Letter 2

You ask me: (1) What I understand by the word religion, and…

9 · I · 1894Printed pp. [ 128 ]–154

VII

RELIGION AND MORALITY*

You ask me: (1) What I understand by the word religion, and, (2) Is it possible to have a morality independent of religion, in the sense in which I understand that word?

I will do my best to answer these most important and excellently-put questions.

Three different meanings are commonly given to the word religion.

The first is, that religion is a special and true revelation given by God to man, and is a worship of God in accord with that revelation. This meaning is given to religion by people who believe in one or other of the existing religions, and who consequently consider that particular religion to be the only true one.

The second meaning is, that religion is a collection of certain superstitious beliefs, as well as a superstitious form of worship that accords with such beliefs. This is the meaning given to religion by unbelievers in general, or by such as do not accept the particular religion they are defining.

The third meaning is, that religion is a collection of propositions and laws devised by wise men, and needed to console the common people, to restrain their passions, and to make the masses manageable. This meaning is given to religion by those who are indifferent to religion as religion, but consider it a useful instrument for Governments.

[p. 129]

Religion according to the first definition is a sure and certain truth, which it is desirable and even necessary for human welfare to promulgate by all possible means.

According to the second definition, religion is a collection of superstitions, from which it is desirable and even necessary for human welfare that man should be emancipated by all possible means.

According to the third definition, religion is a certain useful appliance, not necessary for men of high culture, but indispensable for the consolation and control of the common people, and which must therefore be maintained.

The first is like the definition a man might give of music, who said that music is a particular tune—the one he knows best and is fondest of; and that it ought to be taught to as many people as possible.

The second is like a definition given by a man who does not understand, and consequently dislikes, music, and who says that music is the production of sounds with one's throat or mouth, or by applying one's hands to certain instruments; and that it is a useless and even harmful occupation from which people ought to be weaned as quickly as possible.

The third is like the definition of music by a man who says it is a thing useful for the purpose of teaching dancing, and also for marching; and that it should be maintained for those purposes.

The diversity and incompleteness of all these definitions arise from the fact that they fail to grasp the essential character of music, and only define some of its traits, from the definer's point of view. The same is true of the three definitions given of religion.

According to the first of them, religion is something in which the definer rightly believes.

According to the second, it is something in which, according to the definer's observation, other people mistakenly believe.

According to the third, it is something the definer thinks it useful to get other people to believe in.

[p. 130]

In all three cases the thing defined is not the real essence of religion, but something people believe in and consider to be religion.

The first definition substitutes for the conception of religion a faith held by the definer ; the second definition substitutes a faith held by other people : something they take to be religion—while the third definition substitutes people's faith in something supplied to them as religion.

But what is faith ? And why do people hold the faith they do hold ? What is faith, and how did it arise ?

Among the great mass of the cultured crowd of to-day it is considered a settled question that the essence of every religion consists in superstitious fear, aroused by the not-understood phenomena of Nature, and in the personification and deification of these natural forces, and the worship of them.

This opinion is credulously accepted, without criticism, by the cultured crowd of to-day ; and not only is it not refuted by the scientists, but among them it generally finds its strongest supporters. If voices are now and then heard (such as that of Max Müller and others) attributing to religion another origin and meaning, they pass almost unheard and unnoticed among the common and unanimous acknowledgment of religion in general as a manifestation of ignorance and superstition. Not long ago, at the commencement of the nineteenth century, the most advanced men—if (like the Encyclopædists of the later part of the eighteenth century) they rejected Catholicism, Protestantism, and Russo-Greek Orthodoxy—never denied that religion in general has been, and is, an indispensable condition of life for every man. Not to mention the Deists (such as Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, Diderot, and Rousseau), Voltaire erected a monument to God, and Robespierre instituted a fête of the Supreme Being. But in our time—thanks to the frivolous and superficial teaching of Auguste Comte (who, like most Frenchmen, really believed Christianity to be the same thing as Catholicism

[p. 131]

, and saw in Catholicism the complete realization of Christianity)—it has been decided and taken for granted by the cultured crowd (always eager and prompt to accept the lowest view) that religion is only one special, long-outlived phase in the development of humanity, and a hindrance to its further progress. It is taken for granted that humanity has passed through two stages, the religious and the metaphysical, and has now entered on a third and highest one—the scientific ; and that all religious manifestations among men are mere survivals of humanity's spiritual organ, which, like the fifth toe-nail of the horse, has long lost all meaning or importance.

It is taken for granted that the essence of religion lies in fear evoked by the unknown forces of Nature, in belief in imaginary beings, and in worship of them, as in ancient times Democritus supposed, and as the latest philosophers and historians of religion assert.

But, apart from the consideration that belief in invisible, supernatural beings, or in one such being, does not always proceed from fear of the unknown forces of nature—as we see in the case of hundreds of the most advanced and highly-educated men of former times (Socrates, Descartes, Newton) as well as of our own day, whose recognition of the existence of a supreme, supernatural being, certainly did not proceed from fear of the unknown forces of Nature—the assertion that religion arose from men's superstitious fear of the mysterious forces of Nature really affords no answer to the main question, 'What was it in men that gave them the conception of unseen, supernatural beings ?'

If men feared thunder and lightning, they feared them as thunder and lightning ; but why should they invent some invisible, supernatural being, Jupiter, who lives somewhere or other, and sometimes throws arrows at people ?

