LETTER V. · DESIGN OF THE JESUITS IN THE INSTITUTION OF A NEW MORAL CODE. TWO SORTS OF CASUISTS AMONG THEM; MANY LAX, BUT A FEW SEVERE; THE REASON OF THE DIFFERENCE. EXPLANATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ‘PROBABILITY.’ A MULTITUDE OF MODERN AND OBSCURE AUTHORS SUBSTITUTED FOR THE FATHERS.

I am about to fulfil my promise…

20 · III · 1656ParisPrinted pp. 57–76

LETTER V.

DESIGN OF THE JESUITS IN THE INSTITUTION OF A NEW MORAL CODE. TWO SORTS OF CASUISTS AMONG THEM; MANY LAX, BUT A FEW SEVERE; THE REASON OF THE DIFFERENCE. EXPLANATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ‘PROBABILITY.’ A MULTITUDE OF MODERN AND OBSCURE AUTHORS SUBSTITUTED FOR THE FATHERS.

Sir,

I am about to fulfil my promise, and to furnish you with some of the leading principles of morality of the Jesuit Fathers:—“These men, eminent in learning and in wisdom, guided by a wisdom from above, which is more infallible than all the rules of philosophy.” You may suppose I am jesting in using such expressions; I am quite serious; they are their own words, in their work entitled “Imago primi sæculi.” I am only transcribing from them, and from the close of their Eulogium. “This is the society of men, or rather of angels, predicted by Isaiah in these words: ‘Go, ye angels prompt and swift of wing.’” Is not the prophecy, as applicable to them, clear? “They are eagle-spirits; they are a flock of phœnixes (a certain author having lately demonstrated

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that those birds are numerous): they have changed the face of Christianity.” Since they assert all this, we are bound to believe them. And all this, I proceed to show you in the following communication; as well as to put you in possession of their maxims for the conduct of life and conversation.

I made up my mind to inform myself thoroughly upon these matters. I determined not to rely solely upon the information of my friend; but to see with my own eyes. I found, however, that he had told me nothing but what was strictly accurate; and I think you will see this to be the case, from the account I am about to give of our conferences.

In my various conversations with him, he related to me such extraordinary things, that I had at first great difficulty in believing them. He however confirmed his statements by the publications of these very Fathers; so that I had no way left to excuse them, but to suggest that the sentiments in question were only those of individuals, and that it was not fair to impute them to the society at large. And, in fact, I contended that I was acquainted with some among them who were as strict, as others whom he referred to were lax. Upon this he proceeded to disclose to me the spirit upon which the Society’s proceedings are founded; and this being by no means generally known, you will probably be interested in learning. The following is his statement.

“ You suppose it to be much in their favour to be able to show, that there are among these professors some whose sentiments are as evangelical, as those of others are the contrary; and you thence come to the conclusion, that

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these latitudinarian opinions are not chargeable upon the whole body. I well know all this; for if such were the case, they would not be able to tolerate those who are so opposed to them. But since they have among them a portion who hold these licentious doctrines, you must in the same way conclude, that the spirit of the Society is by no means rigid; otherwise it would not allow such an intermixture as that which actually exists.” “How!” I inquired, “what then is to be deemed their object and aim as a body? It must be, surely, that they shall be bound by no fixed principles, and that each shall have liberty to think and speak as he pleases.” “That never could be the case,” replied my friend;—“so large a body could never be formed upon a plan so desultory, nor exist without a governing spirit to regulate all its movements: to say nothing of one of their special rules, viz. that nothing should go forth to the world respecting their doctrines and principles, without the sanction of their superiors.” “But then,” I said, “how is it possible that these very superiors can give their sanction to such contradictory maxims?” “That is what I propose to explain to you,” he replied.

