LETTER VII. · ON THE METHOD USED BY THE CASUISTS IN REGULAT- · ING MOTIVES. THE PERMISSION GIVEN TO THEM TO · TAKE LIFE, IF IN DEFENCE OF HONOUR AND PRO- · PERTY, EXTENDED MOREOVER TO THE PRIESTHOOD · AND RELIGIOUS ORDERS. CURIOUS QUESTION PRO- · POSED BY CARAMUEL, WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR · JESUITS TO KILL JANSENISTS.
After appeasing the good Father…
LETTER VII.
ON THE METHOD USED BY THE CASUISTS IN REGULAT- ING MOTIVES. THE PERMISSION GIVEN TO THEM TO TAKE LIFE, IF IN DEFENCE OF HONOUR AND PRO- PERTY, EXTENDED MOREOVER TO THE PRIESTHOOD AND RELIGIOUS ORDERS. CURIOUS QUESTION PRO- POSED BY CARAMUEL, WHETHER IT IS LAWFUL FOR JESUITS TO KILL JANSENISTS.
Sir,
Paris, April 25, 1656.
After appeasing the good Father, whose discourse I had somewhat interrupted by my story of John D'Alba, he recommended it, on my assurance that I would not disturb him by anything more of the kind ; and he related to me the maxims of the casuists respecting the Aristocracy in the following terms :
“ You are aware that the ruling passion of persons of this class of life, is the maintenance of their honour ; by which they are continually hurried into excesses, which seem, undoubtedly, opposed to Christian piety. This would lead to their almost entire exclusion from the confessional, had not our Fathers somewhat relaxed, in their favour, the severe requirements of religion, out of a proper consideration for human infirmity. But being
[p. 97]desirous of reconciling their duties to God and the Gospel, and kindness to their fellow-men, and, amongst them, the people of the world, they have exerted all their ingenuity to devise expedients by which matters may be so tempered and adjusted, that the persons in question may maintain and retrieve their honour without a violation of conscience; and by this means preserve in a becoming harmony, two things usually regarded as opposed to each other—religion and the point of honour. But, in proportion as this aim was desirable, so was it difficult; the enterprize was noble yet laborious: you cannot but perceive this yourself.” “ Surprisingly ! ” I replied, though coolly. “ Surprisingly,” he cried; “ it must indeed surprise and astonish every one. Don’t you know, that the Gospel, on the one hand, enjoins, ‘ Render not evil for evil, but leave vengeance to God ;’ and, on the other, that the laws of the world forbid us to endure an injury, but enjoin us rather to seek its redress, and that, often, by the death of the party inflicting it ? Was there ever any thing apparently more contradictory ? And yet, when I tell you, our Fathers have solved the difficulty, you merely say, it is surprising.” “ I did not, perhaps, sufficiently explain myself, my good Father,” I replied ; “ I should, to say the truth, have held the thing to be impossible, if I had not known, from what I had before seen of your learned divines, that they can accomplish with ease what other men find to be impossibilities. This satisfies me that they have, in the present case, succeeded in devising methods, which I shall doubtless admire, when I become fully acquainted with them. Pray satisfy my curiosity.”
[p. 98]“ If you really feel such an interest in the matter,” he rejoined, “ I cannot refuse. Know then, that this great and astonishing principle is, our method of ‘ regulating the motive ;’ * the importance of which, in our system of morals, is so great, that I could almost venture to compare it with the Doctrine of Probability. You have had some hints of it already ‘ en passant ;’ for when I explained how valets might reconcile becoming the bearers of certain improper messages, did you not observe that it was done by diverting their intention from the misconduct of which they made themselves the agents, to the profit which would accrue to them from it ? This is one instance of what is meant by ‘ regulating the intention :’ and in the same way, you have seen that persons giving money for church-preferment would be guilty of actual Simony, but for a similar ‘ regulation.’ But I am now going to show you this eminent principle in all its splendour in the case of homicide—a practice which it has succeeded in justifying in a thousand cases of duels ; and you will at once acknowledge its immense capability and value.” “ I see already,” I said, “ that every thing must be rendered lawful by means of it—nothing can escape.” “ You are always going from one extreme to the other,” replied the Father ; “ you should cure yourself of that habit. To convince you, now, that every thing is not allowed, I can tell you, for example, we do not allow of any one committing sin with a deliberate purpose to do so ; and if a person persists in having no other end in a transgression than the sin itself, we break with him ; such conduct is
[p. 99]diabolical, without distinction of age, sex, or condition. But, if such be not the unhappy disposition of the party, then we endeavour to put in practice our method of directing or regulating the intention, which consists in proposing for the act committed a lawful motive and object. Not that we do not endeavour, as far as it is in our power, to turn men from forbidden courses; but when we are unable to prevent the act, we at least, purify the intention; and thus, correct the viciousness of the means by the goodness of the end.