Men struck by the sight of death would fear death ; but why should they invent souls of the dead with whom they entered into imaginary intercourse ? From thunder men might hide. Fear of death might make

[p. 132]

them try to escape death. But if they invented an eternal and powerful being on whom they supposed themselves to depend, and if they invented live souls for dead people, they did this not simply from fear, but for some other reasons. And in those reasons, evidently, lay the essence of the thing we call religion.

Moreover, every man who has ever, even in childhood, experienced religious feeling, knows by personal experience that it was evoked in him, not by external, terrifying, material phenomena, but by an inner consciousness, which had nothing to do with fear of the unknown forces of Nature—a consciousness of his own insignificance, loneliness, and guilt. And therefore, both by external observation and by personal experience, man may know that religion is not the worship of gods, evoked by superstitious fear of the invisible forces of Nature, proper to men only at a certain period of their development; but is something quite independent either of fear or of their degree of education—a something that cannot be destroyed by any development of culture. For man's consciousness of his finiteness amid an infinite universe, and of his sinfulness (i.e., of his not having done all he might and should have done) has always existed and will exist as long as man remains man.

Indeed, everyone on emerging from the animal conditions of infancy and earliest childhood, when he lives guided only by the demands of his animal nature—everyone on awakening to rational consciousness, cannot but notice that all around him lives, renewing itself, undestroyed, and infallibly conforming to one, definite, eternal law: and that he alone, recognising himself as a being separate from the rest of the universe, is sentenced to die, to disappear into infinite space and endless time, and to suffer the tormenting consciousness of responsibility for his actions—i.e., the consciousness that, having acted badly, he could have done better. And understanding this, no reasonable man can help pausing to ask himself, 'What is the meaning of my momentary, uncertain, and unstable

[p. 133]

existence, amid this eternal, firmly defined and unending universe?’ Entering on truly human life, a man cannot evade that question.

That question faces every man, and, in one way or other, every man answers it. And in the reply to that question lies the essence of every religion. The essence of religion consists solely in the answer to the question, ‘Why do I live, and what is my relation to the infinite universe* around me?’

All the metaphysics of religion, all the doctrines about deities, and about the origin of the world, and all external worship—which are usually supposed to be religion—are but indications (differing according to geographical, ethnographical, and historical circumstances) of the existence of religion. There is no religion, from the most elevated to the coarsest, that has not at its root this establishing of man’s relation to the surrounding universe or to its first cause. There is no religious rite, however coarse, nor any cult, however refined, that has not this at its root. Every religious teaching is the expression which the founder of that religion has given, of the relation he considered himself as a man (and consequently all other people also) to occupy towards the universe and its origin and first cause.

The expressions of these relations are very numerous, corresponding to the different ethnographical and historical conditions of the founders of these religions, and the nations that adopted them. Moreover, all these expressions are variously interpreted and perverted by the followers of teachers who were usually hundreds, and sometimes thousands, of years ahead of the comprehension of the masses. And so these relations of man to the universe—i.e., to religion—appear to be very numerous, though, in reality, there are only three fundamental relations in which men stand towards the universe and its author. They are: (1) The primitive

[p. 134]

, personal relation ; (2) the pagan, social, or family-State relation ; (3) the Christian or divine relation.

Strictly speaking there are only two fundamental relations in which man can stand towards the world : the Personal, which sees the meaning of life in personal well-being, obtained separately, or in union with other individuals ; and the Christian, which sees the meaning of life to consist in service of him who sent man into the world. The second of the three divisions mentioned in the first classification—the social—is really only an extension of the first.

The first of these perceptions, the oldest—now found among people on the lowest plane of moral development—consists in man considering himself to be a self-motived being, living in the world to obtain the greatest possible personal happiness, regardless of the suffering such attainment may cause to others.

From this very primitive relation to the world (a relation in which every infant lives on first entering the world ; in which humanity lived during the first, pagan, period of its development ; and in which many of the morally-coarsest individuals and savage tribes still live) flowed the ancient pagan religions, as well as the lowest forms of the later religions : Buddhism,* Taoism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity, in their perverted forms. From this relation to the world comes also modern Spiritualism, which has, at its root, a desire for the preservation and well-being of one's personality. All the pagan cults : divinations ; the deification of beings who enjoy themselves like man ; Saints who intercede for man ; all sacrifices and prayers offered

[p. 135]

for man's earthly welfare, and for deliverance from calamities—come from this conception of life.

The second form of the pagan relation of man to the world, the social, which he adopts at the next stage of development—a relation natural chiefly to adults—consists in seeing the meaning of life, not in the welfare of one separate individual, but in the welfare of a group of individuals : a family, clan, nation, empire, or even of all humanity (as in the Positivist's attempt to found a religion).

In this relation of man to the world, the meaning of life is transferred from the individual to a family, clan, nation, or empire—to a certain association of individuals, whose welfare is considered to be the aim of existence. From this view come all religions of a certain type—the patriarchal and social : the Chinese and Japanese religions ; the religions of a 'chosen people'—the Jewish, the Roman State-religion, our Church and State religion (improperly called Christian, but degraded to this level by Augustine), and the proposed Positivist religion of Humanity.

All the ceremonies of ancestor-worship in China and Japan ; the worship of Emperors in Rome ; the multitudinous Jewish ceremonials aiming at the preservation of an agreement between the chosen people and God ; all family, social, and Church-Christian prayers for the welfare of the State, or for success in war—rest on that understanding of man's relation to the universe.

The third conception of this relation, the Christian—of which all old men are involuntarily conscious, and into which, in my opinion, humanity is now entering—consists in the meaning of life no longer appearing to lie in the attainment of personal aims, or the aims of any association of individuals, but solely in serving that Will which has produced man and the entire universe, not for man's aims but for its own.