“Understand then, in the first place, that their object is by no means the corruption of morals. On the other hand, they are equally remote from entertaining a single-minded aim for their reformation: this they would hold to be impolitic. Their reasoning is as follows: They think so favourably of themselves, that they believe it to be useful and—so to speak—necessary for the interests of religion, that their reputation should stand high with all classes, and their sway be extended over every man’s conscience

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. And as they see that severe and evangelical principles are most influential over some persons, they avail themselves of such, where they judge their opportunity favourable. But knowing these principles to be not favoured by the great majority, their method is to relax them in favour of these latter; and, thus, they are able to meet the tastes of all. For these reasons—having to deal with such varieties of condition, and even with entire nations—differing so much from each other—it is found necessary to have casuists adapted to all these diversities.

“ On this principle you will easily see, that if they employed only teachers of relaxed principles, they would frustrate their great aim of getting all classes under their influence; as the severely pious seek for guides of severe views in their spiritual affairs. But as that class is not a numerous one, it does not require a large body of instructors: on the other hand, crowds of the more easy sort of teachers take the field, for the service of the multitudes that are more loosely inclined.

“ It is by this kind of ‘facile and accommodating conduct’ (as it is called by the Pére Petau) that they hold out the hand of fellowship to the whole world. If, for instance, one person presents himself who is desirous to make restitution of some ill-gotten gains, think not that they will repulse him; they will applaud, and confirm him in so holy a resolution. But if, on the contrary, another is desirous of absolution of his sin without restitution, it will go hard with them if they do not find means for accomplishing his object; and they will become themselves guarantees for their efficacy.

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“ By these methods they preserve their friends, and are protected from their enemies ; for, if reproached with laxity of principles, they straightway bring forward their austere professors ; together with, perhaps, some of their publications, that enforce the rigour of Christian principles ; and the simple and unreflecting are satisfied with such proofs.

“In this way they adapt themselves to all classes. Nay, they respond so admirably to every taste, that, in countries where the notion of a crucified Deity is esteemed folly, they suppress the scandal of the Cross ; preaching only the Saviour in his state of glory, and not of suffering. It is in this manner that they have acted in the Indus and China, permitting their converts even to practice idolatry, by the subtle contrivance of directing them to conceal an image of Christ under their garments, and mentally to render to it those public devotions, which were professedly paid to the idol Cachinchoam, and their Keum-fu-cum. These are facts, which rest on the authority of Gravina, a Dominican, as also of the Spanish memorial presented to Philip 4th of Spain by the Grey Friars of the Philippine Isles, as related by Thomas Rastado in his work of ‘ The Martyrs of the Faith,’ page 427. In the same manner, the congregation of the Cardinals ‘ de Propaganda fide ’ was obliged to interdict the Jesuits, specially, and on pain of excommunication, from permitting the adoration of idols on any pretence whatever, as well as from concealing the doctrines of the Cross from their students in theology ; expressly directing them to admit none to baptism, but on a full explanation of those holy mysteries ; and ordering them to exhibit crucifixes in all their churches ; as is fully

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set forth in the decree of that congregation, of July 1646, signed by Cardinal Carponi.

“ It is in this way, and by virtue of the doctrine of “ probable opinions,” * the source and the foundation of every species of disorder, that they have spread themselves over the face of the whole earth. You may hear the same things from themselves; for they affect no concealment of them; nor of various other facts with which I am about to acquaint you; with this difference only, that their prudence (which is in reality worldly and political) is masked under the pretext of a prudence divine and spiritual; as if true faith, and the tradition by which it is supported, were not one and unchangeable, in all times, and all places; as if it were allowable to bend its requisitions, to accommodate those who ought to conform themselves to its obligations; and as if the soul, in order to cleanse itself from its pollutions, might dare to corrupt the Law of the Lord; whereas we know, that ‘ the Law of the Lord is pure, converting the soul, and making wise the simple ! ’

