand Moral Theology,” before referred to; in which he seems to hold views entirely different from those in his “Selection from the Twenty-four Elders.” Instead of considering, as in the former work, that opinions might be held in speculation which were not carried into practice, he has since then come to an opposite conclusion; and has fully developed it in the latter work; so much does the doctrine of probability, as well as every individual opinion, acquire strength by time.
Listen to his words in Prœlog. C. 3, N. 15; “I cannot see,” he says, “how a thing which is lawful in speculation should not be so in practice, since what may be right practically depends upon what is believed to be so in theory; and the two differ, only as cause differs from effect. Speculation is what determines action. Whence
[p. 247]it follows, that we may, with a safe conscience, carry into practice whatever opinions are determined to be speculatively probable ; and that, even with greater security than in the case of those who have been subjected to this speculative examination.”
In truth, Reverend Sirs, the reasoning of your champion Escobar is sometimes not wanting in force. There is indeed so intimate a connexion between speculation and practice, that when once the one has taken root, the transition is easy to the undisguised reality. This is exemplified in the licence to kill for a blow ; which, from simple theory, has been, by Lessius, boldly advanced to a practice, which may not, however, with too great facility be allowed ; and, thence, by Escobar, to an allowable practice.* Since which your learned Fathers of Caen, as we have already seen, have carried it out to a plenary permission, without any distinction of theory and practice.
Thus it is that you advance, step by step, your opinions. If they were to appear at once in all their naked deformity, they would inspire unmixed horror ; but their slow and stealthy progress renders them familiar to the mind, and mitigates their atrocity. In this way, the sanction of murder—that crime so abhorrent both to the State and to the Church, is insinuated first into the Church, and from the Church finds its way into the State.
Similar has been the progress of the opinion, that life may be taken for the offence of slander. At the present time the sanction has obtained without any distinction. I should not pause to cite here the passages bearing upon
[p. 248]it from your Fathers, were it not necessary to expose to the world the intrepidity with which you have ventured to assert in your 4th “ Imposition,” pages 26 and 30, “ that there is no Jesuit who has sanctioned the taking life on account of slander.” Before you ventured on this statement, my Fathers, you should have satisfied yourselves that I had not the means of seeing these things with my own eyes ; so easy is it to me thus to refute you. For, in addition to the fact that your Fathers Reginaldus, Filiutius, &c. have respectively sanctioned this practice speculatively (as I said before), and that such speculative sanction, on Escobar’s principle, assuredly leads to practice ; I now assert, that several of your own writers have allowed the act in question in express terms. Among others is the Père Hereau, in his public lectures ; for which the King caused him to be put in ward in your own house : the doctrine he taught (together with others equally erroneous), being, that “ when a person traduces us in the presence of respectable persons, and continues to do so after being warned to desist, it is lawful for us to take his life, not indeed publicly, for fear of scandal, but in secret—“ sed clam.”
I have spoken before of Père Launy, and you are aware that his doctrine on this subject was, in 1649, censured by the University of Louvain. And yet it is not six months since, that your Father Des Bois maintained at Rouen the very doctrine of Launy, thus stigmatized ; and inculcated the lawfulness of an ecclesiastic defending his reputation, even by taking the life of him who attacked it—“ etiam cum morte invasoris.” Which circumstance occasioned such offence in that place, that all the ministers joined
[p. 249]together to silence him, and to compel him, by ecclesiastical censures, to make a recantation of his doctrine. This circumstance is officially recorded.
What is your answer, I ask, to this, Reverend Fathers? Will you now maintain that “ no Jesuit has advanced the opinion that life may be taken for a slander ?” And need any thing further be produced for your refutation, than the expressions of your own authors, seeing they forbid not the murder in question abstractedly, but solely, on the ground that practically it might cause inconvenience to the public welfare? I ask you here then, Sirs, whether this is not the only question between us, viz. that your doctrine is subversive of the law of God against murder ? It is not whether the State may sustain injury, but is religion violated ? What avails it in such a dispute as this to plead that society is spared a wrong, when the deadliest wound is inflicted upon piety ? I want nothing further to terminate the controversy than this one statement produced by yourselves from Reginaldus, p. 28, t. 3. “ The opinion of Reginaldus on the question of killing for the offence of slander is, that an individual may resort to this kind of defence, considered simply in itself.” * “ An individual,” you say, “ may resort to this mode of defence,”—that is, slaying another man for a slander— “ considering the matter in itself ;” consequently, the law of God, which forbids murder, is overthrown by your decision !
