LETTER IV. · OF GRACE ‘ACTUELLE,’ ALWAYS PRESENT, AND OF SINS · OF IGNORANCE.

There are no people in the world like these Jesuits.

26 · II · 1656ParisPrinted pp. 40–56

LETTER IV.

OF GRACE ‘ACTUELLE,’ ALWAYS PRESENT, AND OF SINS
OF IGNORANCE.

Sir,

There are no people in the world like these Jesuits. I have seen Dominicans, doctors, and all sorts of persons; but such a visit as I have just paid I still needed, to supply my deficient information. Others are but copyists of these men. Things are best learnt at the fountain-head: I have seen one of the ablest among them; and I was accompanied by the same faithful Jansenist friend, who went with me to the Dominicans. Being particularly desirous of information respecting the differences between them and the Jansenists, upon what they denominate ‘ Actual Grace,’* I told this good Father that I should be greatly obliged to him to explain the matter to me; that I did not even know what the expression meant; and begged him to inform me. “ Willingly,” he replied, “ I am fond of persons of an inquiring disposition. This is the definition. ‘ Actual grace ’ we call an inspiration of

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the Deity, by which he acquaints us with his will, and by which, further, he excites in us the desire to fulfil it." "And what," said I, "is your difference with the Jansenists on this subject?" "It is this," he replied; "we hold that God bestows actual grace on all men upon every occasion of temptation; since if we had not in every temptation actual grace to preserve us from sin, whatever sin was committed could not be imputed to us. The Jansenists, on the other hand, say that sins committed without actual grace are certainly imputed; but in this they are mere dreamers." I perceived what he intended to say, but in order to make him express himself more clearly, I said, "This word 'actual,' father, perplexes me; I am not accustomed to it; have the goodness to state the point again, without using this term, and I shall be greatly obliged." "Certainly," replied the Father, "you wish to have the substance of the definition without technicalities; this can be done without any change of meaning; I shall be most happy. We maintain, then, as an incontestible principle, 'that an action cannot be imputed as sin, if God do not give us, before its commission, the knowledge of its sinfulness, and an influence from himself, by which we are excited to avoid it.' Do you understand me now?"

Astonished at this statement, according to which all sins of surprise, and all such as are committed in entire forgetfulness of God, are not to be imputed to us, I turned to my Jansenist companion, and saw plainly by his look that he admitted nothing of the kind. But, as he made no remark, I said to the Father, "I should be very glad if this were as you have stated, and could be

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established by sound reasoning and proofs.” “Say you so,” he quickly rejoined; “I can furnish you with them at once, and those of the most unquestionable kind.” On which he proceeded to search for his books.

In the meantime I remarked to my friend, “Are there any others, then, that hold the same language as this person?” “Is this so new to you?” he replied; “undoubtedly neither the Fathers, Popes, nor Councils,—neither the Scriptures, nor any pious works (even of latter times) have expressed such sentiments; but as to the casuists and scholastics of the present day, he will find you sufficient of these.” “But,” said I, “these are authorities that I repudiate; they are opposed to the Fathers.” “Very true,” he replied.

Upon this the good Father came back, loaded with books; and offering me one, said “Read this—‘the Catalogue of Sins, by Father Bauny’—the 5th edition too. Does not that prove it to be a valuable work?” “It is unfortunate,” said my Jansenist friend to me, in a low voice, “that this book was condemned at Rome, as well as by the bishops of France.” “Look here,’ said the Father, “at page 906.” I read, as he directed, and found what follows. ‘In order to constitute sin, and to incur guilt in the sight of God, we must know that the act committed is evil, or at least doubt, or fear it to be so; or, believing the act meditated to be displeasing to God, and forbidden by him, yet, being notwithstanding bent upon its commission, we take the fatal course, and pass the boundary of obedience.’

“This begins well,” said I. “See nevertheless,” he rejoined, “what malice will do. This was what M. Hallier,

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before he came over to us, taunted M. Bauny upon, and applied to him the words, ‘Ecce qui tollit peccata mundi.’” “It is certain,” I replied, “that according to Father Bauny, this is a new species of redemption.”