“ I should wish you then to make the acquaintance of these worthy Fathers; and take my word for it, you will easily perceive, in the laxity of their morals, the results of their doctrines respecting grace. You will find in them the Christian virtues almost extinct, and stripped altogether of that grace of charity, which is their soul and life. You will see so many crimes palliated, and so much irregularity allowed, that you will be no longer surprised to find them maintain, all men to have grace sufficient

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for such a measure of piety of life, as their principles propose. For a morality such as theirs—little better than Pagan—the light that Nature supplies is indeed enough. When we inculcate the necessity of an efficacious grace, we assign other virtues for its exercise. It is not simply, to eradicate some kinds of vices by the cultivation of others; it is not merely, to induce an observance of the external duties of religion; it is to nourish a virtue more elevated than the Jewish Pharisees, or the wisest of Pagans ever reached. The restraints of law—the deductions of reason—suffice for attainments such as those. But, to disengage the soul from love of the world, and allure it from all that it holds most dear below; to annihilate self, and consecrate the affections solely and unchangeably to God; all this can be the work alone of an Omnipotent hand! And it is, therefore, as little rational to pretend that we have in ourselves this sufficiency of power, as it would be to deny that such qualities as have been described, if destitute of Divine love, which, notwithstanding, these Fathers confound with Christian virtues, are not within our own power of attainment.”

It was thus my friend discoursed to me, evincing a deep concern for the irregularities he described. For my part, I could not help at least admiring the excellent policy of this society; and I determined to follow the advice I had received, to resort to one of their most able casuists for further information. For this purpose I found out an old friend of my own, and proceeded to renew my acquaintance with him. And as I was aware in what way to obtain most effectually my object, we soon came to an excellent understanding.

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He received me with great cordiality, for he had always been attached to me; and after some general conversation, I took occasion, in reference to the present season, to ask him a few questions respecting fasting, with a view to draw him insensibly into the subjects I desired. I complained that I experienced difficulty in enduring that exercise.

He began by exhorting me to the duty of forcing my inclinations; but, as I continued my complaints, he expressed concern for my case, and set himself to find excuses for me. He suggested several causes of the inconvenience I suffered, which, however, did not apply to my own circumstances. At last it occurred to him to ask me whether I found any difficulty in sleeping without taking supper. “Indeed I do, my Father,” I replied, “and for that reason I am often obliged both to take a collation at noon, and to sup in the evening.” “I am glad to say I can find a way,” he replied, “to relieve you, without any sin on your part. There—you may dispense with fasting. I do not, however, wish you to take my word only for it; come into the library.” I went accordingly, and there, taking up a book, he said, “Here is my authority; and heaven knows how eminent an one it is. It is Escobar.” “Who is Escobar?” I enquired. “What! don’t you know Escobar, a member of our society, who compiled that Moral Theology of 24 of our Fathers; respecting which he makes, in the Preface, an allegorical comparison to the Apocalypse, sealed with seven seals? And further he says, that Jesus thus offers it sealed to the four living creatures, Suarez, Vasquez, Molina, Valentia, in presence of 24 Jesuits, representing

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the 24 Elders." He then read the whole of this Allegory, which he evidently considered very impressive, and conveying a striking proof of the excellence of the work. Then, finding the passage relating to fasts—" Here it is," said he, tr. 1, ex. 13, N. 67, 'If a person cannot sleep without having eaten, is he obliged to fast? By no means.' Are you not satisfied?" " Not entirely," I replied, " for I find I can bear fasting, by taking a collation in the morning, and supping at night." " See what follows then," he said; " they have provided for all cases. ' And suppose a person finds himself enabled to fast by taking only a collation in the morning, and supper at night?' Here is the answer; ' Still he is not bound to fast; no one is obliged to reverse the order of his meals.'" " Excellent reasoning!" I exclaimed. " But tell me," he continued; " Do you take much wine?" " No," I answered; " I cannot bear much." " I asked the question," said he, " for the purpose of apprizing you, that you may lawfully drink wine in the morning, and whenever you please, without violating your fast; and that is very supporting to the strength. This is decided in the same part, No. 75. ' May we, without breaking our fast, drink wine at any hour we choose, and even in large quantities? We may, and even of hypocras.'"* " I don't remember that hypocras wine," said I; " I must put it down in my memoranda. But really this Escobar is an excellent person." " Every one likes him," replied the Father; " he puts such striking queries. Look here, in the same place, No. 38; ' If a person is doubtful whether he has reached 21, is he bound to fast? No. But