“It is in this way that our leaders have found the means to tolerate the acts of violence practised in defence of honour; for they have only to substitute, as the motive, instead of a thirst of vengeance, which is criminal, a desire to defend our reputation, which the Fathers allow; and the thing is done. By similar means, they succeed in fulfilling all their duties towards God and their fellow-creatures: the world they satisfy by the permission of the act; and they comply with the Gospel in purifying the motive. All this was heretofore unknown; and for this, our Society is to be thanked. Do you understand the matter now?” “Perfectly,” I replied; “you give over to man the external and material act; and you assign to God the internal, spiritual intention; and by this equitable division, you reconcile human rules of conduct with those of the Divine will. But, my good Father, to confess the truth, I am a little suspicious of your premises; and entertain some doubt, whether your authorities will fully bear out your position.” “You are mistaken,” said the Father; “I advance nothing that I cannot prove, and
[p. 100]that, by so many passages, that their number, their authority and force, will fill you with admiration.
“ To show you, now, how our Fathers have brought the maxims of the Gospel into agreement with those of the world, hear our Père Reginaldus in Praxi, Liv. 21, N. 62, p. 260. ‘ Individuals are not allowed to avenge themselves, for St. Paul says, Rom. ch. xii. “ Recompense to no man evil for evil;” and Eccles. ch. xxviii. “ He that avengeth shall find vengeance from the Lord, and he will surely keep his sin in remembrance.”’ Besides, what is said in Scripture of the forgiveness of injuries, as in ch. vi. and xviii. of St. Matthew.” “ Certainly, my excellent Father, if, after this, your author asserts anything beyond what is contained in Holy Writ, it is not for want of knowing better. What is his conclusion, however ?” “ It is this,” said the Father; ‘ From all this it appears, that a military man may at the instant, pursue any one who has injured him; not, indeed, with the intent to return evil for evil, but with that of preserving his honour: ‘ Non ut malum pro malo reddat, sed ut conservat honorem.’
“ You see, now, how carefully the intention of rendering evil for evil is guarded against, seeing what is the prohibition of Scripture upon that point. It is never for an instant allowed. See Lessius, de Just. Liv. 2. C. 9. d. 12. N. 79. ‘ A person receiving a blow must not contemplate revenging it; but he may desire to escape dishonour; and for that purpose may instantly repel the injury, even at the point of the sword: ‘ etiam cum gladio.’ So far are we from allowing a desire to take revenge on our enemies, that the Fathers will not permit
[p. 101]us ever to wish for their death, in an angry encounter. See Father Escobar, tr. 5. ex 5. N. 145. ‘ If your enemy endeavours to injure you, you must not desire his death, as a consequence of any act of hostility on your part ; but you may commit such act, to avoid detriment to yourself. And so strictly lawful is this (provided such be our intention) that our famous Hurtado de Mendoza says, ‘ We may pray to God to cause promptly the death of any one that persecutes us, if it cannot otherwise be averted.’ This is in his Work de Spl. Vol. 2. d. 15. Sec. 4. N. 48.”