“And now will you have a higher authority still,” added he. “Here is a work of Father Annat;* it is his book against M. Arnauld. Read the lines I have marked, at page 34: they are golden ones.” I read accordingly as follows: ‘He who has no thought of God, or of his sins; nor any apprehension, (that is, as I consider) no consciousness of his duty to exercise love to God, or penitence; he has no actual grace to direct his conduct; but it is also true that he commits no sin; and that if he is condemned it will not be as a punishment of such omission.’ And a few lines further, ‘The same may be said in regard to a culpable act also.’

“You see,” said the Father, “how he here speaks of sins of omission, as well as of commission; for he leaves out nothing. What do you say to this?” “Oh, I am delighted,” I replied; “the consequences must be admirable; I foresee them already: what mysteries open themselves to me! I predict that more people, beyond all comparison, will be justified by this ignorance, and this forgetfulness of God, than by grace and by the Sacraments. But, my good Father, may you not be affording me a false satisfaction? Is there not here something that resembles a ‘sufficiency’ that suffices not? I am terribly afraid of the ‘distinguo;’ I have already been taken in by it. Pray be sincere.” “How!” said the Father,

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warmly; “this is no matter for jesting; we are not dealing in equivocation.” “I am not jesting,” I said, “my anxiety is proportionate to the interest I feel in the question.”

“Look then,” said he, “for fuller satisfaction at the writings of M. Le Moine, one of the highest authorities of the Sorbonne. He first learned his doctrine from us, indeed; but he has treated the matter admirably, and established the point beyond dispute. He teaches, that to constitute the sinfulness of an action, all the following things must pass through the soul. Read, and ponder every word.” I read accordingly in Latin, what here follows translated: ‘1. On the one part, God imparts to the soul a measure of love, which inclines it towards the thing commanded; and, on the other, lust urges it to the contrary act. 2. God imparts to the soul a knowledge of its weakness. 3. God gives a knowledge of the medicine which heals spiritual diseases. 4. God inspires a desire of the cure. 5. God imparts the desire to pray, and to obtain his assistance.’

“And if all these things do not pass through the soul,” added the Jesuit, “the act is not properly sinful, and cannot be imputed as such,” as M. Le Moine states in another place, and throughout the whole of the remainder of the treatise.

“Do you wish for yet further authorities? Here they are.” (“But all of them modern,” quietly whispered to me my Jansenist companion.) “I see it plainly,” I said; and then addressing the Father, observed, “My excellent Father, this will be good news for some people of my acquaintance; for you never knew any persons who

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commit less sin than they. They never think of God; their vices have perverted their very reason. They have never been aware of their spiritual disease, or of the medicine that is to heal it. They have had no concern for their soul's welfare, and still less did they ever pray to God for assistance; consequently they are, according to M. Le Moine, 'in their baptismal innocence.' They have had no thought of love to God, or penitence for sin; therefore, according to Father Annat, 'they have committed no sin, through failure of love or penitence:' their life has been passed in a constant pursuit of pleasure of every kind, uninterrupted by the slightest remorse or compunction. All these things have made me fear hitherto that their destruction was inevitable; but you, my worthy Father, have shown me that these very excesses tend to assure their safety. Heaven bless you, my Father, for convincing me thus of their justification! Other persons seek the cure of their souls by painful austerities, but you demonstrate that those, supposed to be the most dangerously sick, are in reality well. Oh happy prospect for them, both for this world and the next! I had always believed that we sinned the more, the less God was in our thoughts; but, from what I now learn, when once we have achieved the power to dismiss him altogether, all things become pure for ever after. No more half-sinners, who retain some little love for virtue; your half-sinners may be all lost; but, for your free and easy sinners—your hardened sinners—sinners without compunction—full and complete sinners—hell will never get hold of them; they have cheated the devil by the very act of giving up themselves to him!"