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supposing I shall be 21 to-night, an hour after midnight, and to-morrow is fast-day, shall I be bound to fast to-morrow? No; you may eat as much as you like between midnight and one o’clock, as you are not 21 till then; and thus, as you have a right to break the fast, you are not bound to keep it.’” “It is really very entertaining,” said I. “Oh, there’s no leaving it off when you have once begun to read it: I pass days and nights over it—I read nothing else.” The worthy Father, in fact, seeing how it interested me, was delighted, and went on. “Look at this passage of Filiutius, one of the 24 Jesuits, vol. ii. tr. 29, part ii. c. 6, N. 143; ‘If a person is exhausted, as, for instance, ‘ad insequendam amicam,’ is he bound to fast? No. But if he has fatigued himself, expressly for the purpose of obtaining a dispensation from fasting, will he still be bound to fast? Though he may have formed a purpose of doing so, he will be under no such obligation.’ There,” said he, “now you would not have believed this!” “Indeed, my good Father,” said I, “I do not believe it now. What! is it no sin not to fast when we are able to do so? Is it lawful for us to seek occasions to commit sin? or rather are we not bound to avoid them? Truly, this is a very accommodating doctrine.” “Not always,” he replied; “it depends upon circumstances.” “On what circumstances?” “Oh, oh!” he rejoined; “then it is your opinion, that if we are exposed to inconvenience in avoiding such occasions, still we are bound to do so? That is not, I assure you, the opinion of Father Bauny, as you will see here at page 1084, ‘Absolution is not to be refused to those who continue in a ‘proximate’ condition

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of sin,* if it be such as they are unable to withdraw from, without bringing scandal upon themselves ;† or without sustaining personal inconvenience.’” “I am delighted to hear it, my good Father; there is nothing more wanting, but to say, these occasions may be purposely and deliberately sought, since it is allowable not to avoid them.” “That very thing is in some cases allowed,” rejoined he; “the celebrated casuist Basil Ponce states this, and the Pére Bauny confirms his opinion in his tract on Penitence, ix. 4, p. 94: ‘We may seek occasions, directly, and of themselves, ‘primo et per se,’ if the spiritual or temporal good of ourselves or our neighbour induce us to do so.’”

“In truth,” I exclaimed, “I seem in a dream when I find religious persons holding language like this? My good Father, tell me now, can you conscientiously maintain such opinions ?” “No, indeed I do not,” he replied. “Then you are speaking contrary to your conscience ?” “By no means ; I say this, not according to my own conscience, but according to the consciences of Ponce, and Père Bauny; and surely we may follow such eminent men as these.” “What then, my Father, because they have introduced a few such lines as these into their books, can you in your conscience believe it is lawful to seek occasions of sin ? I always thought that Scripture and the traditions of the Church were to be guides, and not vain casuists.” Oh! bon Dieu !” cried the Father, “this is just like the Jansenists. Does not the authority of such men as Père Bauny and Basil Ponce, give a measure

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of probability at least to these opinions ?” “I cannot be satisfied with probability,” I replied; “I want certainty.” “I see,” said the Father, “you don’t understand this doctrine of ‘probable opinions ;’ * you would think differently, if you did: I must instruct you in it. You will find you have not lost your time in coming here; but for that, you would have known nothing about it. It is the very foundation—the A, B, C of our system of morality.”