“ My reverend Father,” I here interposed, “ the Church, I am afraid, has omitted to insert a collect of this nature among her prayers.” “ The Church,” he replied, “ has not introduced in her prayers every thing that may be made a matter of request to God. Besides, the thing was not possible, for the opinion in question is more recent than the Breviary : you are no chronologist. But to continue the subject, hear again this passage from Père Gaspar Hurtado, de Sub. pecc. diff. 9, quoted by Diana, p. 5. tr. 14. r. 99. (He is one of the twenty-four Fathers of Escobar.) ‘ An incumbent may, without committing mortal sin, desire the death of one who enjoys an annuity out of his benefice ; and a son, that of a father ; and they may rejoice when the event occurs, provided it be only for the benefit thus accruing, and not from any personal hatred.’ ”
“ Truly, my good Father,” I exclaimed, “ these are valuable fruits of your ‘ regulation of motives.’ I begin to see the vast extent of it ; nevertheless it appears to me, that there are still certain cases, interesting to the higher
[p. 102]classes, somewhat difficult of solution, although very important.” “ Let me hear them,” said the Father. “ Explain to me then,” I replied, “ how, by means of this regulation of the intent, it is lawful to fight a duel ?” “ The great Hurtado Mendoza,” said the Father, “ shall satisfy you at once , in a passage quoted by Diana, p. 5. tr. 14. r. 99. ‘ If a gentleman challenged in a duel, be known not to be a religionist, and it be notorious, from his habitual and unscrupulous laxity of conduct, that, if he refuse the challenge, it is not from any pious scruples, but from cowardice ; and he would thus be liable to be stigmatized as chicken-hearted and unmanly—‘ gallina et non vir ’—he may, to preserve his honour, repair to the place of rendezvous ; not absolutely and with express intention of fighting, but only for the purpose of defending himself, if the challenger should attack him unjustly. His conduct will thus be thoroughly innocent. For what harm is there in going to the field, walking about there, to meet another, and defending himself if attacked ? In this way he commits no offence, as he does not accept the challenge, but has an entirely different intention. The acceptance of a challenge consists in an express intention to fight, which is not at all his case.’ ”
“ You have not quite kept your word with me, my good Father. All this does not amount strictly to permitting a duel ; on the contrary, your author sees the practice to be so absolutely forbidden that, in order to bring it within the license, he avoids admitting that it is a duel at all.” “ Oh ! oh !” said the Father, “ you are beginning to understand matters ; I am delighted with you : I might say, however, that he therein allows all that duellists wish
[p. 103]for. But, as you like me to be exact in my answers, our Père Layman shall now give one for me, in which you will find he sanctions duelling in so many words; provided the intention be so adjusted, that the acceptance of a challenge shall be only for the preservation of honour or fortune. It is in Book 3, pa. 3, C. 111, N. 2 and 3. ‘ If a soldier in the army, or a gentleman of the court, be in danger of losing his honour or his prospects of advancement, by refusing a challenge, I do not see that he is to be condemned for accepting it.’ Petrus Hurtado says the same, as reported by the celebrated Escobar, in tr. 1, ex. 7, N. 96 and 98. ‘ We may engage in a single combat in defence of our property, if no other way be left to us; for every one has a right to defend his own, even by the death of his enemies.’”
I could not but remember with admiration on hearing these passages, how the piety of our Sovereign* had induced him to use his authority for the abolition of duelling in his dominions, while the piety of the Jesuists had suggested to them the most ingenious expedients for sanctioning and authorizing the practice. But the worthy Father had so kindled with the subject, that I could not bring myself to check him, and he thus continued.
“ Lastly, we come to Sanchez—you see what kind of authorities I have to cite—and he goes even beyond this; for not only does he allow the acceptance, but the giving even of a challenge, provided the intention be properly directed. And Escobar follows him in his opinion, in the part before quoted, N. 97.”
[p. 104]“ My Father,” said I, “ I give up, if it be indeed so ; but I can never believe that he has written such a thing as this ; I cannot find it.” “ Read it here yourself then,” he replied ; and, in truth, I did read the following in the Moral Theology of Sanchez, Liv. 2, C. 39, N. 7. ‘It is quite reasonable to affirm that a man may engage in a duel, to preserve his life, his honour, or his property (if the latter be considerable,) since he may be otherwise continually exposed to the unjust deprivation of them by vexatious suits and chicanery ; and he has no other way than this to preserve them.’ And Navarrus says most justly, that, for such a purpose, it is lawful both to accept and to give a challenge ; ‘ licet acceptare et offerre duellum.’ And further, he may kill his enemy secretly.* And even in such encounters, he is not bound to resort to the process of a duel, if he can succeed in killing his enemy by secret means, and thus terminating the affair ; for in this way he will avoid both exposing his own life in a conflict, and participating in the sin which his antagonist would commit by engaging him in a duel. “ Truly, my Father,” I said, “ this is somewhat of a pious fraud ; but although very pious, it is a fraud still, to allow you thus to kill your enemy by treachery.” “ Did I say,” he replied, “ any thing about treachery ? God forbid ! I said, you might kill him secretly, and you all at once conclude he may be killed treacherously : as if they were the same things. Hear what Escobar says about killing treacherously, tr. 6, ex. 4, N. 16, and then you will understand better ; ‘ To slay another treacherously is
[p. 105]when the person has no suspicion of your intention; therefore he is not to be said to slay his enemy by treachery, even if it be by striking him from behind, or when taken in ambush—‘licet per insideas, aut a tergo percutiat.’ And in the same Treatise, N. 56; ‘He that kills an adversary with whom he had been reconciled, under a promise not again to attempt his life, is not absolutely to be considered as killing treacherously, unless there had subsisted a very close friendship between them —‘arctior amicitia.’ You see,” he continued, “that you don’t understand even the very terms in question, and yet you affect to pronounce authoritatively upon the matter.”
