LETTER XIV. · REFUTATION FROM SCRIPTURE, THE HOLY FATHERS, &c., OF THE JESUIT MAXIMS UPON HOMICIDE. PASSING REPLY TO VARIOUS OTHER SLANDERS, AND COMPARISON OF THEIR DOCTRINE WITH THE FORMALITIES OBSERVED IN CRIMINAL PROCESSES.

Reverend Fathers

If my task were nothing more than to reply to your threefold misrepresentations…

23 · X · 1656Printed pp. 257–277

LETTER XIV.

REFUTATION FROM SCRIPTURE, THE HOLY FATHERS, &c., OF THE JESUIT MAXIMS UPON HOMICIDE. PASSING REPLY TO VARIOUS OTHER SLANDERS, AND COMPARISON OF THEIR DOCTRINE WITH THE FORMALITIES OBSERVED IN CRIMINAL PROCESSES.

Reverend Fathers,

If my task were nothing more than to reply to your threefold misrepresentations respecting homicide, I should not need to employ many words, and my refutation would lie in the narrowest compass ; but, considering it much more important to impress upon the world a due horror of your opinions on this subject, than to justify the fidelity of my quotations, I deem it necessary to occupy the larger part of this letter in a general refutation of your tenets ; and in proving how opposed they are at once to the sentiments of the Church, and to the dictates of nature.

The sanction to take life, conceded by you on so many occasions, proves how, in this respect, you have utterly disregarded the law of God, and sought to extinguish, in man, the light of nature; so that it is become necessary to bring you back to the very elementary principles of religion and common sense. What can be more in accordance

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with natural feelings than the sentiment, “ That one man has no right to deprive another of life.” “ Our own consciences may tell us,” says St. Chrysostom, “ that when God issued the command, ‘ Thou shalt not kill,’ he deemed it not necessary to assign the reason why homicide is a sin; because the law supposes such a principle of nature to be already known to us.”

This is a command, then, that has been imposed upon man from the commencement of time, and in every age. The Gospel confirmed the sanction of the law; and the decalogue only renewed the prohibition, which man had received from the mouth of Deity (before the introduction of the law) through the instrumentality of our progenitor Noah. At that second birth of the world, God said to the patriarch, “ At the hand of every man’s brother will I require the life of man : Whoso sheddeth man’s blood, by man shall his blood be shed ; for in the image of God made he man.”

This universal interdict takes from man all right over the life of his fellow-man. And so absolutely has God reserved this power to himself, that, by the principles of Christianity—principles at variance, herein, with the false opinions of Paganism—man has not even a right to dispose of his own life. But, as it seemed good to the Divine Providence to give to man the institutions of Society, and to appoint punishments for those who trouble its well-being, he has himself enacted laws for taking away the life of offenders; and thus, homicides, which, without such sanction would be unjustifiable infringements upon the rights of our fellows, become, under that sanction, lawful and necessary. This is admirably unfolded

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by St. Augustine, Book I. of his “ City of God,” Ch. 21. “ God,” he says, “ has himself decreed some exception to his general prohibition to kill, whether by the institution of laws for the punishment of criminals, or by special commands, occasionally given, for the death of individuals. When life is taken away in such cases as these, it is not man that kills, but God, of whom man is the mere instrument; as is a sword in the hand of him who uses it in warfare. But, with these exceptions, whosoever takes away the life of man is a murderer.”

It is then not to be doubted that God alone has the right to take away man’s life. Nevertheless, having instituted laws for the capital punishment of offences, he has constituted earthly sovereigns or governments, the depositaries of this power. This is taught us by St. Paul, where, speaking of the right possessed by kings to take life, he clothes it with a Divine authority, saying, “ He beareth not the sword in vain; for he is the minister of God, to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.” (Rom. xiii. 4.)

But this authority being committed to man by God, he requires that it shall be exercised by man, as it is by Himself, with justice, according to St. Paul again in the same connexion. “ Rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good. He is the minister of God to thee for good.” And this restriction, so far from weakening, elevates their authority; for it assimilates it to that of the Almighty himself; who is incapable of evil, but omnipotent for good; in contrast with that of demons, who are incapable of good, and have power

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only for evil. There is this difference, alone, between Jehovah and earthly potentates, that He, being himself perfect justice and wisdom, may at any instant take the life of his creatures, whensoever and in what manner it shall please him ; for, besides that He is the absolute Disposer of man's life, it is not to be doubted that He never resumes that life without good cause, and in the exercise of perfect discretion, inasmuch as He is incapable alike of injustice and of error. But princes may not thus act ; because, although ministers of God, they possess a human and not a divine nature. They are obnoxious to be misled by error, excited by false suspicion, carried away by passion ; and this has led them, of their own accord, to resort to fitting institutions, and to delegate the power thus committed to them of God, into the hand of wise and impartial magistrates, that it may be improved to the august purposes for which it has been bestowed.