I was delighted to find him thus fall into the topic I desired; and eagerly expressed my wish that he would explain to me the meaning of a ‘probable opinion.’ “Our writers will furnish you with an answer better than myself,” he replied. “This is what they lay down generally on the subject; and among others, our Twenty-four, in Princ. ex 3, N. 8. An opinion is termed ‘probable,’ when it is founded upon reasons entitled to a certain measure of consideration. Thence it may happen, that a single authority of eminence may render an opinion ‘probable.’ ” “And this is the reason.” . . . . “A person, specially devoted to the study of a given subject, would not embrace an opinion, if he had not good and sufficient cause for it.” “Then,” said I, “a single doctor may turn our consciences, at his own pleasure, and without fear of consequences !” “You need not laugh,” said he ; “this is a doctrine not to be questioned. The Jansenists have tried to shake it, but they have lost their labour. It is too firmly established. Hear what Sanchez, one of our most celebrated Fathers, says, ‘You will doubt, perhaps

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, how the authority of one sound and learned doctor should render an opinion probable; nevertheless, such is the case, as we are assured by Angelus, Sylv. Navarre, Emmanuel Sa,’ &c. And they prove it thus. A probable opinion is one that has weight and foundation. Now the authority of a wise and pious man is not a trifle, but rather a matter of great consideration. And weigh well the reason. If the testimony of any individual be credible, as to a certain event having occurred at such a place—for instance, Rome—why may not such testimony be equally valid in a question of morals?”

“A happy comparison,” I exclaimed, “mere worldly matters with those relating to the conscience!” “Have patience: Sanchez has an answer for this in the lines that immediately follow; ‘And I do not agree with the distinction which certain authors draw, that the authority of any learned man may weigh in a matter of a worldly nature, but not in those relating to Divine things; for it is of great weight, both in the one and the other.’”

“My good Father,” said I, frankly, “I cannot make anything of this rule of yours. Who will satisfy me that, with this licence which your Fathers assume, of examining matters by reason only, that which will appear certain to one, will be so to others? So great is the diversity of opinion.” “You don’t see the point,” interrupted the Father; “they are by no means without differences of opinion; but that is of no importance. We all know that they do not all hold the same sentiments; on the contrary, they scarcely ever agree: but it is all the better for that. There are few questions in which you will not find that one will say, Yes; another, No. And, in all these cases,

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each of the two conflicting opinions has some degree of probability; and therefore it is, that ‘Diana’ remarks on this subject, Part III. Vol. IV. p. 244, ‘Ponce and Sanchez hold different opinions; but, as they are both wise men, each of their opinions rests upon grounds of probability.’”

“But, my Father,” I said, “this must render a choice between the different views embarrassing.” “Not in the least,” he replied; “we have nothing to do but to follow that which agrees best with our own.” “But suppose the other has the greater measure of probability?” “No matter,” he replied. “And if the other should be the more sound?” “No matter still,” rejoined the Father; “here is an excellent solution of the point. It is in Emanuel Sa, a member of our society, in his Aphorisms ‘de Dubio,’ p. 183, ‘We may do any thing that we believe to be allowable, if authorized by an opinion grounded on probability; although the contrary opinion may be the more sound one. The opinion of any one learned man suffices for this purpose.’” “Then if an opinion be altogether less probable, and less sound, is it allowed to act upon that, in preference to one which is believed to be more probable, and more sound?” “Yes,” again he said; “hear the words of Filiutius, the great Roman Jesuit, Mort. quæst. tr. 21, c. 4, N. 128, ‘It is lawful to follow a less probable, and less sound opinion; many authors concur in this judgment.’ Is not this explicit?” “This gives us sufficient latitude, it must be confessed, my reverend Father,” I said: “thanks to your ‘probable’ opinions, we get a very comfortable degree of liberty of conscience. And pray, do your other casuists