“I confess,” I replied, “that this is all new to me; I gather from this definition that no one, probably, in the world, was ever destroyed treacherously; we never think of killing any but our enemies; and, according to Sanchez, we may freely slay—not to say treacherously, but by a blow from behind, or by ambuscade, a slanderer who molests or prosecutes us?” “Yes,” said the Father, “provided the intention be duly regulated; you always forget that most important point. Molina maintains the same thing, Vol. 4, tr. 3, disp. 12. So also says the learned Reginaldus, Book 21, C. 5, N. 57, ‘We may lawfully destroy false witnesses that are suborned against us.’ And again, according to our illustrious Fathers, Tannerus and Emanuel Sa, we may both destroy false witnesses and the judge also, if the latter conspires together with them. These are the words, tr. 3, disp. 4. 9. 8. N. 83, ‘Sotus and Lessius say, it is not lawful to kill a false witness and a judge who conspire together to
[p. 106]cause the death of an innocent person; but Emanuel Sa, and other writers, do well in disallowing this sentiment, at least as far as the conscience is concerned.’ And he decides, in the same part, that it is lawful to kill both witness and judge.”
“My respected Father,” I now said, “I think I understand tolerably well your principle of directing the intention; but I should further be glad to learn the consequences to which it leads, and the several cases in which this rule gives permission to take life. Let us, for fear of misapprehension, review all that you have enumerated; for in a case like this, ambiguity would be dangerous. We ought clearly only to kill for a good purpose, and on a probable ground of lawfulness. You assure me then, that if the motive be properly regulated we may, on the authority of your Fathers, in order to defend our honour and even our property, accept a challenge, and sometimes give one; we may secretly dispatch a false accuser, a perjured witness, and also the corrupt judge, who takes part with them; and you further say that a man receiving a blow may, without incurring the sin of avenging himself, seek reparation at the point of the sword. But you have not told me to what extent this latter may be done.” “There can be no doubt upon the question,” he replied; “to the extent of his death. This is proved completely by the learned Henreques, Book 14, C. 10, N. 3, and others of our Fathers cited by Escobar, tr. 1, ex. 7, N. 48, in these words; ‘We may kill any one who gives us a blow, although he flies from us, provided it be not done in hatred, or for vengeance; and also that we do not give occasion by it to murders in excessive numbers, and such
[p. 107]as would be injurious to the State. And the reason is, that we may in this way protect our honour, as we would pursue a garment stolen from us; for although our honour cannot be taken possession of by an adversary in the way our clothes may be stolen, we may nevertheless recover it in the same manner, by the display of our power and authority, and thus secure the good opinion of our fellow men. For is it not the fact, that he who receives a blow is considered to have forfeited his reputation, till he has succeeded in killing him who has inflicted it.’”