From this relation to the world comes the highest religious teaching known to us, germs of which existed already among the Pythagoreans, Therapeutæ, Essenes, and among the Egyptians, Persians, the Brahmins,

[p. 136]

Buddhists, and Taoists, in their best representatives, but which received its complete and final expression only in Christianity, in its true and unperverted meaning. All the ritual of those ancient religions that proceeded from this understanding of life, and, in our time, all the external forms of worship among the Unitarians, Universalists, Quakers, Servian Nazarenes, Russian Doukhobórs, and all the so-called rationalistic sects: their sermons, hymns, conferences and books, are religious manifestations of this relation of man to the universe.

All possible religions of whatever kind can, by the nature of the case, be classed according to these three ways of regarding the universe.

Every man who has emerged from the animal state inevitably adopts the first, or the second, or the third, of these relations, and that is what constitutes each man's true religion, no matter to what faith he may nominally belong.

Every man necessarily conceives some relation between himself and the universe, for an intelligent being cannot live in the universe that surrounds him, without having some relation to it. And since man has as yet devised but three relations that we know of to the universe—it follows that every man inevitably holds one of these three, and, whether he wishes to or not, belongs to one of the three fundamental religions among which the human race is divided.

Therefore the assertion, very common among the cultured crowd of Christendom, that they have risen to such a height of development that they no longer need, or possess, any religion, only amounts to this—that repudiating the Christian religion, which is the only one natural to our time, they hold to the lower, social, family, State religion, or to the primitive pagan religion, without being aware of the fact. A man without a religion—i.e., without any relation to the universe—is as impossible as a man without a heart. He may not know he has a religion, just as a man may not know he has a heart, but he can no more exist without a religion than without a heart.

[p. 137]

Religion is the relation in which a man acknowledges himself to stand towards the infinite universe around him, or towards its source and first cause ; and a rational man must have some relation to them.

But you will, perhaps, say that to define man's relation to the universe is not the affair of religion, but of philosophy, or of science in general, if one includes philosophy as part of science. I do not think so. On the contrary, I think that the supposition that science in its widest sense, including philosophy as part of it, can define man's relation to the universe is quite erroneous, and is the chief cause of the confusion concerning religion, science, and morality, which prevails among the cultured classes of our society.

Science, including philosophy, cannot define man's relation to the infinite universe or its source, were it only for this reason—that before any philosophy or science could arise, that must already have existed without which no activity of thought, nor relation of any kind between man and the universe, is possible.

As a man cannot by any possible motion discover in which direction he ought to move, yet every movement is necessarily performed in some direction, so also is it impossible by mental effort at philosophy or science to discover the direction in which such efforts should be performed ; but all mental effort is necessarily performed in some direction that has been predetermined for it. And it is religion that always indicates this direction for all mental work. All known philosophers, from Plato to Schopenhauer, have always and inevitably followed a direction given them by religion. The philosophy of Plato and his followers was a pagan philosophy, which examined the means of obtaining the greatest possible well-being for separate individuals, and for an association of individuals in a State. The Church-Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages, proceeding from a similar pagan conception of life, investigated ways of obtaining salvation for the individual—that is, ways of obtaining the greatest personal welfare in a

[p. 138]

future life ; and only in its theocratic attempts did it treat of arrangements for the welfare of society.

Modern philosophy, both Hegel's and Comte's, has at its root the State-social religious conception of life. The pessimistic philosophy of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, wishing to free itself from Judæo-religious cosmology, involuntarily adopted the religious basis of Buddhism.

Philosophy has always been, and will always be, simply the investigation of the consequences that result from the relation religion establishes between man and the universe, for until that relation is settled there is nothing on which philosophy can work.

So also with positive science, in the restricted meaning of the word. Such science has always been, and will always be, merely the investigation and study of all such objects and phenomena, as in consequence of a certain relation religion has set up between man and the universe, appear to demand investigation.

Science always has been, and will be, not the study of ‘everything,’ as scientists now naïvely suppose (that is impossible, for there are an incalculable quantity of objects that might be studied), but only of such things as religion selects in due order and according to their degree of importance, from among the incalculable quantity of objects, phenomena, and conditions, awaiting examination. And, therefore, science is not one and indivisible, but there are as many sciences as there are religions. Each religion selects a range of objects for investigation, and therefore the science of each different time and people inevitably bears the character of the religion from whose point of view it sees its objects.

Thus pagan science, re-established at the Renaissance and now flourishing in our society under the title of Christian, always was, and continues to be, merely an investigation of all those conditions from which man may obtain the greatest welfare, and of all such phenomena as can be made to promote that end. Brahman and Buddhist philosophic science was always merely

[p. 139]

the investigation of those conditions under which man escapes from the sufferings that oppress him. Hebrew science (the Talmud) was always merely the study and explanation of the conditions which man had to observe in order to fulfil his contract with God, and to keep the chosen people at the height of their vocation. Church-Christian science has been, and is, an investigation of the conditions under which salvation can be obtained by man. True Christian science, such as is only now being born, is an investigation of the conditions enabling man to know the demands of the Supreme Will from whence he came, and how to apply those demands to life.

Neither philosophy nor science can establish man's relation to the universe, for that relation must be established before any philosophy or science can begin. They cannot do it for this further reason—that science, including philosophy as part of it, investigates phenomena intellectually — independently of the investigator's position or the feelings he experiences. But man's relation to the world is defined not by intellect alone, but also by feeling, and by the whole combination of his spiritual forces. However much you may assure a man, and explain to him, that all that truly exists is only idea—or that everything consists of atoms—or that the essence of life is substance, or will—or that heat, light, movement and electricity are different manifestations of one and the same energy—to a being that feels, suffers, rejoices, fears and hopes, it will all fail to explain his place in the universe.