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give the same licence in their replies?” “Yes,” said he, “we reply just according to our own pleasure, or rather according to the pleasure of those who interrogate us; for these are but rules, taken from the works of the Fathers, Layman, Theol. Mor. l. 6, tr. 1, c. 2, § 2, N. 7—Vasquez, Dist. 62, c. ix, n. 47; Sanchez in Sam. l. 1, c. ix. N. 28; and of our ‘24’ in Princ. ex. 3, N. 24. These are the words of Layman, which are followed by the ‘24;’ A doctor, when consulted, may give such advice as is not only, in his opinion, probable, but even contrary to his opinion, if it be thought probable by others, provided such contrary opinion will be more favourably received by, and be more agreeable to the party asking advice; ‘si forte, ex illi favorabilios seu exoptatior sit.’ But I go further, and say, it will not be unreasonable for him to give to the consulter an opinion that may have been entertained as probable by some learned persons, although he himself may believe it to be utterly false.’”

“Admirable! my good Father, your doctrine is most convenient. So, you may reply Yes or No, at your pleasure! It is impossible to estimate too highly such an advantage. I now see the use of the opposing opinions held by your authorities on all subjects; for the one are always serviceable, and the other can never be injurious. If you don’t find your account on the one side, you try the other, and are thus always secure.” “It is very true,” he replied; “and thus we can always say, with Diana, who had Father Bauny on his side, while Father Lugo was against him,

‘Sœpe, premente Deo, fert Deus alter opem.’
‘Si quelque Dieu nous presse, un autre nous delivre.’

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“I understand you,” said I; “but there is one difficulty, to my mind; suppose, after consulting one of your doctors, and receiving from him a somewhat latitudinarian opinion, you were to fall in with another more severe in his views, and who would not give absolution without a change of opinion? Have you not given directions for such a contingency?” “Can you doubt it?” he replied; “they are compelled to absolve such penitents as hold the probable opinions in question, on pain of being held guilty of mortal sin if they refuse. This has been clearly proved by our writers, and among others Père Bauny, tr. 4, de pœnit. qu. 13, p. 19. ‘When the penitent,’ he says, ‘acts upon the authority of a probable opinion, the confessor must absolve him, even if his own opinion differ from that of the penitent.’” “But he does not say it is a mortal sin not to absolve him.” “You are too hasty!” said he; “hear what follows: it is expressly laid down, ‘To refuse absolution to a penitent for an act committed in pursuance of a probable opinion, is an offence, in its very nature, mortal.’ And he quotes, in confirmation of this sentiment, three of the most eminent of our Fathers, Saurez, Vol. 4, dist. 32, sect. 5; Vasquez, disp. 62, ch. 7, et Sanchez, N. 29.”

“Well, my good Father,” I rejoined; “this is truly excellent! There is nothing now to fear. A confessor cannot dare to refuse! I did not know before that you had the power to issue ordinances on pain of damnation. I supposed you were only able to take away sins; I did not imagine you had authority to make them also: but I now see there is no limit to your powers.” “You do not express yourself properly,” he replied; “we do not make

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sins; we only furnish the occasion for bringing them to light. I have several times observed that you are not a good scholastic.” “Be that as it may, Father,” I said, “my doubts are now all satisfied. But I have one more question to ask you. I do not exactly see how you manage, when the Fathers of the Church are opposed to the opinions of your Casuists ?” “You do not understand the matter,” he replied. “The Fathers were well enough for their own times; but they don’t go far enough for ours. Modern morality is not to be regulated by them; but by the casuists of our own day. Hear the words of our own Père Cellot, De Hier. lib. 8, cap. 16, p. 714, following, in this, the famous Père Reginaldus: ‘In questions of morals the modern Casuists are preferable to the ancient Fathers, although they lived at a period nearer to the apostolic age.’ And, in conformity with this view, Diana thus speaks, pa. 5, tr. 8, reg. 31: ‘Are the holders of benefices bound to give up their revenues, if they make an ill use of them ?’ The ancients said, Yes; but the moderns say, No: let us then not relinquish this decision, by which the obligation to give up property in the supposed case is put an end to.” “Admirable sentiments !” I replied, “and full of comfort for a large part of mankind.” “As to the Fathers,” said my friend again, “we leave them to such as incline to the dogmatic school; but we who have the keeping of men’s consciences, study them but little; and quote, in our writings, none but the modern casuists. Look at Diana, for instance, whose works are so copious; he has enumerated, at the outset, the authors whom he