Know then, Reverend Father, that to escape the guilt of homicide in taking man's life, the authority of God should be wielded in conjunction with the justice of God ; and that if these two conditions be not fulfilled, sin is committed ; be it under Divine authority, but without justice ; or, with justice, but without Divine authority. “From the necessity of such a union, it follows,” says St. Augustine, “that any one who, without authority, puts a criminal to death, is himself guilty of crime ; for this reason, chiefly, that he usurps an authority which God has not conferred.” On the other hand, the judge although clothed with that authority, is guilty of homicide, if he puts an innocent person to death, in violation of the laws which it is his duty to follow.

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These, Sirs, are the great principles upon which rest the peace and security of society; principles which have prevailed in all ages, and among all nations; and on which legislators, both sacred and profane, have founded their laws. For Pagans, even, have not violated these rules, excepting on occasions when the loss of chastity or life could not be averted without it; “ for then,” remarks Cicero, “ the laws themselves seem to furnish arms to those exposed to such an exigency.”

But that, apart from such occasions as these, individuals should ever be allowed to deprive their fellow-men of life, in revenge for an affront, or to escape an injury to reputation or property, and that, where life is exposed to no danger; this, I assert, is what heathens themselves never sanctioned. They have, on the contrary, expressly forbidden it; for the Roman law of the twelve tables enacted, “ That it is unlawful to slay a robber, in the day-time, who is not armed for his own defence.” This too was forbidden in Exodus Ch. xxii. And the law, “ Furem, ad legem Corneliam,” taken from Ulpian, “ forbids even the killing of robbers by night, if they do not put our own life in peril.” See Cujas, in tit. dig. de Just. et Jure. ad Leg. 3.

I ask you now, Reverend Fathers, by what authority it is, that your Society permits that which laws, both human and divine, have forbidden; and how Lessius has dared to say, B. 2, C. 9, N. 66 and 72 : “ In Exodus it is forbidden to kill those committing robbery by day, not defending themselves by arms; and he that killed another in such manner was to be punished. Yet, notwithstanding this, in doing so we should not, in conscience, be culpable, seeing that we cannot otherwise have any certainty

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of recovering the property thus stolen from us; but such recovery must be doubtful; and we are not bound to expose ourselves to the loss of property, to save the life of a robber. And this even is lawful for ecclesiastics also.”

Inconceivable audacity! The law of Moses punishes the taking the life of a robber, if our own life be not threatened; and you say, the law of the Gospel absolves it! What, Sirs, did Christ come to destroy the law, or to fulfil it? “The law might punish,” says Lessius, “for such an offence; but conscience shall acquit us.” Is the morality of the Gospel more cruel—less hostile to blood-shedding—than that of heathenism, from whence our own legislators have derived the very laws which condemn it? Shall Christians set more value upon their sordid goods, and less upon the life of immortal man, than idolators and infidels? What is it, Reverend Fathers, that you ground your rules upon? Not surely upon any actual law of God, or of man; but upon reasoning such as this: “The law allows us to defend ourselves against robbery; and to repel force by force. Now, defence being allowed, homicide must also be allowable, since without it, such defence would often be impossible.”

Here, Sirs, I am at issue with you. Defence being allowed, it follows not that homicide is also allowable. It is this barbarity in the manner of defence that is the source of your perversions, and is denominated by the faculty of Louvain “a murderous defence”—defensio occisiva—in their Censure of your Père Launy’s doctrines upon Homicide. I maintain, then, that there is so much difference in law, between the taking of life and allowable self-defence, that on those very occasions in which the

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latter is permitted, homicide is equally forbidden, where life is not put in danger. Hear what Cujas says on this subject, “It is lawful to repel one who endeavours to deprive us of our property; but it is not lawful to deprive him of life.” And again, “If we receive a blow, but not with a design against our life, it is lawful to defend ourselves, but not, in doing so to take life.”