All this seemed to me so horrible, that I could scarce refrain myself; but, in order to learn the whole of the matter, I allowed him to continue his discourse as follows: “And even we may, in order to avert a blow, kill the person who is preparing to inflict it, if we cannot otherwise escape. This is declared by several of our Fathers; for example, Azos, Instit. Moc. part 3, Book 2, p. 105 (he again is one of the 24 Elders.) ‘May a man of honour kill one who is about to inflict upon him a blow, or strike him with a stick? Some say No; and they reason, that the life of our neighbour is more precious than our honour; besides, that there is cruelty in taking the life of a man only to escape a blow. But others say this is lawful; and I certainly consider the opinion ‘probable,’ if there be no other way of escape; for, without this, the honour of innocent persons would be constantly exposed to the malice of the insolent. So our celebrated Filiutius, Vol. 2, tr. 29, C. M. N. 50; and Pére Hereau, in 2. 2. in his Treatise on Homicide; Hurtado de Mendoza, disp. 179, Sec. 16 § 137; and Becan, Som. t. 1. 9. 64. de Homicid. and the Fathers Flahaut
[p. 108]and Lecount in their writings, which the University in her third petition circumstantially reported, for the purpose, (although unsuccessfully) of denouncing them; and Escobar, in the same place, No. 48—all these authorities are to the same effect. In fact it is so generally maintained, that Lessius decides the matter as one uncontroverted by any of the Casuists, Book 2, C. 4, N. 76; for he cites a large number in its favour, and none against it. And he even adduces Peter Navarre, N. 77, who, speaking generally of affronts (of which none are more acute than a blow,) declares that by the concurrence of all Casuists —‘ êx sententia omnium, licet contumeliosum occidere si aliter ea injuria arceri nequet.’ Do you wish for further proofs?”
I thanked my friend: but I had heard only too much already. However, to see how far this damnable doctrine might be carried, I said, “But my good Father, is it not allowed to deprive of life for less serious causes? Might not the intention be so regulated, for example, as that death might be inflicted for giving another the lie?” “Certainly,” he replied, “According to our Father Baldelli, l. 3, disp. 24, N. 24, reported by Escobar, in the same place, N. 49: ‘It is lawful to slay one that gives you the lie, if he cannot be reproved in any other way.’ And, in the same manner, life may be taken for defamation; for Lessius, whom among others, Père Hereau follows, word for word, says in the place before quoted, ‘If a man endeavours to ruin my reputation by calumnies uttered before trust-worthy persons, and I have no way to rid myself of his injuries but by taking his life, may I do so?’ ‘Yes,’ say our modern authorities; ‘and that even
[p. 109]if the offence imputed be founded in fact, provided it have been heretofore concealed, and it be one that could not have been brought to light by the ordinary course of justice. And this is the proof. If you seek to wound my honour by the infliction of a blow, I have the means of averting it by strength of arm; it follows then that a similar defence is lawful if you aim at injuring me by word of mouth. Furthermore, we may protect ourselves from insults; we may equally do so from defamation. Finally, honour is dearer to every one than life: now, we are allowed to kill another to defend life, therefore we may kill to defend our honour.’
“ These arguments are conclusive. They are not mere reasoning; they are demonstration. And the great Lessius actually affirms, in the same place, No. 78, that death may be inflicted even for an offensive gesture, or an expression of contempt. ‘ A man’s honour,’ he says, ‘ may be attacked and impaired in various ways, against which it is allowable to defend himself; such as a stroke of a cane, a blow, or contumelious words or gestures; sive per signia,’ &c.”
“ My worthy Father,” I now replied, “ this constitutes indeed a most ample protection for our wounded honour; but surely life is sorely endangered, if we are thus at liberty with ‘ safe consciences to inflict death upon another for a mere slanderous speech or an uncourteous gesture ! ’ ”
“ It is very true,” he replied; “ but as our Fathers are prudent persons, they have not failed to take the precaution of forbidding recourse to the doctrine in question on very slight occasions; for they are careful to subjoin:
[p. 110]‘ this ought rarely to be put in practice ’—‘ practicè vix probari potest.’ And this is indeed not without good reason; as thus ”——“ Who can doubt it?” I said; “ Does not the law of God forbid to take life ?” “ They do not go exactly upon that ground,” he rejoined: “ they consider it to be allowed by the rules of conscience, and by the dictates of absolute truth.” “ Then, why do they forbid it ?” “ Listen,” he said : “ it is because a community would be depopulated, almost to extinction, if all the slanderers were to be destroyed. You will find this set forth in Reginaldus, Book 21, n. 63, p. 260 : ‘ However the opinion, that we may take the life of another for defamation, be not without probability in theory, we must adopt the contrary view in practice; for we ought ever to avoid doing injury to the State in our manner of defending ourselves. Now it is plain that in killing others in this way, we should commit too great a number of murders.’ Lessius says the same, in the place before referred to : ‘ We must be careful that in carrying out this maxim, no injury be done to the State ; for in that case, it must not be permitted—tunc enim non est permittendus.’ ”
“ So then, my Father, this is an interdiction of policy, and not of religion ! How many do you suppose are likely to be kept in check by this caution, especially in the heat of blood ? They will probably think they do the State no wrong by purging it of a flagitious character.” “ For this very reason, Père Filiutius adds to this consideration another most important one, tr. 29, ch. 3, N. 51 . ‘ it is that we might expose ourselves to the arm of justice, by killing others for such causes.’ ” “ I told
[p. 111]you, my friend, that you would do nothing effectually, without getting the judges on your side.” “The judges,” said the Father, “being unable to penetrate men’s consciences, regard only the external acts; while we, on the contrary, look chiefly at the intention; on that account it is that our maxims occasionally differ somewhat from theirs.” “However that may be,” I replied, “it clearly results from yours, that provided we avoid detriment to the State, we may take the life of one that slanders us, with a safe conscience, supposing always it be with safety to our own persons.”