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refers to. They amount to 296, the oldest of their publications having appeared within the last eighty years.” “ Subsequent to the institution of your Society, then ?” I said. “ About contemporaneously,” he replied. “That is to say,” rejoined I, “ on its appearance, at once were cashiered St. Augustine, Chrysostom, Ambrose, Jerome, and their brethren, as concerns every thing that relates to morals. But I should be glad to be informed the names of their successors : who, pray, are these new authorities ?” “ Oh, they are most able and distinguished men—Villalobos, Conink, Llamas, Achokeri, Dealkoser, Dellacroix, Veracruz, Ugolin, Tambourin, Fernandez, Martinez, Suarez, Henriquez, Vasquez, Lopez, Gomez, Sanchez, de Vechis, de Grassis, de Grassalis, de Peliginnis, de Graphocis, Squilante, Bezozeri, Barcola, de Bobadilla, Limancha, Perez de Lara, Aldretta Lorca, de Scarica, Quaranta, Scophra, Pedrezza, Cabrezza, Bisbo, Dias, de Clavasio, Villagat, Adam a Menden, Isibaine, Binsfield, Volfangi a Vorberg, Vosthery, Strevesdorf.” “ Oh, my good Father ! ” cried I, alarmed, “ were all these people Christians ? ” “ Christians ! ” said he, “ did I not tell you they were the only persons by whom, in the present day, we regulate our system of Christianity ? ”

I was concerned to hear him say this ; but made no remark ; and only asked him if they were all Jesuits ? “ No,” he replied ; “ but that is of no importance ; there are excellent things in them all. Not but that, to say the truth, the greater part are taken or imitated from ourselves ; but we do not stand upon punctilios ; besides which, they never fail to quote our Fathers with eulogiums. Diana, for instance, who is not a member of our

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Society, when he speaks of Vasquez, calls him the ‘ Phœnix of Minds.’ And elsewhere he says, Vasquez, alone, is as valuable to him as all the rest together; ‘ Instar omnium.’ All our writers also make great use of this worthy ‘ Diana ; ’ as you will see, when you come to understand our doctrine of ‘ Probability.’ On the contrary, we have wished that others besides the Jesuits should deal in ‘ probable ’ opinions, that we may not alone have such things imputed to us. And thus, when some author—whoever he may be—advances an opinion of this kind, we may, if we think proper, weigh it by the doctrine of ‘ probability ; ’ at the same time that we are not answerable for it, if the writer does not belong to us.” “ I understand all that,” I replied : “ I see very well that every thing is made to suit your views completely—excepting only the old Fathers—and that you are masters of the field. Your course is clear.”

“ At the same time,” I continued, “ I cannot help thinking, I perceive a few important inconveniences, and some powerful obstacles in the way of your career.” “ Indeed ! ” exclaimed the Father, astonished. “ They are,” said I, “ the Scriptures, the Popes, and the Councils ; all which you cannot possibly gainsay, and which are all united in one uniform system of evangelical truth.” ‘‘ Oh, is that all ? ” he replied. “ You quite alarmed me. Do you suppose, so palpable a point as that has not been foreseen and provided for ? I cannot indeed but admire that you should think, we have put ourselves in opposition to the Scriptures, the Popes, and the Councils ! I must set you right. I should be concerned that you should suppose us so wanting in our duty. You have no doubt

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conceived this notion from certain sentiments of our Fathers, which bear an appearance of such a contradiction, but are not such in reality. However, in order to satisfy you of our agreement with them, we must seek an opportunity of more leisure. If your stay here is not disagreeable, and you will let us meet again to-morrow, I will give you the necessary information."