It is futile to say, as you afterwards do, “ This is unlawful and cruel, even according to God’s law, on account
[p. 250]of the numerous murders and irregularities which ensue; inasmuch as we are bound, before God, to have regard to the welfare of the State.” This is to evade the question. Be it remembered, man is under obedience to two great laws; the one which forbids to take blood, the other which forbids to injure the State. Reginaldus would keep clear of detriment to society, but he doubtless violates the Divine law against murder. This is the only point in dispute. But your other Fathers, who have sanctioned these murders in actual practice, have subverted both these rules.
Let us now proceed a step further. We have seen that you, in some cases, forbid injury to the State, and allege that your design in so doing is to conform to the Divine law, which enjoins its support. This may be true, although it is by no means certain; for you might attain the same end, by the fear alone of the civil power. Let us then examine, upon what principle it is that you herein proceed.
If, Reverend Sirs, you were really influenced by the fear of God, and his law were the first and chief object of your thought, would not this motive uniformly regulate your decisions, and the interests of religion be on all occasions your aim? But if, on the contrary, we find you unscrupulously violating the most sacred commands imposed by the Deity upon man, when unsupported by the arm of civil authority,—thus submitting the law of God, which proclaims these acts to be criminal in themselves, and shrinking only from carrying them into practice from the fear of human law—is it not clear that you have no regard to the Divine will; and that, if you externally
[p. 251]abstain from injuring society, it is from no motive of piety, but only to subserve your own aims and interests, which have been always the governing principle of bodies of men uninfluenced by conscientious motives ?
What, Sirs! regardless of the Divine canon against Homicide, you teach, that blood may be spilt for a slanderous word! And then, while thus setting yourselves against the august command of God, you suppose you can obviate the scandal, and retain your claims to our respect, by alleging that, in practice, you forbid it, from regard to the State, and fear of the law ! Is not this only an aggravation of the outrage? Not, indeed, by the regard you show for the civil power—it is not for that I censure you; and you yourselves have made this point the subject of your absurd banter at p. 29—I reproach you not for your fear of the Judges, but for your fear of the Judges only. This is my indictment, that you make God less the enemy of sin than man ! Were you to say that a slanderer might be murdered by the rules of men, but not by those of God, that would be less intolerable ; but to maintain that such an act is too criminal for human endurance, but lawful in the sight of heaven—of Justice itself—of the Supreme and Eternal source of Right—what is this but to proclaim to the whole world, by this unholy perversion, that you can show yourselves fearless towards God, while you are timid towards men ?
Then again, wishing to insinuate the permission insensibly, and to circumvent by stratagem the guardians of the public safety, how politicly have you acted, in separating your precepts from each other, and laying down, on the one hand, “ the lawfulness, speculatively, of taking
[p. 252]life for slander” (for who can gainsay mere speculation ?) and on the other hand, “ that what is lawful in speculation is also lawful in practice : ” for what interest can the State feel in a proposition thus abstract and metaphysical ? Thus, these two unsuspected propositions, being separately propounded, the vigilance of the magistrate is lulled ; and he forgets to put together the two maxims, and draw from them your own conclusion, that murder is allowable, in revenge for the simple offence of slander !
We have now arrived at one of the most subtle artifices in your policy, that of separating in your writings maxims which in your system are really united. It is in this way that you have established your doctrine of probability, so often referred to. The general principle being stated, you proceed separately to advance things, which—innocent perhaps in themselves—become detestable, when united with a previously enunciated and pernicious principle. I adduce, for example, what you say at page 11 of “ your Impositions,” and which calls upon me for a reply ; “ Several celebrated theologians,” it is there stated, “ are of opinion that life may be taken for the offence of a blow.” Here it is clear, that, if a person not holding the doctrine of Probability had asserted this, there would have been nothing to object to, for it is a simple and inconsequential affirmation. But if you, Reverend Sirs, and all who maintain the dangerous doctrine “ that whatever is approved by all authors of celebrity is probable, and safe as regards the conscience,” add to this latter proposition, the one above cited, “ that several celebrated theologians hold ‘ life for a blow ;’ ” what is this, I ask, but to place the poignard in every Christian’s hand, to
[p. 253]revenge his affronts with death, by announcing that his conscience may be at rest, seeing he is following the opinion of grave and learned authorities ?