That place, and consequently his relation to the universe, is shown to him by religion, which says to him : 'The world exists for you, therefore take from life all you can get from it,' or : 'You are a member of a chosen nation loved by God, therefore serve that nation, do all that God has demanded, and you together with your nation will receive the greatest welfare obtainable,' or : 'You are an instrument of the Supreme Will, which has sent you into the world to perform an appointed task ; learn that Will and fulfil

[p. 140]

it, and you will do for yourself the best it is possible for you to do.’

To understand the statements of philosophy and science, preparation and study are necessary, but for religious comprehension they are not necessary: it is given to everyone, even to the most limited and ignorant of men.

For a man to know his relation to the world around him or to its source, he needs neither philosophic nor scientific knowledge (an abundance of knowledge burdening the consciousness is rather a hindrance), but he needs, if but for a time, to renounce the cares of the world, to have a consciousness of his material insignificance, and to have sincerity—conditions most often met with (as is said in the Gospels) among children and among the plainest, unlearned folk. That is why we often see that the plainest, least-learned, and least-educated people quite clearly, consciously, and easily, assimilate the highest Christian understanding of life, while very learned and cultured men continue to stagnate in crude paganism. So, for instance, there are most refined and highly educated people who see the meaning of life in personal enjoyment or in avoidance of suffering, as did the very wise and highly educated Schopenhauer, or in the salvation of the soul by Sacraments and means of grace, as highly educated Bishops have done; while an almost illiterate Russian peasant sectarian sees the meaning of life, without any mental effort, as it was seen by the greatest sages of the world (Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Seneca)—in acknowledging one’s self an instrument of God’s will, a son of God.

But you will ask me: ‘What is the essence of this non-philosophic, non-scientific kind of knowledge? If it is neither philosophic nor scientific, what is it? How is it definable?’ To these questions I can only reply that, as religious knowledge is that on which all other knowledge rests, and as it precedes all other knowledge, we cannot define it, for we have no means enabling us to do so. In theological language this knowledge is called revelation, and, if one does not

[p. 141]

attach a mystic meaning to the word ‘revelation,’ that term is quite correct; for this knowledge is not obtained by study, nor by the efforts of one man or of many men, but only by one man or many men accepting that manifestation of infinite wisdom, which is gradually revealing itself to mankind.

Why, 10,000 years ago, were people unable to understand that the meaning of life is not limited to the welfare of one’s personality, and why did a time come when a higher understanding of life—the family, social, national, State understanding of life—was revealed to them? Why, within historic memory, was the Christian view of life disclosed to men? And why was it disclosed to this man or that people in particular; and why precisely, at such a time, in one and not in another form? To try to answer these questions by seeking for reasons in the historic conditions of the time, life, and character and special qualities of those who first made this view of life their own, and first expressed it, is like trying to answer the question, ‘Why does the rising sun light up some objects before reaching others?’ The sun of truth, rising higher and higher over the world, lights up more and more of it, and is reflected first by those objects which are first reached by its illuminating rays, and which are best fitted to reflect them. But the qualities which make some men more suited to receive the rising truth are not any special, active qualities of mind, but, on the contrary, are passive qualities of heart, rarely coinciding with great and inquisitive intellect: renunciation of the cares of the world, consciousness of one’s own material insignificance, and great sincerity, as we see exemplified by all the founders of religion, who were never remarkable either for philosophic or scientific erudition.

In my opinion the chief mistake, and the one which more than any other hinders the true progress of our Christian branch of humanity, lies in the fact that the scientists (who now occupy the seat of Moses)—guiding themselves by the pagan view of life re-established at the time of the Renaissance, and accepting as the

[p. 142]

essence of Christianity something that is really a rude perversion of it—have decided that Christianity is a condition humanity has outlived, and that the ancient, pagan, State-social view of life held by them (one that is really worn out) is the very highest understanding of life, and the one humanity should persistently cling to. Holding this view, they not only do not understand Christianity—that highest view of life humanity is approaching—but they do not even try to understand it.

The chief source of this misunderstanding lies in the fact that the scientists, parting company with Christianity and recognising that their science does not accord with it, have decided that the fault lies with Christianity and not with their science. That is to say, they are pleased to believe, not what is really the case, that their science is 1,800 years behind Christianity, which already influences a large part of contemporary society, but that Christianity has lagged 1,800 years behind science.

From this reversal of rôles come the astonishing fact, that no people have a more confused conception of the essence and true importance of religion, of morality, or of life, than scientists ; and the yet more astonishing fact that the science of to-day—while accomplishing really great success in investigating the phenomena of the material world—turns out to be of no use for the direction of human life, or even does actual harm.

And, therefore, I think that certainly it is neither philosophy nor science that determines man’s relation to the universe, but it is always religion.

So to your first question, ‘What do I understand by the word religion,’ I reply : Religion is a relation man sets up between himself and the endless and infinite universe, or, its source and first cause.

From this answer to the first question, the answer to the second follows naturally.

If religion is a relation man establishes towards the universe—a relation which determines the meaning of life—then morality is the indication and explanation of

[p. 143]

such human activity as naturally results from men holding this or that relation towards the universe. And as only two such fundamental relations are known to us, if we consider the pagan, social relation as an enlargement of the personal ; or three, if we count the social, pagan relation as a separate one—it follows that but three moral teachings exist : the primitive, savage, personal ; the pagan, family, State, or social ; and the Christian or divine teaching, of service to man or to God.