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The good Father, seeing clearly enough the connexion between these consequences and his own principle, eluded the difficulty with adroitness; and, without forgetting either his good-humour or his prudence, merely said, “Do not suppose we are unprepared to meet the unhappy cases you describe: know, we hold that if those reprobates of whom you speak had never experienced compunction, nor felt any desire to give themselves to God, they would have been without guilt. But we maintain that they have experienced all this; and God would never have left a man to his sin, without discovering first to him the evil of what he was about to do, and giving him a desire to avoid it, or at least to ask assistance to be enabled to do so; and it is only the Jansenists that affirm the contrary.”

“What! Father,” I rejoined, “is that then what constitutes the heresy of the Jansenists? To deny that every time sin is committed, the conscience is troubled; in spite of which, men yet take the leap, and pass the boundary of obedience, according to Pere Bauny? If this be all, it is certainly a peculiar kind of heresy! I supposed we were condemned for being destitute of good thoughts or notions; but, that we should be condemned for not believing all the world to be endued with them, did certainly never occur to me. But, my good Father, I feel bound in conscience to undeceive you; and to tell you, there are multitudes who are conscious of no such desires; who sin without compunction; who sin with satisfaction; who make sin a matter of boast and exultation. And who is better acquainted with these things than yourself? You have yourself probably confessed some of these very persons

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; for it is among people of distinction that they are most usually found. But take heed, my Father, of the dangerous consequences that flow from this principle of yours! Do you not perceive the effect it will produce on libertines, whose great desire is to invalidate the truth of religion? What an excuse do you not furnish them with, in laying down as an article of faith, that they must feel in every sin which they commit, a secret warning, and an internal desire to abstain from it! Is it not obvious, that being convinced by their own experience of the fallacy of your doctrine upon this point, which you maintain to be one essential to faith, they will extend the consequences to every other. They will, if they find you not to be believed in one Article, suspect the whole; and thus you will compel them to the conclusion, either that religion is false, or that you are ill-instructed in its doctrines.”

My colleague then, taking up my argument, said, “You would do well, Reverend Father, while you endeavour to maintain this doctrine of yours, not to avow quite so plainly as you have now done, what you mean by ‘actual grace.’ How could you openly declare, without losing altogether your hold upon mens’ minds, ‘that none can be guilty of sin, without a previous knowledge of their infirmity, and of the remedy provided for it; without a wish for its cure, and for receiving such cure at the hands of God?’ Can you now, seriously and conscientiously, say that those who are immersed in avarice, in lust, in blasphemy, in broils and animosities, in robbery and sacrilege—that such have in reality any desire of chastity, of humility, and of other similar virtues?

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“Will any one believe that the philosophers who boasted so much of the powers of nature, knew any thing of disease and medicine? Will you tell me, that those who hold, as an undoubted axiom, ‘that it is not God who imparts virtue, and that no one was ever found to seek it of Him,’ would ever think of seeking it of Him themselves?

“Who could suppose that the Epicureans, who deny a Divine Providence, were ever sensible of an impulse to pray to the Deity? They who declared ‘that it was an affront to God to solicit him in our necessities; as if He could be supposed capable of bestowing a thought upon such beings as ourselves.’

“And, finally, can it be imagined that idolaters and atheists, in all the temptations to which they are urged into sin—that is, in times and on occasions without number—have any desire to pray to the true God (with whom they are unacquainted) to bestow upon them virtues, of whose nature they knew nothing?”

“All this we do maintain,” replied the worthy Father, in a determined tone; “and sooner than admit that men sin without the consciousness of doing ill, and a desire of the opposite virtues, we declare that all persons, both the vicious and the unbelieving, experience such influences and desires on every occasion of temptation; for you can furnish me with no proof, especially from Scripture, to the contrary.”

I then resumed the discourse as follows: “What! my Father, must we have recourse to Scripture to demonstrate a matter so palpable? This is no point of faith, or even

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of reasoning; it is a question of fact: it is matter of sight, of knowledge, of feeling.”