Where then do you receive authority to say, as do Molina, Reginaldus, Filiutius, Escobar, Lessius, and others. “It is lawful to take life in revenge for a blow?” And again, “It is allowed, by the opinion of all Casuists, ‘ex sententia omnium,’ to take the life of him who assails our reputation,” * as says Lessius, N. 74. By what title do you—mere unauthorized individuals yourselves—give this power over life to individual persons, and even to the pious? How is it that you presume to usurp this right over life and death—the sole prerogative of the Most High, and the brightest jewel in the crown of Infinitude? To this I demand a reply; and you affect to give one by saying simply in your “thirteenth Imposture,” “that the consideration in value for which Molina allows the killing a robber, who escapes without threatening violence, is not so small as I state, and must exceed six ducats.” Miserable sophistry! Where, Sirs, will you fix this amount? At fifteen—at sixteen ducats? Does this improve your case? Why you do not then get beyond the price of a horse; for Lessius plainly declares, B. 2, C. 9, N. 74, “that we may kill a man who steals our horse.” But I tell you again, as I have stated already, that, according to

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Molina, the amount is fixed at six ducats; and if we cannot here agree, let us call in an arbitrator, and one whom you cannot gainsay. I name for the purpose your own Reginaldus, who commenting on this passage of Molina, B. 21, N. 68, says, “Molina here decides that the amount for which it is not permitted to take life is three, or four, or five ducats.” Thus, my Fathers, I have not only Molina, but Reginaldus also to support my assertion.

It will be not less easy for me to refute your fourteenth “Imposture,” respecting Molina’s alleged permission “to kill a thief for the robbery of a dollar.” This is so uniform a doctrine, that Escobar will furnish you with it. In tr. 1, ex. 7, N. 44, he says, “Molina authoritatively fixes the amount for which life may be taken, at a dollar.” But you charge me, in the same connexion, with suppressing the subsequent part of the passage: “We ought herein, however, to be careful to observe the moderation of a just defence.”* Why do you not then censure Escobar, who has equally omitted these words? This is somewhat sharp policy. Do you think others do not understand as well as you, your own fashion of defence? Do not we know what it is to make “a murderous defence?” (défense meurtriere.) You would have it understood that Molina meant by this, that when life is exposed to danger in the preservation of our dollar, that we may kill the assailant, as it is then an act of self-preservation. Were that true, my Fathers, why has Molina said in the same passage, that “in this he differs from Carrerus and Bald,” who allow of homicide for preservation of life?

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I maintain that what he means is simply, that if we can save our crown-piece without killing the robber, we ought not to kill him; but if we cannot save it without killing, even if there be no danger of our own life (as when the robber is unarmed), it is then lawful for us to kill the thief, to save our crown; and that in doing so, according to his opinion, we are not exceeding the limits of lawful defence. For proof of this, hear his own explanation: t. 4, tr. 3, d. 11, N. 5, “We do not exceed the moderation of a just defence, when we use arms against those who have none, or avail ourselves of any other advantage over them. I know there are those who hold a different opinion, but I do not agree with them.”

Thus, Reverend Fathers, it is placed beyond controversy, that your authorities allow life to be taken for the defence of property, and reputation, even when the party assailed is in no danger of his own life. And it is on the same principle that sanction is given to the practice of duelling, as I have proved by numerous passages from their writings, to which you have ventured no reply. You comment only on one quotation made by me from your Père Layman, in which he permits such an act, saying, “when, otherwise, we should be in danger of loss of fortune, or honour;” and you charge me with suppressing his concluding words “this, however, may rarely happen.” Now this is really to be admired, my good Fathers! This is your happy way of charging me with misrepresentation! We are enquiring whether duelling be lawful or not. There are here two distinct questions at issue. Layman, as a Casuist, sets himself to decide, “is duelling lawful?” and decides affirmatively. We can judge for ourselves

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whether the case supposed for its justification be infrequent; and we contend that it is of common occurrence. But if you prefer the testimony of your good colleague, Diana, he will inform you how common it is, in part 5, tract 14, Misc. 2, Resol. 99. Be it however common or not, and be it that Layman herein follows Navarre, as you so strongly insist,—is it the less atrocious that he should adopt such an opinion, as that (from a false notion of honour) it should be lawful to engage in a duel, contrary to the laws of all Christian States, and to the canons of the Church; contrary to the authority of Scripture, and to the writings of the Fathers, and to the example of the saints; and in accordance only with such diabolical and impious reasonings as these: “that honour is dearer to us than life; that it is lawful to take life in defence of life; therefore it is lawful to take life in defence of honour”?