From the first of these relations of man to the universe flows the teaching of morality common to all pagan religions that have at their base the striving after welfare for the separate individual, and that therefore define all the conditions yielding most welfare to the individual, and indicate means to obtain such welfare. From this relation to the world flow the pagan teachings : the Epicurean in its lowest form ; the Mohammedan teaching of morality, which promises coarse, personal welfare in this and the next world ; the Church-Christian teaching of morality, aiming at salvation—that is, at the welfare of one's personality, especially in the other world ; and also the worldly utilitarian morality, aiming at the welfare of the individual only in this world.

From the same teaching, which places the aim of life in personal welfare, and, therefore, in freedom from personal suffering, flow the moral teaching of Buddhism in its crude form, and the worldly doctrine of the pessimist.

From the second, pagan relation of man to the universe, which sees the aim of life in securing welfare for a group of individuals, flow the moral teachings which demand that man should serve the group whose welfare is regarded as the aim of life. According to that teaching, personal welfare is only allowable to the extent to which it can be obtained for the whole group of people who form the religious basis of life. From that relation to the universe flow the well-known Roman and Greek moral teachings, in which personality

[p. 144]

always sacrifices itself for society, and also the Chinese morality. From this relation flows also the Jewish morality—the subordination of one's own welfare to that of the chosen people—and also the Church and State morality of our own times, which demands the sacrifice of the individual for the good of the State. From this relation to the universe flows also the morality of most women, who sacrifice their whole personality for the benefit of their family, and especially for their children.

All ancient history, and to some extent medieval and modern history, teems with descriptions of deeds of just this family, social, or State morality. And the majority of people to-day—though they think their morality is Christian because they profess Christianity—really hold this family, State, pagan morality, and hold it up as an ideal when educating the young generation.

From the third, the Christian, relation to the universe—which consists in man's considering himself to be an instrument of the Supreme Will, for the accomplishment of its ends—flow the moral teachings which correspond to that understanding of life, elucidating man's dependence on the Supreme Will, and defining its demands. From that relation of man to the universe flow all the highest moral teachings known to man: the Pythagorean, the Stoic, the Buddhist, the Brahminical, and the Taoist, in their highest manifestations, and the Christian teaching in its real meaning, demanding renunciation of one's personal will—and not only of one's own welfare, but even of that of one's family, society, and country—for the sake of fulfilling the will of him who sent us into life—a will revealed by our conscience. From the first, the second, or the third of these relations to the infinite universe or to its source, flows each man's real, unfeigned morality, no matter what he may profess or preach as morality, or in what light he may wish to appear.

So that a man who considers the reality of his relation to the universe to lie in obtaining the greatest

[p. 145]

welfare for himself—however much he may say he considers it moral to live for his family, for society, for the State, for humanity, or for the performance of God’s will—and however artfully he may pretend and may deceive men, will still always have as his real motive of action simply his individual welfare; so that, when a choice has to be made, he will not sacrifice his own personality for his family or State, nor to do the will of God, but will sacrifice them all for his own sake. Since he sees the meaning of life only in personal welfare, he cannot do otherwise until such time as he alters his relation to the universe.

And, similarly, one whose relation to life consists in the service of his own family (as is the case with most women), or of his clan or nation (as among members of the oppressed nationalities, and among men politically active in times of strife)—no matter how much he may declare himself to be a Christian—his morality will always be family or national, but not Christian, and when any inevitable conflict arises between family or social welfare on one side, and that of his personality, or the fulfilment of the will of God, on the other, he will inevitably choose the service of the group for whom, in his view of life, he exists: for only in such service does he see the meaning of his life. And in the same way a man who regards his relation to the world as consisting in fulfilling the will of Him who sent him hither—however much you may impress upon him that he should (in accord with the demands of his personality, or of his family, his nation, empire, or all humanity) commit acts contrary to the Supreme Will of which the operation of the reason and love wherewith he is endowed makes him aware—will always sacrifice all human ties rather than fail to comply with the Will that has sent him here: for only in such compliance does he discern a meaning for his life.

Morality cannot be independent of religion, for not only is it a consequence of religion—that is, a consequence of the relation in which a man feels that he stands towards the universe—but it is implied (impliquée

[p. 146]

, as the French say) in religion. Every religion is an answer to the question: ‘What is the meaning of my life?’ And the religious answer involves a certain moral demand, which may follow or may precede the explanation of the meaning of life. To the question, ‘What is the meaning of life?’ the reply may be: ‘The meaning of life lies in the welfare of the individual, therefore make use of all the advantages within your reach’; or, ‘The meaning of life lies in the welfare of a certain group of people, therefore serve that group with all your strength’; or, ‘The meaning of life lies in fulfilling the will of Him that sent you, therefore try with all your strength to know that will and to fulfil it.’ Or the same question may be answered in this way: ‘The meaning of your life lies in your personal enjoyment, for that is the object of man’s existence’; or, ‘The meaning of your life lies in serving the group of which you consider yourself a member, for that is your destiny’; or, ‘The meaning of your life lies in the service of God, for that is your destiny.’

Morality is included in the explanation of the meaning of life that religion gives, and can therefore in no way be separated from religion. This truth is particularly evident in the attempts of non-Christian philosophers to deduce a doctrine of the highest morality from their philosophy. Such philosophers see that Christian morality is indispensable, that we cannot live without it; they even see that it is an already existing fact, and they want to find some way to attach it to their non-Christian philosophy, and even to put things in such a way that Christian morality may seem to result from their pagan social philosophy. That is what they attempt, but their very efforts show, more clearly than anything else, that Christian morality is not merely independent of pagan philosophy, but that it stands in complete contradiction to that philosophy of individual welfare, or of liberation from individual suffering, or of social welfare.