“But, my good Father, after all the care you have taken for the protection of our honour, have you done nothing for that of property? I know this is of minor importance; but that does not signify. I should think there might be found means to regulate the intention, so as to allow of taking life for its preservation also.” “Doubtless,” he replied, “all our Casuists agree in permitting it, and that, even if we are in no danger, ourselves, of personal violence, on the part of those attacking our property; as when they are in the act of flight! Azos, a member of our Society, proves this, pa. 3, Book 2, ch. 1. 9. 20.”
“But, my friend, what should be the value of the property thus endangered, to justify such an extremity?” “It must be, according to Reginaldus, Book 21. ch. 5. N. 66. and Tannerus in 2. 2. disp. 4. 9. 8. d. 4. N. 69. property of considerable value ‘in the estimate of an experienced person.’ And Layman and Filiutius say the same thing.” “That is nothing to the purpose, my Father; where are we to find this rarity, this experienced person,
[p. 112]who may make the estimate required? Why do they not fix exactly the amount in question?" "What!" said the Father, "do you think it so easy then to weigh the life of a man—a Christian—against money! Here it is, however, that you will find the value of our Casuists. See whether any of the ancient Fathers will tell you for what sum it may be lawful to kill a man. What do they say but simply, ' Non occides '—Thou shalt not kill?" "Then who, pray, has taken upon himself to determine the amount in question?" I exclaimed. "It is," he replied, "the incomparable Molina, the glory of our Society; who, with inimitable discretion, has estimated it at six or seven ducats; for which sum he affirms it is lawful to kill a robber, even if he be in the act of flight.' It is in his 4 vol. tr. 3. disp. 16. d. 6. And in the same place he further says, ' That he should not dare to pronounce a man guilty of sin who should destroy another for endeavouring to rob him of property, even to the value of a crown, or less—unius aurei, vel minoris adhuc volaris.' And this has led Escobar to lay down the following general rule, N. 44. ' According to Molina, a man may lawfully take the life of another for the value of a crown.'"
"Oh, my good Father!" I cried, "tell me, I beg, where Molina has learnt to decide a point of such importance as this, without the aid of Scripture, the Councils, or the Fathers? I see plainly now that there are authorities far more enlightened than St. Augustine (though very dissimilar to him), ' upon the question of homicide, as well as that of grace.' I am now, however, sufficiently instructed in this question, and I quite understand that it
[p. 113]is only ecclesiastics who would have any scruples to murder such as invaded their honour or their property.” “What do you mean?” cried the Father, “do you think it reasonable that those who most need to stand well with society should be alone exposed to insolence and injury? Our Fathers have provided against this anomaly; for Tannerus says, t. 11. d. 4. 9. 8. d. 4. N. 76. ‘Ecclesiastics, and even members of religious orders, are allowed to take life in defence, not only of their persons, but of their property, or that of the communities to which they belong. Molina cited by Escobar, N. 43; Becan in 2. 2. tr. 11. 9. 7. de Hom. Concl. 2. N. 5; Reginaldus, l. 21. c. v. n. 68; Layman, l. 3, tr. 3. p. 3. c. 3. N. 4; Lessius, liv. 2. c. 9. d. 11. N. 72; and others, all hold the same language.