What, Sirs! Because the wickedness of men leads them to cherish this vanity of reputation more than the existence which their Creator has given them, that it may be devoted to His service, therefore the lives of their fellows are to be sacrificed to its preservation! It is not enough that, by a fatal perversion, this bubble of fame is thus to be valued more than life; but the vicious attachment—capable, when pursued as an end, of sullying the holiest actions—is to be allowed to justify the very worst, when resolved, as its motive, into mere jealousy of honour!

And where is this fearful infatuation to end? To what excesses must it not lead! Is it not obvious that life will come to be set in the balance with the veriest trifles, if it

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be regarded as a point of honour to preserve them; yes, the life of man may be taken for an apple! Here you would again charge me, my Reverend Fathers, with drawing slanderous inferences from your doctrines, were I not, in saying this, supported by the authority of the grave Lessius himself, who has these words, N. 68: “It is not allowable to take the life of another for the preservation of a thing of small value, such as a dollar, or an apple— ‘aut pro pomo’—unless the loss of it should be attended with disgrace to ourselves. For then we are bound to recover it, and even to take life, if necessary, for the purpose—‘et si opus est occidere’—because this is not so much for the preservation of our property as of our honour.” Is not this plain speaking? And, to conclude with a proposition which includes all the others, hear the following passage from Père Hereau, and which he has adopted from Lessius. “The right of defending ourselves extends to the use of every kind of means for preserving ourselves from every kind of injury.”

Look at the consequences involved in this inhuman maxim! Surely every one should oppose it, and especially all persons occupying public stations. And not only should they do this on public grounds, but for their individual safety; for your Casuists, whom I have quoted in former letters, extend their sanction to the invasion of their lives also. Thus, turbulent spirits, who are justly exposed to punishment for their offences, easily persuading themselves that they are objects of oppression, will soon act upon the conviction “that the right to defend themselves extends to every kind of means, against every kind of injury.” They will no longer feel it necessary to

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resist those conscientious scruples, which stifle the greater number of crimes in their birth ; and their only care will be to overcome the external obstacles to their revengeful purposes.

I will however say no more, Reverend Fathers, on this hateful subject, nor on other descriptions of murder yet more atrocious—more imminent to public safety—to which your sanctions have been given, although they are openly treated of by Lessius in his “ Doubts 4 and 6,” as well as by others among your writers. Would that these infamous maxims had never been dragged from the dark abyss in which they were engendered ; and that the Devil, their author, had not succeeded in finding agents so devoted to his interests, as to set them forth in all their deformity among Christian nations !

It must be manifest from all that has been advanced, how opposed is the laxity of your opinions to the strictness of the civil law, even amongst heathen states. What must it be then, when compared with the ecclesiastical code, which is so much the more elevated over every other, inasmuch as it is the Church alone that has discovered and possesses true holiness ! Therefore it is that this chaste Bride of Christ, who, in imitation of her Divine Spouse, is willing to shed her blood for the good of others, but never sheds that of others for her own pleasure, entertains an especial horror of the crime of murder—a horror proportioned to the clearness of that light which has been imparted to her by God himself. She regards man as the image of Him whom she adores. She entertains for every individual of our race a holy reverence, as for one bought with an infinite price, and designed to

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become a temple of the living God. Thus she judges the death of man—unauthorized by a law from heaven— to be not homicide alone, but an act of sacrilege, by which she is deprived of one of her members; since, whether one of the faithful or not, she regards him either as actually one of her children, or as one capable of becoming such.

These, my Fathers, are the hallowed reasons which, seeing that the Deity has condescended to become Man for the salvation of men, have so enhanced the value of man’s life in the eyes of the Church, that she resents the shedding of his blood as the highest crime that can be committed against God. I will adduce some instances of this; not with the view that such severities should on all occasions be imitated (for I know that the Church may vary the degrees of her external discipline,) but to show what has been ever the immutable spirit of her laws on this subject. The penalties she inflicts for this crime of homicide may vary in different periods; but the horror she evinces for the offence will be unalterably the same.