The Christian ethics, which, in accord with our religious conception of life, we acknowledge, demand

[p. 147]

not only the sacrifice of one's personality for the group, but the renunciation alike of one's personality and of one's group for the service of God; but pagan philosophy only investigates means of obtaining the greatest welfare for the individual, or for the group of individuals, and therefore a contrast is inevitable. And there is only one way of hiding this contrast—viz., by piling up abstract conditional conceptions one on the top of another, and keeping to the misty domain of metaphysics.

That is what most of the post-Renaissance philosophers have done, and to this circumstance—the impossibility of making the demands of Christian morality (which have been admitted in advance) accord with a philosophy built on pagan foundations—must be attributed the terrible unreality, obscurity, unintelligibility, and estrangement from life, that characterizes modern philosophy. With the exception of Spinoza (whose philosophy, in spite of the fact that he did not consider himself a Christian, develops from truly Christian roots) and Kant (a man of genius, who admittedly treated his system of ethics as not dependent on his metaphysics), all the other philosophers, even the brilliant Schopenhauer, evidently devised artificial connections between their ethics and their metaphysics.

It is felt that Christian ethics are something that must be accepted in advance, standing quite firmly, not dependent on philosophy, and in no need of the fictitious props put to support them; and it is felt that Philosophy merely devises certain propositions in order that ethics may not contradict her, but may rather be bound to her and appear to flow from her. All such propositions, however, only appear to justify Christian ethics while they are considered in the abstract. As soon as they are applied to questions of practical life, the non-correspondence, and, more than that, the evident contradiction between the philosophic basis and what we consider morality, appears in full strength.

The unfortunate Nietzsche, who has latterly become so celebrated, rendered a valuable service by his

[p. 148]

exposure of this contradiction. He is incontrovertible when he says that all rules of morality, from the point of view of the current non-Christian philosophy, are mere lies and hypocrisy, and that it is much more profitable, pleasanter and more reasonable, for a man to devise his own Super-men (Uebermensch) and be one of them, than to be one of the mass which has to serve as the scaffold for these Super-men. No philosophical constructions founded on the pagan-religious view of life can prove to anyone that it is more profitable or wiser for him to live, not for a welfare he desires, comprehends, and sees to be possible for himself or for his family or his society, but for another's welfare—undesired, not understood, and unattainable by his puny human power. Philosophy founded on an understanding of life limited to the welfare of man, will never be able to prove to a rational man, who knows that he may die at any moment, that it is good for him, and that he ought, to forego his own desired, understood, and undoubted welfare—not even for any certain welfare to others (for he can never know what will result from his sacrifices), but—merely because it is right or good to do so : that it is a categorical imperative.

To prove this from the point of view of pagan philosophy is impossible. To prove that people are all equal—that it is better for a man to sacrifice his life in the service of others than to trample on the lives of others, making them serve him—one must redefine one's relation to the universe : one must prove that man's position is such that he has no option, since the meaning of his life lies only in the execution of the will of Him that sent him ; and the will of Him that sent him is, that he should give his life to the service of men. And such a change in man's relation to the universe comes only from religion.

Thus it is with the attempts to deduce Christian morality from, and to reconcile it with, the fundamental positions of pagan science. No sophistries or subtleties of thought can destroy this simple and clear position, that the law of evolution, which lies at the

[p. 149]

base of all the science of to-day, is founded on a general, eternal, and unalterable law—on the law of the struggle for existence, and the survival of the fittest ; and that, therefore, each man to attain his own and his group's welfare should try to be that 'fittest,' and to make his group such, in order that not he or his group should perish, but some other, less fit.

However much some naturalists, frightened by the logical consequences of this law and by their application to human life, may try to perplex the matter with words, and to exorcise this law—their efforts only make still more evident the irresistibility of that law, which rules the life of the whole organic world, and, therefore, that of man regarded as an animal.

Since I began writing this article, a Russian translation has appeared of an article by Mr. Huxley, composed of a speech on Evolution and Ethics* delivered by him to some English Society. In this article the learned Professor — like our well-known Professor Bekétof and many others who have written on the same subject, and with as little success as his predecessors—tries to prove that the struggle for existence does not infringe morality, and that side by side with the acknowledgement of the struggle for existence as a fundamental law of life, morality may not merely exist, but even progress. Mr. Huxley's article is full of all kinds of jokes, verses, and general views on ancient religion and philosophy, and is consequently so florid and complicated that it is only with great effort that one is able to reach its fundamental thought. That thought, however, is as follows : The law of evolution runs counter to the moral law ; this was known to the ancient Greeks and Hindus. The philosophy and religion of both those peoples brought them to the doctrine of self-renunciation. That doctrine, the author thinks, is not correct ; the correct one is this : A law exists, which the author calls the cosmic law, in