The Jansenist, however, holding the Father to his own terms, thus continued, “If you are desirous, Reverend Sir, to appeal only to Scripture, I consent; but take care how you resist its authority: and since it is written, ‘God has not revealed his judgments to the Gentiles, and has left them to wander in their ways,’ say not that God has enlightened those who, the sacred writings assure us, ‘are abandoned to darkness and the shadow of death.’”

“Is it not sufficient, to prove the error of your principle, that St. Paul calls himself ‘the chief of sinners;’ on account of sin which, he says, was committed in ignorance, and excess of zeal? Is it not enough to find in the Gospel, that those who crucified the Lord Jesus, needed the pardon that he himself sought for them, although they knew not the evil of their doing, and would not have done it had they known it? Is it not enough that Christ warns us, that there will be persecutors in the Church, who will think they do service to God in compassing its ruin; in order to teach us, that this which, according to the Apostle, is the greatest of all sins, may have been committed by those who, so far from knowing it to be sin, believed they should sin in not committing it? And, lastly, is it not enough that Christ himself has taught us, that there are two kinds of sinners,—the one, those who sin with knowledge, and the other, in ignorance; and that both shall be punished, although in different measures?”

The worthy Father, finding himself somewhat pressed by these proofs from Scripture, began to lose ground in the discussion; and allowing that the vicious might sin

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without the inspirations and impulses in question, said, “ You will not, at least, deny that the just never commit sin unless God ordain—” “ You waver,” said I, interrupting him, “ You waver, Father; you abandon the general principle, and finding you can make nothing more of your case respecting sinners, you try to compromise the matter, and establish your point in regard to the just. But now its application will be much circumscribed ; for it will avail so few persons, that it is not, so to speak, worth the trouble any longer to contest it.”

But my companion, who might, as it appeared to me, have studied for the discussion that very morning, so prepared did he seem upon all points, continued thus: “ This, my Father, is the last entrenchment, in which all those of your side of the question take refuge. But you are, in reality, no safer than before, even there. The instance of the just is not more favourable to you than that of the wicked. Who can doubt that the righteous often fall into sin through surprise and inadvertence ? Do we not know that the saints themselves are led into snares by their concupiscence ; and with all their habitual sobriety, yield themselves sometimes up to pleasure, while they believe they are under the constraint of necessity ; as says St. Augustine himself in his Confessions ?

“ How often do we see the most zealous persons drawn into acrimony in dispute from personal feelings, without reproof from conscience, and in the belief that they were actuated by zeal for truth alone ; and remain insensible, till long after, of their error and self-deception !

“ But what shall be said of those who abandon themselves to conduct positively evil, while they believe it to

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be meritorious (instances of which, ecclesiastical history furnishes us in abundance ;) but which belief, according to the Fathers, affords them no justification of their offences.

“ And, independent of this, how many are the secret sins of the righteous ! How otherwise could it be said that God alone knows their magnitude and their number ; that no one can be certain whether he is deserving of the Divine love or displeasure,* and that the very holiest have cause of fear and solicitude, although they may not be conscious of transgression in any particular instance, as St. Paul says of himself ?

“ Do you not see then, my Father, that the cases both of the just and of sinners alike oppose this necessity, in order to constitute sin, of knowing what is evil, and of loving the contrary virtues ? The propensity of the vicious for sin clearly proves that they have no desire of virtue ; and the love of the just to virtue equally shows that they have not always a consciousness of the sins which they daily fall into ; as the Scripture testifies.

“ And so certain is it that the offences of the just are of this nature, that it is seldom that the holiest men commit sin in any other way. For how can it be believed, that souls so pure as to shrink with the most sensitive anxiety from every thing in the slightest degree displeasing to God, as soon as it is known to be so ; and

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who yet offend many times in every day of their existence —that they, on every occasion of offence, should have this consciousness of weakness, this knowledge of the remedy, this desire of restoration, and this dependence on God for assistance ; and that, notwithstanding these their desires and aspirations, persons so zealous and watchful should not be preserved from passing the boundary, and committing sin ?