The Church, during a long period of time, never dispensed with the death of those who were guilty of deliberate homicide, of the same nature as those which your Society sanctions. The celebrated council of Ancyra ordained penance for the crime during the whole period of life: and the Church, since then, has deemed it a sufficient relaxation to reduce the term of penance to a large number of years. But to deter men more effectually from the commission of wilful homicide, she has even imposed severe punishments upon those which occurred

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through inadvertencies ;* as may be seen in St. Basil, St. Gregory Nazianzen, and in the decrees of Popes Zacchary and Alexander II. The canons quoted by Isaac, Bishop of Langres, t. 2, ch. 13, “ direct seven years of penance for killing another in self-defence.” And we find St. Hildebert, Bishop of Mans, replying to Yves de Chartres, “ That he deemed it right to supersede a priest from his office during his whole life, for having killed a thief with a blow of a stone in an act of defence.”

Presume then no longer to assert that your decisions are conformable in spirit to the canons of the Church. I defy you to produce one which authorizes the taking life for the preservation of property only, (for I refer not to occasions in which it may be necessary to defend life also,) ‘ se suaque liberando.’ Your own Fathers acknowledge there are none ; among others Launy, tr. 5, disp. 36, Num. 136: “ There is,” he says, “ no law, divine or human, that expressly allows to kill a thief, who uses no violence.” Nevertheless, this is what you solemnly authorize. I defy you to show one ecclesiastical law, which allows to take life for defending reputation, for a blow, an injury, or a slander. I defy you to show one which allows the killing a witness, a magistrate, a judge, whatever alleged injury may be sustained from them. The spirit of the Church is entirely opposed to these pernicious maxims, which open a door to the most flagrant irregularities. Her lessons have ever been, “ not to render evil for evil ;” “ to give place to wrath ;” “ to submit to violence ;” “ to render to all their dues—honour, submission

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, tribute ;” “ to pay obedience to magistrates and superiors,” even the unjust, because we are to recognize in them the authority of God by whom they are appointed. The Church forbids us (even yet more strictly than the civil law) to avenge ourselves ; and it is by the spirit imbibed from her, that Christian sovereigns, not yielding to vindictive emotions, even in cases of the highest state-treasons, hand over the criminal to the civil judge to be dealt with according to the national laws. Ought not the blush of shame to overspread your cheeks, O Fathers, at the contrast between this mode of procedure and your principles ?

Follow now, I pray, the comparison between the mode of dealing with an enemy, which is authorized by your Society, and the solemn process with which the punishment of death is inflicted upon criminals by our national judicatures.

Every one knows that individuals are never allowed to demand the death of others ; and, if we have been ruined in our circumstances, maimed in our limbs, our house burnt down, our nearest relative even destroyed—if threatened with assassination, or slandered and traduced—we are not left to deal with the offenders ourselves: public prosecutors are appointed, for the purpose of redress on the part of the sovereign, or rather on the part of God. Do you think, Reverend Sirs, that Christian judges have made such regulations as these a mere feint and pretence ? Is it not done, rather, in order that human laws may be assimilated to the Gospel rules, and to prevent the external practice of our jurisprudence being placed in opposition to the convictions and practices of Christianity ?

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We may see from this how you stand confuted on the very first principles of justice. You shall be yet more confounded by what follows.

Let us now suppose that the public functionary referred to has demanded the capital punishment of the criminal ; what follows thereupon ? Is death hastily awarded ? No, my Fathers; man's life is of too much importance for this ; his Maker's gift is treated with more reverence. The law places it not at the disposal of our fellow-men indiscriminately : it is committed into the hand of magistrates, of learning, intelligence and probity. Nor is the judgment of one alone deemed sufficient for his condemnation. Seven * must solemnly concur in the act. Of those seven, care is taken that no one shall have experienced wrong or injury from the criminal, lest any personal prejudice should produce a bias or feeling of resentment against him. And you are aware also, that in order to secure the clearest exercise of the mind on the part of these Judges, the earlier hours of the day only are appropriated to this important duty; such is the solicitude to obtain due preparation for so solemn an act, wherein they are constituted the representatives and ministers of God ; and to ensure that they shall punish none but those whom the Deity himself condemns.