[p. 150]

accord with which all beings struggle against one another, and only the fittest survive. Man also is subject to this law; and thanks only to it has man become what he now is. But this law runs counter to morality. How, then, can it be reconciled with morality? That can be accomplished in this way: A law of social progress exists, which seeks to check the cosmic process, and to replace it by another, an ethical, process, the object of which is the survival, not of the fittest, but of the best in an ethical sense. Where this ethical process sprang from, Mr. Huxley does not explain, but in his 20th foot-note he says that the basis of this process is, on the one hand, that people, like animals, prefer to be in company, and therefore suppress in themselves qualities harmful to societies; and, on the other hand, that the members of a society forcibly suppress actions contrary to social welfare. It seems to Mr. Huxley that this process, obliging men to curb their passions for the sake of preserving the group of which they are members, and for fear of being punished if they disturbed the order of their group, supplies that ethical law the existence of which he wishes to demonstrate. It seems to Mr. Huxley, in the naïveté of his soul, that in English society, as it exists to-day—with its Irish problem, the poverty of its lowest classes, the insensate luxury of the rich, its trade in opium and spirits, its executions, its slaughter or extermination of tribes for the sake of trade and politics, its secret vice and its hypocrisy—the man who does not infringe the police regulations is a moral man, guided by the ethical law. He forgets that the qualities needful to maintain the society in which a man lives may be useful for that society—as the qualities of the members of a band of robbers may be useful to that band, and as in our own society we find a use for the qualities of executioners, gaolers, judges, soldiers, and hypocrite-priests, etc.—but that these qualities have nothing in common with morality.

Morality is something continually developing and growing, and, therefore, conformity to the existing

[p. 151]

rules of a certain society, and their preservation by means of the axe or the scaffold (to which Mr. Huxley alludes as to instruments of morality), will not only not be the maintenance, but will be the infringement of morality. And, on the contrary, every infringement of the existing order—such as were not only the infringements committed by Jesus and his disciples of the regulations of a Roman province, but the infringements of present-day regulations by one who should refuse to take part in legal proceedings, in military service, in the payment of taxes levied for warlike preparations—will not only not be an infringement of morality, but will be an inevitable condition of the manifestation of morality.

Every cannibal who perceives that he should not eat his fellow-men, and who acts accordingly, infringes the order of his society. And, therefore, though action infringing the order of any society may be immoral, every truly moral action which pushes forward the limits of morality will always be sure to be an infringement of the order of society. If, therefore, a law has appeared in society in accord with which people sacrifice their personal advantages for the preservation of the integrity of their group—that law is not the ethical law, but, on the contrary, will generally be a law contrary to all ethics—that same law of the struggle for existence, only in a hidden, latent form. It is the same struggle for existence, but carried over from the individual to a group of individuals. It is not the cessation of the fight, but only a backward swinging of the arm, to strike a harder blow.

If the law of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest is the eternal law of all life (and it cannot but be admitted to be so when we regard man as an animal)—then no tangled discussions about social progress and an ethical law supposed to flow from it, or to spring up from no one knows where, just when we happen to need it (like a deus ex machina), can disturb that law.

If social progress, as Mr. Huxley assures us, collects

[p. 152]

people into groups, then the struggle and the survival will continue among those families, clans, and nations, and the struggle will not only not be more moral, but it will be even more cruel and more immoral than that between individuals, as we see in actual life. Even if we admit the impossible, and suppose that in another thousand years all humanity will, by social progress alone, be united into one whole, and will form a single nation and a single State—even then (not to mention that the struggle abolished between nations and States will continue between man and the animal world, and will always remain a struggle—that is, will remain an activity quite excluding the possibility of the Christian morality we confess)—even then the struggle between individuals forming this union, and between the groups of families, clans and nationalities, will not be diminished, but will continue in a new form, as we see in all aggregations of individuals, families, races and States. The members of a family quarrel and fight with one another as well as with outsiders, and often to a greater degree and with more venom. It is just the same thing in the State; among people living in one State, a struggle continues just as with people outside the State, only it is carried on under other forms. In the one case the slaughter is done with arrows and knives, in the other it is done by hunger. And if both in the family and in the State the weak are saved, that is not done by the social union, but occurs because among the people united in families and in States, love and self-sacrifice exist. If, outside the family, of two children only the fittest survives, while in a good mother's family both remain alive, this does not result from union into families, but from the fact that the mother possesses love and self-sacrifice. And neither self-sacrifice nor love can result from a social process.

To assert that a social process produces morality is like asserting that the construction of stoves produces heat.

Heat comes from the sun, and stoves produce heat only when fuel (the result of the sun's work) is put into

[p. 153]

them. Just so morality comes from religion. Special forms of social life produce morality only when the results of religious influence—which is morality—are put into them.

Stoves may be heated and give warmth, or may not be heated and may remain cold; just as social forms may contain morality, and may then have a moral influence on society, or may not contain morality, and will then remain without influence on society.

Christian morality cannot be based on a pagan or social conception of life, and cannot be deduced either from philosophy or from non-Christian science; and not only can it not be deduced from them, but it cannot even be reconciled with them.

That is how the matter has always been understood by every serious and strictly consistent philosophy and science, which said, quite reasonably: ‘If our propositions do not tally with morality, so much the worse for morality,’ and continued their investigations.

Ethical treatises not founded on religion, and even secular catechisms, are written and taught, and people may suppose that humanity is guided by them; but that only seems to be the case, because people are really guided not by those treatises and catechisms, but by the religions which they have always possessed and still possess; whereas these treatises and catechisms only counterfeit what flows naturally from religion.

The dictates of secular morality not based on a religious teaching are just like the action of a man who, though ignorant of music, should take the conductor’s seat and begin to wave his arms before the experienced musicians who were performing. The music would continue for awhile by its own momentum, and because of what the musicians had learned from former conductors; but evidently the waving of a stick by a man ignorant of music would not merely be useless, but it would in course of time certainly confuse the musicians and disorganize the orchestra. A similar confusion begins to take place in people’s minds at the present time, in consequence of attempts made by

[p. 154]

leading men to teach people a morality not founded on that highest religion which begins to be assimilated, and has already been partly assimilated, by Christian humanity.