This was the conclusion of our conference, as it will be of my present communication—enough in all conscience, for one letter. I doubt not you will be willing to wait for the sequel, and in the mean time, remain, &c. &c.

Notes

  1. *‘ Opinions probables.’ (Fr.)
  2. *Probably something more comforting than ordinary wine.
  3. *‘ Dans les occasions prochaines du péché.’ (Fr.)
  4. †‘ Sans donner suget au monde de parler.’
  5. *‘Des opinions probables.’ (Fr.)

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Scan leaf 151 of the 1847 edition (printed page 65), showing letter LETTER V..
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Scan leaf 152 of the 1847 edition (printed page 66), showing letter LETTER V..
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Scan leaf 153 of the 1847 edition (printed page 67), showing letter LETTER V..
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Scan leaf 154 of the 1847 edition (printed page 68), showing letter LETTER V..
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Scan leaf 155 of the 1847 edition (printed page 69), showing letter LETTER V..
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Scan leaf 156 of the 1847 edition (printed page 70), showing letter LETTER V..
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Scan leaf 157 of the 1847 edition (printed page 71), showing letter LETTER V..
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Scan leaf 158 of the 1847 edition (printed page 72), showing letter LETTER V..
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Scan leaf 159 of the 1847 edition (printed page 73), showing letter LETTER V..
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Scan leaf 160 of the 1847 edition (printed page 74), showing letter LETTER V..
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Scan leaf 161 of the 1847 edition (printed page 75), showing letter LETTER V..
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Scan leaf 162 of the 1847 edition (printed page 76), showing letter LETTER V..
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About this letter

Letter LETTER V. of 25 · printed pp. 57–76 · scan leaf 143 of 570

Where it sits in the book: black are letters, grey the editor’s narrative, pale the front matter, appendices and index.

Source
The Provincial Letters of Pascal, with an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce, 1847, pp. 57–76.
How it was read
Read by machine. Not yet proofread by people. Expect occasional slips in names, accents and foreign words. The book’s reading score is 88 out of 100. How this text was read
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Cite this letter

CitationLetter, 20 March 1656, “LETTER V. · DESIGN OF THE JESUITS IN THE INSTITUTION OF A NEW MORAL CODE. TWO SORTS OF CASUISTS AMONG THEM; MANY LAX, BUT A FEW SEVERE; THE REASON OF THE DIFFERENCE. EXPLANATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ‘PROBABILITY.’ A MULTITUDE OF MODERN AND OBSCURE AUTHORS SUBSTITUTED FOR THE FATHERS.”. In The Provincial Letters of Pascal, with an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1847), pp. 57–76. Paper Lanterns edition, https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/7/.

BibTeX@incollection{pascal-provincial-letters-1847-letter-0007,
  author    = {},
  title     = {LETTER V. · DESIGN OF THE JESUITS IN THE INSTITUTION OF A NEW MORAL CODE. TWO SORTS OF CASUISTS AMONG THEM; MANY LAX, BUT A FEW SEVERE; THE REASON OF THE DIFFERENCE. EXPLANATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ‘PROBABILITY.’ A MULTITUDE OF MODERN AND OBSCURE AUTHORS SUBSTITUTED FOR THE FATHERS., 20 March 1656},
  booktitle = {The Provincial Letters of Pascal},
  publisher = {London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1847},
  year      = {1847},
  pages     = {57--76},
  note      = {With an Essay on Pascal, Considered as a Writer and Moralist, by M. Villemain; Newly Translated by George Pearce. Paper Lanterns edition},
  url       = {https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/7/}
}

Linkhttps://paperlanterns.ink/collections/pascal-provincial-letters-1847/7/

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