And therefore it is, in order that they may be faithful dispensers of this divinely-entrusted authority over man's life, that they are allowed only to proceed upon authentic testimony, and according to all other established formalities ; and, finally, can condemn and sentence capitally

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only in strict conformity with legal rules. And, after all this, if the authority thus divinely derived, compels the abandonment to punishment of the body of the unhappy criminal, the same command of God enjoins a solicitude for their wretched souls. The very criminality of the offenders enhances the obligation to this duty; lest they should be dismissed from life without an effort for their spiritual preparation. Can any thing be more pure and blameless than this? Yet so greatly does the Church abhor the shedding of blood—such is her serious view also respecting homicide—that she holds to be incapacitated from ministering at her altars, any who have taken part in a capital proceeding, although it has been accompanied and sanctioned by all these scrupulous observances !

See then, I pray you, in what manner, by the rules of jurisprudence, man’s life is dealt with : see, on the other hand, how your Order deals with it. By your novel code there is but one Judge, and that Judge is the party against whom the offence has been committed. Behold him, at once, Plaintiff, Judge, and Executioner! At once, he impeaches his enemy, passes his condemnation, and executes the sentence ; and, regardless of the welfare either of body or soul of his fellow-man, he hurls from life, and dooms perhaps to eternal perdition, one, for whom Christ died ! And all this to revenge a blow, a slander, an irritating word, or some similar offence ; for which a magistrate, clothed with lawful authority, might have been himself deemed criminal in capitally committing the offender, seeing the law had awarded no such punishment for the trespass ! And then, to crown and consummate the outrage, no blame, no irregularity, even is to be

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imputed, for such an unauthorized—such illegal taking of man's life—even if the party be an ecclesiastic or a priest !

What, Sirs, are we come to ! Are they ecclesiastics, are they priests, who hold this language ? Are they Christians ? Are they Infidels ? Are they Men ? Are they Demons ? Are these the “ Mysteries revealed by the Lamb to his followers,” or are they abominations whispered by Satan in the ear of those who are led in chains by his delusions ?

For, after all, Reverend Fathers, in what light would you have the world regard you ? Are you to be deemed followers of the gospel, or its opponents ? We must be of one side or another : there is no middle place. “ He that is not with the Saviour is against him.” These two classifications divide the whole race of man. There are, according to St. Augustine, “ two classes, and two different worlds, diffused over the earth's surface ; the world of God's children, which forms that body of which Christ is the Head and Sovereign ; and the world of God's enemies, whose head and ruler is the Devil.” It is on this account that Jesus is called the King and God of the world ; because he has everywhere subjects and worshippers ; and the Devil is also called in Scripture, the Prince and God of the world ; seeing he has everywhere his devotees and slaves. Christ has given to the Church— his seat of empire—such laws as seemed good to his infinite wisdom ; and Satan has also exacted, in his kingdom, laws according to his pleasure. Jesus has conferred honour upon the sufferer : the Devil upon him who suffers not. Jesus has enjoined upon him who is smitten on the one cheek, to turn the other also : Satan tells the man

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who receives a blow, to retaliate even to death upon him that inflicts it. Jesus declares those happy who share with him shame and reproach: Satan proclaims the reproached and slandered to be unhappy. Christ says, “Woe unto you when all men speak well of you!” The Devil says, Woe unto those whom the world esteems and caresses not!

Look well, then, to it, my Fathers, to which of these kingdoms you belong. You know the language of the City of Peace—the mystical Jerusalem; and you know also the language of the City of Sorrow, which the Scripture calls “the spiritual Sodom.” Which of these languages are you versed in? Which of these do you speak? Those who belong to Christ (according to St. Paul) hold the doctrines of Christ; and those who (in the language of Christ) are children of Satan—“ex Patre Diabolo,” who was a murderer from the beginning—follow the maxims of the Devil. See what is the language of your school, and ask your writers the question, “If I receive a blow, shall I patiently endure it, rather than aim at the life of him who gives it? Or, am I allowed to kill such an one in revenge of the affront?” “You are allowed,” say Lessius, Molina, Escobar, Reginaldus, Filiutius, Baldellus, and other Jesuits; “you are allowed to kill a man from whom you receive a blow.” Answer me, now, is this the language of Jesus Christ? Again: “Would a person be dishonoured by receiving a blow, without taking the life of the person inflicting it?” “Is it to be doubted,” says Escobar, “that if a person allows another to live, who has given him a blow, he himself will live without honour?”