It is indeed desirable to have moral teaching unmixed with superstition, but the fact is that moral teaching is a result of a certain relation man holds towards the universe or towards God. If that relation is expressed in forms which seem to us superstitious, we should, to right the matter, try to express that relation more reasonably, clearly, and exactly, or even to destroy the former relation (now become inadequate) of man to the universe, and to substitute for it one that is higher clearer, and more reasonable; but we should in no case devise a so-called secular, non-religious morality founded on sophistry, or simply founded on nothing at all.

The attempts to found a morality apart from religion, are like what children do when, wishing to transplant a flower that pleases them—they pluck it from the roots that do not please, and seem to them superfluous, and stick it rootless into the ground. Without religious roots there can be no real, sincere morality, just as without roots there can be no real flower.

So in answer to your two questions, I say: ‘Religion is a certain relation established by man between his separate personality and the infinite universe or its Source. And morality is the ever-present guide to life which results from that relation.’

Notes

  1. *A reply to questions put to Tolstoy by a German Ethical Society.
  2. *‘Universe’ is used here and elsewhere in its primary significance, embracing the totality of existing things, spiritual or material.
  3. *Buddhism, though demanding from its followers the renunciation of worldly blessings, and even of life itself, is based on the same relation of a self-motived personality (predestined to personal well-being) to the surrounding universe ; but with this difference—that simple paganism considers man to have a right to happiness, while Buddhism considers that the world ought to disappear because it produces suffering to the personality. Buddhism is negative paganism.
  4. *Huxley's Romanes Lecture, delivered in 1894, and contained in Evolution and Ethics, issued by Macmillan and Co.

Choose any passage to light it on the printed page.

Scan leaf 140 of the 1903 edition (printed page [ 128 ]), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page [ 128 ] · scan leaf 140 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 141 of the 1903 edition (printed page 129), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 129 · scan leaf 141 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 142 of the 1903 edition (printed page 130), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 130 · scan leaf 142 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 143 of the 1903 edition (printed page 131), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 131 · scan leaf 143 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 144 of the 1903 edition (printed page 132), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 132 · scan leaf 144 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 145 of the 1903 edition (printed page 133), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 133 · scan leaf 145 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 146 of the 1903 edition (printed page 134), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 134 · scan leaf 146 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 147 of the 1903 edition (printed page 135), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 135 · scan leaf 147 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 148 of the 1903 edition (printed page 136), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 136 · scan leaf 148 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 149 of the 1903 edition (printed page 137), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 137 · scan leaf 149 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 150 of the 1903 edition (printed page 138), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 138 · scan leaf 150 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 151 of the 1903 edition (printed page 139), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 139 · scan leaf 151 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 152 of the 1903 edition (printed page 140), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 140 · scan leaf 152 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 153 of the 1903 edition (printed page 141), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 141 · scan leaf 153 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 154 of the 1903 edition (printed page 142), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 142 · scan leaf 154 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 155 of the 1903 edition (printed page 143), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 143 · scan leaf 155 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 156 of the 1903 edition (printed page 144), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 144 · scan leaf 156 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 157 of the 1903 edition (printed page 145), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 145 · scan leaf 157 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 158 of the 1903 edition (printed page 146), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 146 · scan leaf 158 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 159 of the 1903 edition (printed page 147), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 147 · scan leaf 159 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 160 of the 1903 edition (printed page 148), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 148 · scan leaf 160 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 161 of the 1903 edition (printed page 149), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 149 · scan leaf 161 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 162 of the 1903 edition (printed page 150), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 150 · scan leaf 162 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 163 of the 1903 edition (printed page 151), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 151 · scan leaf 163 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 164 of the 1903 edition (printed page 152), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 152 · scan leaf 164 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 165 of the 1903 edition (printed page 153), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 153 · scan leaf 165 of 388Open the full scan
Scan leaf 166 of the 1903 edition (printed page 154), showing letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY*.
Printed page 154 · scan leaf 166 of 388Open the full scan

About this letter

Letter VII. RELIGION AND MORALITY* of 13 · printed pp. [ 128 ]–154 · scan leaf 140 of 388

Where it sits in the book: black are letters, grey the editor’s narrative, pale the front matter, appendices and index.

Source
Essays and Letters, translated by Aylmer Maude (The World's Classics, XLVI), 1903, pp. [ 128 ]–154.
How it was read
Read by machine. Not yet proofread by people. Expect occasional slips in names, accents and foreign words. The book’s reading score is 100 out of 100. How this text was read
Take the whole book with you
EPUBMarkdownTEI
Cite this letter

CitationLetter, 9 January 1894, “Letter 2”. In Essays and Letters, translated by Aylmer Maude (The World's Classics, XLVI) (London: Grant Richards, Leicester Square, 1903), pp. [ 128 ]–154. Paper Lanterns edition, https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/tolstoy-essays-letters-1903/2/.

BibTeX@incollection{tolstoy-essays-letters-1903-letter-0002,
  author    = {},
  title     = {Letter 2, 9 January 1894},
  booktitle = {Essays and Letters},
  publisher = {London: Grant Richards, Leicester Square, 1903},
  year      = {1903},
  pages     = {[ 128 ]--154},
  note      = {Translated by Aylmer Maude (The World's Classics, XLVI). Paper Lanterns edition},
  url       = {https://paperlanterns.ink/collections/tolstoy-essays-letters-1903/2/}
}

Linkhttps://paperlanterns.ink/collections/tolstoy-essays-letters-1903/2/

The link is permanent and will always lead to this letter.