“ Be assured then, my good Father, that neither sinners nor righteous men are always, and on all occasions, conscious of these convictions, desires, and aspirations, whenever they fall into sin ; that is, to use your own expressions—that they are not endued with ‘actual grace,’ when they offend. Tell us no more, as do these new authorities, that it is impossible to sin without the knowledge of righteousness ; but rather say, with St. Augustine and the old Fathers, that it is impossible not to sin, when we know not what is right ; ‘Necesse est ut peccat, a quo ignorantur justitiæ.’ ”

The good Father seeing his views thus controverted in regard to the just as well as to the sinful, was still determined to keep his ground ; and after a little consideration : “ I see now the way to convince you,” he cried. And again opening Father Bauny at the place he had quoted before, “ See, see the reasoning on which his position is founded. I well knew he would not be found deficient in proofs. Read what he quotes from Aristotle, and you will see that, when he produces so signal an authority, you must either burn the books of this Prince of philosophers, or come over to our opinion. Observe now the principles laid down by Father Bauny. He says

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first, ‘ An action is not blameable, if it be involuntary.’ “ Agreed,” said my friend. “ This is the first time,” said I, addressing both, “ that I have found you agree. Stay where you are, my good Father, if you will take my advice.” “That would be doing nothing,” he replied, “ for we must know what are the conditions of an action being voluntary.” “ I much fear,” I rejoined, “ that you will entangle yourself there.” “ Never fear,” said he: “ one thing I am sure of—Aristotle is on my side. Hear, now, what Father Bauny says; ‘That an action may be proved to be voluntary, it should be committed by a person capable of seeing, knowing, penetrating the good and the evil in it. ‘ Voluntarium est,’ it is usually said, according to the philosopher (‘ Aristotle, remember,’ said he, touching my hand) quod fit a principio cognoscente singula, in quibus est actio ; so that when the will, at random and without deliberation, is impelled to desire or dislike, to do or to omit any thing, before it is apprehended whether it be evil to desire or to shun, to do or to omit it, such action is neither good nor evil ; inasmuch as, until this pre-requisite is fulfilled—this scrutiny and consideration in the mind of the good or evil qualities of the action contemplated—such action is not to be considered as voluntary.”

“ Well,” said the Father, “ are you satisfied ? ” “ It certainly appears,” I replied, “ that Aristotle is of the same opinion as Father Bauny, but that does not surprise me the less. So ! my Father, it is not sufficient to constitute a voluntary action, that we are aware what we are doing, and that we do it because we intend to do it ? But it is also necessary that we ‘ should see, should know,

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should penetrate the good and the evil in an action ?’ If this be so, no action in life can be voluntary; for no one can think at once and altogether of all these things. How many oaths are uttered in our games—what excesses are committed in festivities—what riots during carnival seasons, which are not voluntary, and consequently neither good nor bad, if they must be accompanied by this scrutiny of the mind upon the good or bad quality of the action committed ! But is it possible, my Father, that Aristotle should have entertained such an idea as this—for I have heard he was considered an exact thinker ?” “I will explain the matter,” said my Jansenist friend. And requesting the Father to give him Aristotle’s ‘ Morals,’ he opened it at the commencement of the third book, from which the Father had taken the passage he had quoted, and said to him, “I forgive you for having supposed, on the authority of Father Bauny, that Aristotle had delivered such sentiments. You would have altered your opinion had you looked for yourself. It is perfectly true that he teaches, that ‘ for an action to be voluntary, we must be acquainted with the particulars of that action, ‘Singula in quibus est actio.’ But what does he mean by this, but that we must know the particular circumstances of such an action; as the examples he gives clearly prove ? You will find he adduces only, in proof of his position, instances in which some such circumstances have been unknown; such as, ‘ a person, intending to ascend a machine, detaches a missile which wounds another; or Merope, who killed his son, supposing him to be an enemy; and the like.’