“And according to the celebrated Père Launy, it is even lawful for priests and monks to take the life of such as may be endeavouring to injure their reputation, in order to prevent the completion of their design—always, however, with due regulation of the motive. This is his language, t. 5. disp. 36. N. 118, ‘An ecclesiastic, or a monk, may slay any one who threatens to accuse publicly his community, or even himself, of scandalous offences, provided there be no other means of preventing it; as when (for instance) the party would be forthwith proceeding to a general publication of his slanders, if not promptly destroyed; for, as it would be justifiable for such a one to kill a person who aimed at his life, it is equally lawful to take the life of one that threatens the honour of himself or his community; and that no less in the case of an ecclesiastic than a layman.’”
[p. 114]“ I certainly was not aware of this,” I said; “ and, in fact, I had ignorantly supposed the very reverse to be the case ; merely looking at the fact that the Church professes such abhorrence of blood, that she does not allow ecclesiastical judges to assist in criminal processes.” “ Do not fall into such mistake,” said the Father; “ Père Launy maintains conclusively this doctrine ; although with a humility becoming a great man, he submits it to the discretion of prudent readers. And our illustrious champion Caramuel, who cites it in his ‘ Fundamental Theology, p. 543, regards it as so certain, that he affirms, ‘ the contrary is not to be deemed probable.’ And he deduces from it a variety of admirable conclusions, such as the following, which he styles ‘ the conclusion of conclusions,’ ‘ conclusionum conclusio ;’ a ‘ priest not only is allowed, in certain cases, to slay a calumniator, but it is also sometimes his duty to do it,—etiam aliquando debet occidere.’
“ He investigates also various novel points upon this subject ; among others this, ‘ Is it lawful for a Jesuit to take the life of a Jansenist ?’” “ This is indeed,” I exclaimed, “ a surprising question in your theology. I see plainly enough that according to Père Launy’s doctrine, the poor Jansenists are dead men.” “ Not so fast,” he rejoined ; “ Caramuel decides the very reverse, and from the same principles.” “ How is that ?” “ Because,” he rejoined, “ they do no injury to our reputation. These are his words, N. 1146 and 47. p. 547. and 8 : ‘ The Jansenists call the Jesuits Pelagians ; might they lawfully be killed for this ? No ; because the Jansenists no more impair the reputation of our Society than a
[p. 115]mote obscures the sun; on the contrary, they have raised and increased it, although not intentionally on their part; —occidi non possunt, quia nocere non potuerint.’”
“ So then, my excellent Father, the lives of the Jansenists hang only upon the question whether they have it in their power to injure your reputation! Slender indeed is their tenure; for once render it ever so little probable that they may do you harm, and they are obnoxious to the summary proceeding in question without scruple.* You may frame your argument very logically; and nothing more is needed (after due regulation of the motive) to dispatch a man with an easy conscience. Oh happy those, who have learnt such a doctrine, and who do not choose to brook an affront: but most unhappy they who commit the offence! I must say, however, my Father, it is safer to have to do with people who have no religion, than with such as are indoctrinated after this fashion. For after all, the motive of a person inflicting a wound affords little alleviation to him who suffers from it. He knows nothing of the secret intention; and feels nothing but the pain to himself of the blow. And I don’t know if one should not suffer less from being brutally dispatched by an assassin, than to be conscientiously poignarded by a devotee.
“ Well, my good Father,” I added, “I must tell you the truth, and say I am somewhat surprised at all this; and these propositions of Père Launy and Caramuel do not altogether satisfy me.” “ Why not?” said the Father; “ are you a Jansenist?” “ I have other reasons,”
[p. 116]I replied. “I am in the habit of writing, from time to time, to a friend in the country, an account of the opinions of your Society. And although I do nothing more than simply and faithfully narrate their own words, I cannot be certain that I may not meet with some obtuse minds that would draw rather sinister conclusions from your principles.” “Never fear,” said the Father, “no harm will happen from it; I’ll guarantee you. What our Fathers have printed themselves, and with the approbation of their superiors, it cannot be wrong or dangerous to publish.”
What I write to you then is on the word of this good Father: but now my paper fails me, although not my materials. They are so copious and so striking, that it would take volumes to communicate them. I am, &c.
Notes
- *‘ Diriger l’intention.’ (Fr.)
- *Louis XIV.
- *‘ Et aussi, qu’on peut tuer en cachette son ennemi.’ (Fr.)
- *‘ Les voilà tuable sans difficulté.’ (Fr.)
Choose any passage to light it on the printed page.




