Is not this, I ask, horrible ? To report in this way the damnable opinions of your authors, and virtually your own decision in their favour, and thus to give licence to the conscience to act upon those opinions ! But this, Reverend Fathers, is the policy of your school, and one can only be astonished at your hardihood in avowing so undisguisedly your sentiments, by which you stand convicted, on your own admission, of holding that a man may with safe conscience “ murder another for the offence of a blow ; ” inasmuch as you declare the maxim to be advanced by various eminent authorities.”
It is in vain for you to deny this, or to put forward passages from Vasquez and Suarez, condemnatory of these murders which your Brethren sanction. Testimony of this kind, dissociated from other parts, may confuse those who do not understand your system. But I say, let your principles and maxims be put properly together. You may allege, in one place, that Vasquez disallows such homicide. But what is your language elsewhere ? “ The probability of one opinion does not prevent the probability of an opposite one : ” and, in another place : “ It is lawful to follow a less probable and safe opinion, in preference to one more probable and more safe.” What follows from all this, I demand, but that, with entire liberty of conscience, a man may choose from the most contradictory opinions just that one which falls in the most entirely with his own inclination ? What, then, my Fathers, is the value of all your quotations ? I condemn you by the
[p. 254]very means you employ for your defence. Why produce passages which I did not quote, to excuse others which I did quote, and which have nothing in common with each other? Does this give you a right to call me an impostor? Did I affirm that all your Fathers taught doctrines equally licentious? Have I not proved, on the contrary, that your chief strength lay in having at your command opinions of every hue for your various occasions? To the advocates of murder you present Lessius; to the humane and scrupulous, Vasquez; so that all may be satisfied, and none be without a grave authority to support their view. Lessius, speaking like a Pagan of homicide, and, perhaps, like a Christian of alms-giving; Vasquez, heathenishly of alms, and Christianly of homicide. Then, by means of the doctrine of probability, held by both, they can make over to each other their respective sentiments; and will feel themselves bound to absolve such as may have carried out into action the opinions which each in his turn has condemned. It is this shifting and versatility which enhance your delinquency: uniformity would be comparatively innocent. Nothing, moreover, is more opposed to the express directions of St. Ignatius and your earlier rulers, than this confusion and intermixture of all opinions. I may have something to say to you on this subject, my reverend Fathers, hereafter; and the world will perhaps be surprised to learn how you have degenerated from the early spirit of your institution; while your own founders foresaw that a relaxation of your moral doctrines, such as this, would be fatal, not to your Society only, but also to the universal Church!
[p. 255]I must tell you, however, in the mean time, that you vainly seek to derive advantage from the opinion of Vasquez. It would be strange, indeed, if, among the writings of so many of your brethren, one or two could not have been found holding opinions such as all Christians acknowledge. Little cause of boasting is it in any one, to maintain that, according to Christ's gospel, murder may not be committed for a blow; but most flagrant is the disgrace of those who deny the proposition. Far from affording you any justification, this fact only aggravates your guilt; for it proves that, possessing among your members some who hold the truth, you adhere not to that truth, but love darkness rather than light. You have been told by an eminent authority of your own, “that it is heathenish—not christian—to maintain that a wound may be returned for a mere blow; that such a doctrine is opposed both to the Decalogue and the Gospel; and would be supported only by the most unprincipled of human society.” And in spite of this, and in contradiction of such obvious truths, you are passive, while Lessius, Escobar, and others, aver, in the face of the most solemn denunciations of Jehovah against man-slaying,—that life may be taken in revenge for a blow! What does it avail you then to oppose Vasquez to Lessius, but to show that, according to Vasquez, Lessius is a heathen and a profligate, which is far more than I have ventured to say? What conclusion are we to draw, but that Lessius would overthrow both the Decalogue and the Gospel? What, but that, at the last great day, Vasquez will condemn Lessius on one point, as Lessius will condemn Vasquez on another; and that the whole of your authorities will rise
[p. 256]in judgment, the one against the other, for their awful violations of the law of Christ ?
To conclude, then, Reverend Fathers; since your doctrine of probability renders the opinions of some of your Members useless to the Church, and advantageous only for the advancement of your own polity, these very opinions do but prove, by their contrariety, the duplicity of your principles. It is in this way that you oppose the solemn dictates of Scripture, corrupt the simplicity of Divine truth, and point to man two diverging ways of holiness and salvation !
Notes
- *This seems to refer to some occurrence of that day, of which no particular explanation is given in the text. (Transl.)
- *‘ Une pratique facile.’ (Fr.)
- *‘ La considerant simplement en elle meme.’ (Fr.)
Choose any passage to light it on the printed page.



