“ You thus see what kind of ignorance it is that renders

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actions involuntary; and that it is only that of special circumstance, which is styled by theologians, as you well know, ‘ignorance of fact.’ * But it is ‘ignorance of intention,’ † that is, unconsciousness of the good or evil of an action, which alone is the present question;—let us see whether Aristotle is of the same opinion as Father Bauny. These are the words of that philosopher. “All wicked persons are ignorant as to what they should do, and what they should avoid; and this it is which constitutes them wicked and vicious. We therefore cannot say that, because a man does not clearly know what he is in duty bound to do, that his actions are involuntary. For this ignorance in choosing between good and evil, does not show his act to be involuntary, but only to be vicious. We may say the same of one who is in general ignorant of the rules of duty, since it is that very ignorance which makes him an object of blame, not of excuse. And thus, the ignorance which constitutes actions to be involuntary and venial, is alone that which regards some particular fact, and special circumstances: it is then that a man is excused and pardoned, and considered as having acted against his inclination.”

“And now, my good Father, will you say that Aristotle is of your opinion? Who must not be astonished to see that a pagan philosopher is more enlightened than your doctors, in a matter so important to morality, and to the welfare of the soul, as a knowledge of the distinction between actions voluntary and involuntary, and consequently of the condemnation or acquittal due to sin? Hope nothing

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more then, Father, from this ‘Prince of Philosophers,’ and rather let me urge you to oppose no longer that Prince of Theologians, who thus decides the point in his 1st Book of Retr. chap. 15. ‘ Those who sin through ignorance do not commit the act involuntarily, although they may not deliberately intend to offend. And thus a sin, even of ignorance, cannot be committed without the will of the offender, although it be a will to act, and not absolutely to sin ; which, however, does not prevent the action from being sinful, inasmuch as, to constitute sin, it is sufficient to have done that which we were under an obligation not to do.’ ”

The Father seemed surprised, and still more at the passage from Aristotle, than at that from St. Augustine. But as he appeared to be revolving what reply to make, it was announced that Madame La Maréchale de —— and Madame La Marquise de —— wished to see him. Therefore, hastily leaving us, “ I will mention the matter,” said he, “ to our Fathers ; they will be able to answer you. These are delicate questions.” We understood him ; and when I was alone with my friend, I expressed my astonishment at the tendency of these doctrines to the subversion of morality. He replied, that he was astonished at my astonishment. “ Can you be ignorant,” said he, “ that their obliquities are more flagrant in cases of morality than even in other matters ?” He proceeded to give me some striking instances; and postponed their continuation till a future period. I propose that what I learnt from him shall be the subject of further communications from, &c. &c.

Notes

  1. *‘ Grace actuelle’ (Fr.)
  2. *Pere Annat, Confessor to the King. See 17th and subsequent Letters.
  3. *Had the holy-minded Pascal been permitted to live till his Christian experience had acquired more maturity, without loss of its fervour, he would, it may be hoped, have attained to more cheering views on this subject, There is a measure of humble assurance, without presumption, to be obtained even in this life ; and the Apostle Paul himself, to whom Pascal often refers, affords numerous instances of it in his own experience. (Transl.)
  4. *‘Ignorance du fait.’ (Fr.)
  5. †‘Ignorance du droit.’ (Fr.)

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The Provincial Letters of Pascal, with an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce, 1847, pp. 40–56.
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CitationLetter, 26 February 1656, “LETTER IV. · OF GRACE ‘ACTUELLE,’ ALWAYS PRESENT, AND OF SINS · OF IGNORANCE.”. In The Provincial Letters of Pascal, with an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1847), pp. 40–56. Paper Lanterns edition, https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/6/.

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  title     = {LETTER IV. · OF GRACE ‘ACTUELLE,’ ALWAYS PRESENT, AND OF SINS · OF IGNORANCE., 26 February 1656},
  booktitle = {The Provincial Letters of Pascal},
  publisher = {London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1847},
  year      = {1847},
  pages     = {40--56},
  note      = {With an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce. Paper Lanterns edition},
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