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Yes, Sirs, but it is that honour which the Devil, the fountain of pride, has transmitted to all the children of pride! This is the honour which has ever been the idol of the men of the world. To maintain this honour—the choicest gift of Satan—we see them sacrifice life, in the fury of the duel; true reputation, by the disgraces they entail upon themselves; and their eternal welfare, by the damnation into which they plunge—recklessly foregoing even the rites of Christian sepulture, which ecclesiastical law denies them! But we have cause to bless God for having enlightened the mind of our sovereign * with purer views than those inspired by your theology. His severe ordonnances on the subject have not indeed had the effect of constituting duelling a crime, but they have inflicted a punishment upon the crime inseparable from duelling. He has deterred, by the fear of legal rigours, those, who could not be restrained from the practice by the fear of God; and his sense of piety has taught him that a Christian's honour consists in observance of the laws of God and of religion; and not that vain and empty phantom of honour, which you pretend to be a legitimate excuse for the murder of a fellow-creature! Thus it is that your blood-thirsty decisions have become the abhorrence of the whole world; and you would do well to change your system from a motive of policy, even if not of religious duty. Let me advise you, my Fathers, by a voluntary condemnation of these inhuman opinions, to obviate the fatal consequences which must ensue from them; and for which you alone are responsible. And, to inspire a more

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just horror of the crime of homicide, bear ever in mind, I pray you, that the first crime of fallen man was a homicide, committed upon the innocent; that the greatest of crimes was a homicide committed upon the Head and Representative of all the Just; and that homicide is that crime, of all others, which outrages at once the State, the Church, human nature, and religion !

P. S.—I have just seen the reply of your apologist to my 13th Letter: but if he makes no better than that to the present letter, which solves the greater part of his difficulties, he will deserve no further rejoinder. It is pitiful to see him wandering continually out of his proper topics, to scatter his reproaches and slanders against both the living and the dead. Really it is quite needless for you, in order to give greater credibility to the statements with which you furnish him, to disavow before the public so notorious a fact as Compiègne's blow. It is established by the acknowledgment of the party insulted himself, that he received a blow on the cheek from the hand of a Jesuit; and the only doubt that your friends have been able to raise upon the question is, whether he received it from the back or the palm of the hand; and therefore, whether a blow from the back of the hand ought to be called a blow or not? I really do not know who is to decide this point; but I certainly am of opinion that it must be called, at least, a “probable” blow. This is enough to satisfy my conscience.

Notes

  1. *‘Tuer celui qui veut nous faire un affront.’ (Fr.)
  2. *‘ L’on doit garder en cela la modération d’une juste défense.’ (Fr.)
  3. *‘ Par imprudence.’ (Fr.)
  4. *It is obvious that it is the French criminal system that is here referred to. (Transl.)
  5. *Louis XIV.

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Scan leaf 343 of the 1847 edition (printed page 257), showing letter LETTER XIV..
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About this letter

Letter LETTER XIV. of 25 · printed pp. 257–277 · scan leaf 343 of 570

Where it sits in the book: black are letters, grey the editor’s narrative, pale the front matter, appendices and index.

Source
The Provincial Letters of Pascal, with an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce, 1847, pp. 257–277.
How it was read
Read by machine. Not yet proofread by people. Expect occasional slips in names, accents and foreign words. The book’s reading score is 88 out of 100. How this text was read
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Cite this letter

CitationLetter to Reverend Fathers, 23 October 1656, “LETTER XIV. · REFUTATION FROM SCRIPTURE, THE HOLY FATHERS, &c., OF THE JESUIT MAXIMS UPON HOMICIDE. PASSING REPLY TO VARIOUS OTHER SLANDERS, AND COMPARISON OF THEIR DOCTRINE WITH THE FORMALITIES OBSERVED IN CRIMINAL PROCESSES.”. In The Provincial Letters of Pascal, with an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1847), pp. 257–277. Paper Lanterns edition, https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/18/.

BibTeX@incollection{pascal-provincial-letters-1847-letter-0018,
  author    = {},
  title     = {LETTER XIV. · REFUTATION FROM SCRIPTURE, THE HOLY FATHERS, &c., OF THE JESUIT MAXIMS UPON HOMICIDE. PASSING REPLY TO VARIOUS OTHER SLANDERS, AND COMPARISON OF THEIR DOCTRINE WITH THE FORMALITIES OBSERVED IN CRIMINAL PROCESSES., 23 October 1656},
  booktitle = {The Provincial Letters of Pascal},
  publisher = {London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1847},
  year      = {1847},
  pages     = {257--277},
  note      = {With an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce. Paper Lanterns edition},
  url       = {https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/18/}
}

Linkhttps://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/18/

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